
THE ART
HOW TO KNOW
MEN.

THE ART How to know MEN.

Originally Written,

BY THE

Sieur *DE LA CHAMBRE*,

Counſellour to His Majeſty of *France*, and Phyſician in Ordinary.

Rendred into Engliſh

BY

JOHN DAVIES of *Kidwelly*.

LONDON,
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TO THE
RIGHT. HONOURABLE
CHARLES
EARL of *CARLISLE*,
Vicount HOVVARD of *Morpeth*, Baron *Dacre* of *Gilsland*, Lord Lieutenant of *Westmerland* and *Cumberland*, and one of His Majesties most honourable Privy-Council.

MY LORD,

IF *the Present your Lordship here receives be consider'd only according to its bulk, I must,*

no doubt, lie open to the reproach of offering ſo mean a Sacrifice, at the Shrine of ſo noble a Name. But if the excellency of the Subject treated of be put into the other Scale, with this allowance, that whatever is offer'd derives its merit from the ſincerity and devotion of the Offerer, I may more rationally hope the acceptance, than fear the rejection of it.

Your Lordſhip will find, in this ſmall Treatiſe, the Frontiſpiece, or firſt Draught, of the boldeſt deſign that, haply, was ever undertaken in the Empire of Learning, to wit, THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN; *an Art, com-*

comprehending what ever contributes to the discovery of their most secret Inclinations, the Motions of their Souls, their Vertues and their Vices; an Art, which, if well studied, will bring to those who shall attain it, answerably to their several qualifications, the greatest satisfaction and advantages imaginable.

For what greater can any one man frame to himself, than those, which accrue from his knowledge of another, even though they move in the meanest station of Affairs? But if those are so considerable, how much more must they be, which are made by persons en-

truſted with the management of Embaſſies, and the moſt important Tranſactions of Crowns and Scepters, and conſequently, oblig'd to treat with People of different Tempers and Climates? In theſe laſt it ſuffices not, to be guided by thoſe common obſervations and characters of men, which are obvious to the Populace, and commonly mask'd and diſguiz'd; but the grand ſecret is, to penetrate into the Cloſets, and inſinuate into the very boſoms, of Princes and Favourites.

And this conſideration it was, which the more inclin'd me, to make a particular dedication of this

this Labour of mine to your Lordſhips patronage. For whom could I expect more favourable to the ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, *than One, who had ſo lately ſatisfy'd the world, how well he had ſtudied it before? From whom could that Art look for a kinder reception, than from one who had ſhewn himſelf ſo much a Maſter of it, in carrying on a Negotiation, which led him, from the moſt, to the leaſt-civiliz'd extremities of Chriſtendom?*

Your Lordſhip might here expect I ſhould give ſome account of my Author, the Advancer of this ſo excellent and beneficial an Art;

but

but I refer what I have to say of him to another place, concluding here, after I have begg'd your Lordship's pardon for the rudeness of this Address, with an assurance, that it is made with the greatest respects and submissions, and, consequently, that I am,

Right Honourable,

Your Lordship's most humble,

and most obedient Servant,

J. Davies.

AN Accompt of the AUTHOR, *taken out of the Hiſtory of the* French Academy, *Printed at* London, *in the year* M. DC. LVII. *Pag.* 229.

THE Author of that Hiſtory, being to give an accompt of the firſt ſetling and advancement of the Academy, to that time, thought fit, towards the end of his Work, to ſet down a Catalogue of the Members of it, of which number our Author being one, I find this ſaid of him, being the ſixth nam'd in the Catalogue.

MARIN CUREAU DE LA CHAMBRE, Counſellor to the King in his Councils, and his Phyſician in Ordinary, born at Mans. *His Works in Print are,* New Conjectures about Digeſtion. New Conjectures concerning the Cauſes of Light; the Overflowing of the Nile; *and* the Love of Inclination. The Characters of the Paſſions, *in two Volumes.* A Treatiſe of the Underſtanding

ſtanding of Beaſts. New Obſervations and Conjectures about the Rainbow. *If he perfect what he hath begun, we ſhall have* a Continuation of the Characters of the Paſſions; A Treatiſe of Man's Beauty; *Another*, Of the Nature and Diſpoſitions of Nations, and *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN. He hath tranſlated into* French, *the* Eight Books of *ARISTOTLE*'s Phyſicks, *which are not Printed; and he gives us hopes, ere long, of* a Commentary on the Aphoriſms of *Hippocrates, which he calls* Uſus Aphoriſmorum; *his deſign is, after he hath ſet down* Hippocrates's *meaning in each Aphoriſm, to apply it to other Subjects, and ſhew all the Uſes which may be made of it.* Thus farr the Author of the Hiſtory. It is very probable, that, not only thoſe Pieces here mention'd of his, but alſo divers others are ſince Printed, in ſeveral Languages. Of which we ſhall forbear to give any further, ſince we cannot give an exact accompt.

TO

TO

The very Worthy *Tranſlator* of this Exquiſite Piece, *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.*

THere are various kinds of *KNOWLEDG* that belong to Man, The chiefeſt of all is, To know his *Creator*; The ſecond, to know *Himſelf*; The third, to know his *Fellow-Creatures*, eſpecially, for *Man to know Man.*

Touching the firſt, 'Tis ſo ſublime, and tranſcendent a Speculation, that, though the greateſt Theoriſts have ſcru'd up their Wits to the higheſt Pin, yet, the further they ſoar'd, the more they were at a loſs; For there is no Finite Intellect can frame a *Quidditative* apprehenſion of God; There may be *Negative* conceptions of Him, as to think he is Immenſe, Infinite, Immortal, *&c.* Or there may be Relative Expreſſions of Him, as when we call Him Creator, King, and Conſervator of all things, *&c.* Or, He may be

be deſcrib'd by an accumulation of Epithets, as Almighty, Mercifull, Juſt, and by the *Abſtracts* thereof, *&c.* But for a comprehenſive *Quiddity* of His Eſſence, it cannot fal under the capacity of any created power; In ſo much that the Dedication inſcrib'd upon the Greek Altar, τῷ Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, *To the Unknown God*, may, in a *ſane ſenſe*, carry with it a holy kind of Admiration and Modeſty, rather than Ignorance.

Concerning the ſecond, It was the Motto, which the greateſt Philoſopher fix'd upon the portal of his School, γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, *Know thy ſelf*; And one would think that every one is near enough to attain this knowledg, yet 'tis obſerv'd, that not one Phyſician among twenty, will venture to miniſter himſelf Phyſick, when he is dangerouſly ſick; And touching the *Mind*, every Man commonly looks upon himſelf through a Magnifying-glaſs, ſo that he cannot behold his true proportion.

Touching the laſt, *viz.* for knowing our *Fellow-Creatures*, we have been near upon ſix thouſand years in ſtudy of it, yet, if what *we know* all this while were caſt in to counterballance with what *we know not*, 'tis thought the ſcale of *Ignorance* would outweigh that of *Knowledg*.

But

But for *Man to know Man*, which is the Subject of this Treatiſe, it is an Art as full of incertitude as any; The lineaments of the Face, and lines of the Hands, are not ſtreight enough to lead us unto it, though *Vultus* be *Index Animi*, though the Eyes be as the Caſements of the Soul, yet, many times they prove falſe Glaſſes; though (as the *Turk* believes) every Man's Fate and Fancy be written in his Forehead, yet the letters are ſo obſcure, that we canot read them; and the Poet tells us,

Fronti nulla fides. ——

Indeed, the probableſt way to get this Art, is by Converſation, and Diſcourſe, according to the *Italian* Proverb, *A Roma ti viddi, a Venetia ti conobbi*, I ſaw thee *at* Rome, *I knew thee at* Venice; which made the Philoſopher ſay to a man who had a promiſing Face of Wiſdom, *I thought thee wiſe, till I heard thee ſpeak.*

This Sagacious and ſharp-ſighted *Author*, hath gone very farr in this Art, as appears in this Diſcourſe, and in other acute Notions that I have read of His, which ſhew him to be full of *penſees deſliees*: Moreover, I had the good hap, and occaſion to know Him, and converſe with Him in *Paris*; and truly I believe, He may well be ranked among

among the Philosophers of the *Upper House* which this Age affords; Therefore Sir, besides your great *Ingenuity*, you discover also much *Judgement* in the Election of your *Authors*, who are much oblig'd to you, for your exact fidelity in rendring them; And consequently, it may well be said, that *You* have attain'd the *Art* of knowing Men, by penetrating the true sence, and very Souls of those *Authors* you deal withall.

JAM. HOWEL.

THE

THE PREFACE.

Wherein is treated of the Excellency of the *ART HOW TO KNOW MEN*, and of the Author's Deſign.

IT was a groundleſs complaint of him, who wiſh'd Nature had plac'd a window before mens hearts, that their thoughts and ſecret deſigns might be ſeen. There was, I ſay, no reaſon for that complaint, not only, in regard thoſe are not things which fall under the Senſes, and that though the eyes ſaw the very bottom, and all the windings & turnings of the heart, yet could they not obſerve any thing therein, from whence they might derive the leaſt knowledge of it: but alſo, in

as much as Nature hath made other provi-ſion for this diſcovery, and found out more certain means to make it, then would have been that ſtrange openneſs, which Momus *imagin'd to himſelf.*

For ſhe hath not only beſtow'd on Man voice and tongue, to be the interpreters of his thoughts; But out of a certain diſtruſt ſhe conceiv'd, that he might abuſe them, ſhe hath contriv'd a language in his forehead and eyes, to give the others the Lye, in caſe they ſhould not prove faithful. In a word, ſhe hath expos'd his ſoul, to be obſerv'd on the out-ſide, ſo that there is no neceſſity of any window, to ſee his Motions, Inclinations, and Habits, ſince they are apparent in his face, and are there written in ſuch viſible and manifeſt characters.

From theſe characters, it is our deſign to frame the greateſt and moſt advantageous work, that haply was ever undertaken; a

work,

work, wherein the Nobleſt and moſt neceſſary diſcoveries of knowledg, which Man can arrive unto, are contained; in fine, a work, wherein may be found the ſecret and perfection of Wiſdom *and humane* Prudence.

Theſe great promiſes will be thought the more attainable, when it ſhall be known, that what we undertake is THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, an Art whereby every man is taught to know himſelf, *wherein conſiſts the higheſt point of* Wiſdom; *and withall to know* others, *which is the Maſter-piece of* Prudence.

The ſecret of Wiſdom conſiſts in this, that a man knows what he is himſelf, what he may do, and what he ought to do; and that of Prudence, in knowing alſo what others are, what they may do, and what they are deſirous to do. Can any knowledg be more delightful or more profitable then theſe?

And may not he, who hath acquir'd them, juſtly pretend to the acquiſition of the greateſt advantages of this life.

Now the Art of Knowing Man *teaches all theſe things: For though it ſeems to have no other end, then to diſcover the Inclinations, the Motions of the Soul, the Vertues & Vices, which are obſervable in others; yet does it, with the ſame labour, teach every one to find them out in himſelf, and to deduce more rational and more impartial judgments thereof, then if he firſt conſidered them in his own perſon.*

For it is moſt certain, that we cannot by our ſelves come to a perfect knowledge of our ſelves: and our Souls may, in that reſpect, be compar'd to our Faces, inaſmuch as the former, as well as the latter, can only view themſelvs in Mirrours. If ſhe attempts the beholding of herſelf, the trouble ſhe is at in that ſelf-reflection diſtracts and wearies

her,

her, and ſelf-love corrupts, and poyſons, all the judgments ſhe makes of her-ſelf.

For inſtance, a perſon transported with Anger cannot make any juſt judgment of his paſſion, which, how furious ſoever it may be, ſtill thinks that all the reaſon and juſtice is of its ſide. A covetous perſon thinks his moſt ſordid cares the effects of Prudence and Neceſſity. In a word, all our Inclinations and Habits pleaſe and humour us, all our Paſſions ſeem rational to us. Who therefore could be ſenſible of them, much leſs condemn them, having the recommendation of pleaſure, & being maintain'd by an appearance of Reaſon, which are the two greateſt corrupters of our ſentiments? To apprehend therefore their imperfections, it is requiſite we ſaw them in another, that being a glaſs which flatters not; and though thoſe we make uſe of do repreſent ſuch Images as are immediately blotted out of the memory,

the caſe is not the ſame with this, which makes conſtant and permanent draughts, the remembrance whereof is not eaſily loſt. In fine, it is a thing out of all diſpute, that there is no better way for a man to come to the knowledg of himſelf, then by ſtudying that knowledg in others.

Thus is it then, that the Art, we teach, is able to bring a man to the knowledg of himſelf. But inaſmuch as there are two kinds thereof, one Phyſical *and* Natural, *which examines the compoſition of Man, the nature of the Soul's faculties, and the admirable Oeconomy obſervable in their functions; the other,* Moral, *which relates to Morality, and makes a diſcovery of the Inclinations, Paſſions, and Vices: it muſt be acknowledg'd that it undertakes not to give an account of the former, to the utmoſt extent it is capable of, but leaves the abſolute and exact diſquiſition thereof, to Medicine and Philoſophy.*

But

But being oblig'd to make the ſtricteſt examination of things relating to Manners, *it is impoſſible, but that, enquiring into their cauſes, and the manner whereby they are framed in the Soul, there falls within its deſign the nobleſt and moſt intricate part of Phyſick or natural Philoſophy, and, treating of the conformation of parts, the temperaments Spirits, Humours, Inclinations, Paſſions, and Habits, It ſhould not diſcover what is moſt ſecret, in Body and Soul.*

Nay, I have this further to affirm, that by all theſe diſcoveries of Knowledg, it elevates the ſpirit of Man, to the Soveraign Creator of the Univerſe. For, acquainting it with the infinite miracles remarkable in Man, it inſenſibly inclines him to glorify the Author of ſo many wonders, and, by that means, directs him to the end, whereto he is deſign'd.

For ſhould he conſider only the ſtructure

of Man's body, how can he forbear being ravished with astonishment, to see the order and symmetry of all the springs and Resorts, *from which this admirable Machine derives its motion? And the unimitable Art which is concealed therein, would it not discover to him the hand that was employed about it, and the understanding and design of the great Master, whose work it is?*

But if he would raise his thoughts yet a little higher, and make a privy-search into the secrets of the Soul, to find out, there, the manner whereby she comes to the knowledge of things, how she moves, and how many several motions she assigns her-self; What excess of ravishment would not the knowledge of so many miraculous operations cause in him? What sentiments would he not have of the Goodness and Wisdom of God, who hath lodg'd so many vertues, in so small a space, and not only epitomiz'd all the crea-

tures

tures in Man, but would alſo make in him an abbreviation of himſelf?

For, not to enter into any diſcourſe of our ineffable Myſteries, & keep within the bounds of Nature, the Inclination he hath infus'd into him towards all ſorts of good things, the Light, wherewith he hath illuminated him, in order to the knowledge of all things, are they not the effuſions of his infinite Goodneſs and Wiſdom? But what is yet more aſtoniſhing, hath he not enclos'd within the ſpirit of Man, which hath its limits and boundaries, the whole extent and infinity of his Power? And by a miracle which is hardly conceivable, hath he not inveſted him with a power of creating all things as himſelf? For if the underſtanding produces, and, in a manner, creates the images and repreſentations of thoſe things which it knows, it muſt needs follow, ſince it hath the power to know them all, that it alſo, according to its manner

ner, creates them all, and conſequently that it is the Creator of a new world, or at leaſt the Copiſt, or after-drawer of all the works of God. It muſt be ſo, inaſmuch as when it thinks on the Sun, it cannot do ſo without making, at the ſame time, another Sun in it ſelf. By the ſame rule it makes alſo Starrs, Heaven, Elements, in a word, whatſoever is in the Univerſe.

But if God hath wrought one miracle by beſtowing an infinite power on a limited thing he hath alſo done another, in joyning greatneſs and power, with miſery and weakneſs. For it is certain, that of all the Creatures, there is not any ſubject to ſuch a multitude of miſeries and infirmities as Man: Nay, theſe are raiſ'd even out of his advantages, and if he had not that pregnancy of wit, and the delicate compoſure of body which he hath, he would not be ſo unfortunate and miſerable, as he is. So that it may be ſaid, by inſtancing him

him alone, we may decide that famous Probleme, which hath been ſo often propos'd, to wit, What thing is that in the world, which is, at the ſame time, both the greateſt and leaſt?

He therefore is only to contemplate himſelf who would enter into the knowledg he ought to have of the Divinity, and there he will find eternal ſubjects of the praiſes, and reſpects, and thanksgivings, which he is oblig'd to render upon all occaſions, and at all times.

Theſe are the high Leſſons which may be learn'd by the ART HOW TO KNOW MEN. But when it ſhall be advanc'd to thoſe, whereby it would diſcover the inclinations, manners and deſigns of others, there will be a neceſſity of making this general acknowledgment, that it is the ſureſt guide can be taken for a man's conduct in civil life, and that he who ſhall make uſe of it, will

avoid

avoid thouſands of dangers and inconveniences, into which, from time to time, he runs the hazard of falling. There need no reaſons to prove a thing ſo clear, ſince it is certain that if the ART is able to perform what it promiſes, there are few actions wherein it is not neceſſary; as for inſtance, the Education of children, the choice of Servants, Friends, Company, and moſt others, which cannot be well done without it. It ſhews the opportunities, and favourable conjunctures of time, wherein a man ought to act or ſpeak a thing, and teaches him the manner, how he ought to do it. And if it be requiſite to ſuggeſt an advice, to inſpire a paſſion, or deſign, it knows all the paſſages, through which they are to be derived into the Soul. In fine, if we may rely on the advice of the Wiſeman, who forbids our converſing with an angry or envious perſon, and going into the company of the wicked; What can reſcue us

from

from thoſe unhappy accidents, but the ART *we treat of? For the account commonly given of Man is deceitful, if a man go only according to the reputation they have; and dangerous, if their acquaintance be gotten by converſation: but that, which our* ART *promiſes, is only without fraud or hazard.*

Yet is it not to be imagin'd, as ſome at firſt ſight are apt to do, that this ART *is no other then* PHYSIOGNOMY, *and that its power reaches no further, then to make a diſcovery of the preſent inclinations, and thence draw ſome light conjectures, in relation to Vertues and Vices. For, beſides that it does all this, as well as the other, but with greater exactneſs, as ſhall be ſeen hereafter; it goes much further, ſince it promiſes to ſhew, what were, or will be, the inclinations and paſſions, paſt and to come, the ſtrength and weakneſs of mens minds, the diſpoſitions they have to certain Arts and*

Sciences,

Sciences, the Habits they have acquir'd: and what is moſt important, it teaches the way, to diſcover ſecret deſigns, private actions, and the unknown Authors of known actions. In a word, there is no diſſimulation ſo deep, into which it does not penetrate, and which, in all likelihood, it will not deprive of the beſt part of thoſe veils, under which it lurks.

Now, forasmuch as all theſe things may be reduc'd to four principal heads, to wit, the INCLINATIONS, *the* MOTIONS OF THE SOUL, VERTUES & VICES, *it is oblig'd, ere we paſs any further, to tell us in the firſt place, What* Inclination *is, what are the cauſes of it, and how it is framed in the Soul. 2. How the Soul is* Mov'd, *nay how and why it cauſes the heart and ſpirits to move in the paſſions: In fine, 3. Wherein* Vertue *and* Vice *conſiſt, and what is the number of the Species of both, whereof it may make its judgment.*

Beſides,

Beſides, ſince it ought to denote the Exceſſes *and* Defects *of all things, and ſhew thoſe that are, and are not, conſonant to the nature of Man in general, but alſo to the different ſexes, ages, nations, and kinds of life; it is neceſſary, above all things, that it give us a Modell, and Idæa of that perfection, which is conſonant to the nature of Man, that it may be the rule and meaſure of all the good and evil, which may happen to every one in particular. For it is certain, that the exceſs and defect cannot be known, without a prævious knowledg of the perfection, from which both decline and recede; and, to judge of the diſtance of the* Extremities, *a man ought to know the* Mean *to which they relate.*

Having made an examination of all theſe things, we are further to be ſhewn, what MEANS *it uſes, to perform what it promiſes; what* SIGNS *it ought to employ*

ploy therein, and what is their Nature, Strength, and Weakneſs. It is alſo to tell us, what Uſe it makes of the Rules of PHYSIOGNOMY, and whether CHIROMANCY and METOPOSCOPY are ſerviceable to its deſign, whereof we ought to have a general Draught or Platform.

Theſe are the Præliminaries, which ſerve for an Introduction to the whole Science, *and are contained in this Part, which ſhall be divided into* Two Books ; *the former whereof ſhall treat of the matters, which are the* Object *of the ARTHOW TO KNOW MEN, to wit, the* Inclinations, Motions of the Soul, Vertues *and* Vices : *The ſecond ſhall examin the* Means, *whereby it ought to diſcover all theſe things.*

THE

THE ART How to know MEN.

The First Book.

Chap. I.

An Idæa of the natural Perfection of Man.

EVERY thing is perfect to which there is nothing wanting, and which hath whatsoever is necessary for the accomplishment of its Nature. It is therefore requisite, that Man, who consists of Body and Soul, should, to be absolutely perfect, have whatever is necessary for the accomplishment and perfection of these

two parts. Now the natural Perfection of the Soul conſiſts in its having all the faculties and powers, which are neceſſary, in order to the performing of thoſe functions, whereto ſhe is deſign'd. The perfection of the Body conſiſts in the diſpoſitions, which thoſe faculties require therein, to ſerve for Organs to their functions.

But ſince ſome of the faculties are nobler then others, and that in the order of things, unequal, the more excellent are the rule of the others; it follows, that the Underſtanding, which is the nobleſt faculty in Man, ſhould be the rule and meaſure of all thoſe that are inferiour to it, and that theſe laſt ſhould be ſo diſpos'd, as that, as much as poſſibly, they may be conformable to that ſuperiour faculty, to the end they ſhould not obſtruct the actions it ought to do.

So that the Underſtanding, being of its own nature indifferent and indeterminate, in order to the judgment it is to make of all things, and conſequently, that it is all things, *in potentia*, that is, potentially, as not being determined to any one in particular, it is requiſite, that the faculties ſubordinate to it, ſhould, as much as may be, comply with that indifference. Which indifference ſince they cannot have in the ſame degree of perfection as the Underſtanding, in regard they are material, and conſequently determinate, they ought nevertheleſs to have it ſo far, as they are capable thereof. Now all the indifference they are capable of is reduc'd to that which conſiſts in a mediocrity, for the mean is leſs determinate then the extremities, as being indifferent, in reſpect to both. Thoſe faculties therefore which conſiſt of the mean or mediocrity, are more conformable to the Underſtanding then thoſe, in the exceſs, or defect.

But

But foraſmuch as the Inſtruments ought to be proportioned to the powers, by which they are employ'd, it follows that the Conformation of the parts and the Temperament, which are the inſtruments of the Soul's faculties, ſhould have the ſame mediocrity as they have. So that the parts ought to be neither too big nor too little, nor the qualities, whereof the Temperament conſiſts, be predominant one over another, but all ought to be in a juſt *æquilibrium* and mediocrity.

Article I.

That only Man hath the Senſe of Touching in perfection.

AND that this is according to the deſign of Nature, may be deduc'd hence, that ſhe hath beſtow'd this perfect Temperament only on Man; for there is alwaies ſome exceſs in that of other Creatures, one being too hot, or too cold, another too dry, or too moiſt. But in man all theſe qualities are united in a juſt moderation; and therefore the Senſes, which follow this Temperament, as the Touching, and Taſting, which is a kind of Touching, as *Ariſtotle* affirmes, are more perfect in him, then in any other Animal. For theſe Senſes, and eſpecially the Touching, require an exact Temperature in their Organs; it being requiſite, that what ought to judg ſhould be in the mean, that it may judg without any pre-occupation. Now as there are two ſorts of means, one, conſiſting in the abſolute privation of the Objects, and the other, in their equal participation,

only the Touch judges by this latter. For all the others are deſtitute or depriv'd of the qualities whereof they judg; as the Ey, which judges of colours, ought to be without any colour. But in regard the Touching judges of the firſt qualities, whereof its Organ cannot be depriv'd, it is requiſite, for its more perfect knowledg thereof, that it ſhould have them united in a juſt mediocrity, that it may judg of their extremities, which it hath not, and of their moderation, by not aſſigning any exceſs therein.

But howere it be, Nature hath no other motive in enduing man with this perfect Temperature, then to make conformable to the nobleſt faculty of the Soul, the general inſtrument of its functions, and to place it in the mean, that it might be leſs determinate, and that it, as well as the faculty, ſhould have all the indifference, whereof it is capable, whichwas not neceſſary for other Animals, all whoſe faculties are determinated.

Art. 2.

All in Man ſhould be in a mediocrity.

FRom this truth, thus eſtabliſh'd, there may be drawn a conſequence, which confirms what we have ſaid, concerning the mediocrity, which ought to be in the powers of the Soul, not only in thoſe which are ſubalternate, but alſo in the ſuperiour, ſuch as are, the Underſtanding and the Will. For ſince the Temperament moderates all the faculties, rendring them more or leſs ſtrong, according to the degrees it hath, and that if it be hot, for inſtance,

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it ſtrengthens the Imagination, and weakens the Judgment; and that, on the contrary, if it be cold, it aſſiſts the Judgment, and injures the Imagination, and ſo of the reſt: It follows, that, if there be an equality requir'd, to render the man perfect, it is alſo requiſite, that all the faculties of the Soul ſhould participate of that equality, and that they ſhould obſerve the ſame moderation, which is in the Temperament.

So that the natural perfection of man, requires not an exceſſive vivacity of Imagination, nor an over-circumſpect Judgment, nor a too happy memory: Nay, it cannot bear with theſe ſublime Spirits, which are alwaies fixt on the contemplation of things high and difficult, not only upon this account, that, having deſign'd man for ſociety, it expects, he ſhould equally apply himſelf to Contemplation and Action; but principally, in regard that it is impoſſible, the body ſhould have its natural perfection, when it hath the diſpoſitions requiſite to ſublimity of Spirit. For the Body muſt needs be weak, when the Spirit is too ſtrong, as the over-great ſtrength of Body leſſens and weakens the Spirits, as we ſhall ſhew more at large hereafter.

The caſe is the ſame with all the other faculties; for if the Appetite be too apt to move, if the Senſes too ſubtile, if the Concoctive virtue, the evacuative, or retentive, be too ſtrong, they are ſo many defects and irregularities: they ſhould all be proportionate to the equality of the Temperament, which does not admit of theſe vicious perfections.

Art. 3.

That all the Faculties ought to be in a Mean.

AND that this is true, even in thoſe faculties, which are ſpiritual, may be deduced hence, That the action and the power ought to be conformable one to the other, in as much as the action is only a progreſs, and effuſion of the active power. If therefore actions cannot be perfect but ſo far as they are moderate, it is neceſſary, that the faculties ſhould derive their perfection from their moderation. But it is a receiv'd maxim in morality, That actions, to be virtuous, ought to be in a mediocrity, and conſequently, the faculties, from which they proceed, ſhould alſo be in the ſame mediocrity. Now the firſt ſpring of this mediocrity is the Indifference, which is natural to the rational Soul: for ſince the Action is conformable to the power, the actions ſhould be as indifferent as the other is, and though it be determined by the action it does, yet does it nevertheleſs preſerve its indifference, by the mediocrity, which the action receives from it. The reaſon is, that what is in the mean is indifferent, in reſpect of the extremities, and that what is in the extremity is leſs indifferent, and more determinated, then what is in the mean, as we have ſhewn already.

And thence proceeds the neceſſity there is, of moderating the paſſions. For though, in other animals, they are the more perfect, the greater and ſtronger they are, and that the more fearful a Hare is, and the more cruel a Tigre, the more perfect is each of them

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in its kind: yet is not ſo in thoſe of man, in as much as they ought to be in a mean, between exceſs and defect, that they may be the more conformable to the indifference of the ſuperiour part.

Art. 4.

That all natural Inclinations are defects.

I Conceive it will be no hard matter to apprehend, and ſubſcribe unto all theſe truths, becauſe they are maintain'd by reaſon and experience. But there is yet another may be deduc'd from the ſame principles, which I queſtion not will be thought very ſtrange, though it be no leſs certain. It is this, That, though there be ſome Inclinations which are good in themſelves, and deſerve commendation, ſuch as thoſe men have for the virtues; yet are they defects, and alter the natural perfection which is conformable to humane nature. And certainly, this will occur upon common obſervation and experience, that thoſe who have from their birth, ſome excellent virtues, have had them attended by greater vices, for a man muſt needs fall into defects and imperfections, ſo far as he is at a diſtance from perfection. Now the perfection of man is, to be indifferent, and, not determinated to any particular virtue, he ſhould be capable of all. For the Virtues that come along with the birth are not real virtues, they are only the initiatios of them, or rather, they are but inclinations which a man hath for them. In a word, they are bounds and limits, confining the capacity of the Soul, which is univerſal, to a particular habit. The Soul, of its own

nature, is not determinated, and ought to be capable of all humane actions; And, as it may know all things, ſo is it requiſite, that the Appetite, which follows her knowledg, ſhould have alſo the freedom to incline it ſelf to all things. And this univerſal capacity is at the ſame time an effect of the ſpirituality of her nature, and the cauſe of the liberty ſhe hath: For if ſhe were material, ſhe would be determinated, and if ſhe were not indifferent, ſhe ſhould not be free.

The Inclinations therefore, which man may have, though they might be for the moſt excellent virtues, are imperfections; he ought not to have any for any one in particular, but for all together. And this is that, which the Angel of the Scholes hath ſo judiciouſly deliver'd, when he affirm'd, That there is no Animal, but hath ſome inclination, to a Paſſion conformable to his nature; but that man only is the mean of all, and that it is requiſite, he ſhould be equally ſuſceptible thereof, in as much as he is, of his own nature, indifferent and indeterminate.

To conclude, ſince the Temperament and the Conformation of the parts are the two principal cauſes of natural Inclinations, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter, and that they make the Soul incline to thoſe actions which are conformable to them, it is not to be doubted, but that the mediocrity, and the mean, which they ought to be guided by in man, does alſo inveſt the Soul with an equal bent towards both the extremities.

Art. 5.

Art. 5.

That every ſpecies hath its proper Temperament.

But it is to be obſerved, that in the diſtribution of the Temperament, made by Nature to Animals, ſhe hath in the firſt place conſidered their ſpecies, and hath appointed every one, that which was moſt convenient for it. For example; ſhe hath aſſign'd a hot and dry Temperament for the ſpecies of the Lion; a hot and moiſt, for that of a Horſe; a cold and dry for that of an Aſſe, and ſo all the reſt. But, as ſhe hath been careful of the conſervation of theſe ſpecies, and, to that end, hath beſtow'd on them the two Sexes, which were to receive different qualities, ſhe hath been oblig'd to divide this firſt Temperament, and to give one part of it to the male, and the other to the female. For though, in the ſpecies of the Lyon, the male and female are hot and dry, yet is it certain that the female is ſuch, in a lower degree then the male, and the ſame thing is to be ſaid of all the reſt.

It is therefore to be granted, that the juſt and equal Temperament, we have ſpoken of before, is that which is moſt convenient to humane Nature. But in as much as it was alſo requiſite, that the man and Woman ſhould have different qualities, that juſt Temperament was divided between them, and without ſtraying too much from that perfect Temperature, the man hath receiv'd a little more heat and drought, and the Woman a little more cold and moiſture.

And this is the true interpretation that we muſt give

give to the Fable of *Androgyne*, when *Plato* ſaies, that Man and Woman at the beginning made up but one body, which was of a round figure; that they were afterwards divided into two, and that the Love they have one for the other, is onely the deſire they have to be re-united, and a means of their perpetuation. For, this firſt union of Man and Woman, is nothing elſe but humane nature comprehending both Sexes, and having, for its body, that juſt temperament, which may be compar'd to a round figure, whereof all the parts are equal and uniform. But in the diſtinction, which was made of this nature, into two Sexes, that Temperament was divided into two parts, and thence were fram'd two bodies, unlike one to the other, in reſpect of the different qualities, which they receiv'd in order to the conſervation of the ſpecies.

Art. 6.

Why Sexes were beſtow'd on Animals, and why the Male is hot and dry, and the Female cold and moiſt.

THe beſtowing of Sexes on Animals, was onely in order to Generation, and where there is no generation to be made, there are no Sexes, as in Angels. But in regard this action, as all others whatſoever, ſtands in need of two principal cauſes, to wit, the *Efficient* & the *Material*, there was a neceſſity, that every ſpecies of Animals ſhould be divided into two Sexes, to execute the function of theſe two cauſes. And that is alſo the reaſon there are but two Sexes, for as much as theſe two cauſes are ſufficient for any action whatſoever.

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But whereas there is not any vertue or power, which ſtands not in need of certain diſpoſitions, to execute the function, whereto it is deſign'd, and that among the corporeal diſpoſitions, the firſt qualities are moſt efficacious and moſt neceſſary; it muſt follow, that heat and drought, as being the moſt active, ſhould be beſtow'd on the Sex which executes the function of the *Efficient* cauſe, and that cold and moiſture, as being the moſt paſſive, ſhould be moſt obſervable in that Sex, which repreſents the *Material* cauſe. And this is the original reaſon, why Man is hot and dry, and Woman cold and moiſt, for that Man hath the vertues and qualities of the *Efficient* cauſe, and the Woman thoſe of the Paſſive cauſe.

For, though there be ſome diſpute among the *Philoſophers*, concerning the function of the Female in the buſineſs of generation, and that it is maintain'd by ſome, that ſhe is concurrent to the production of the Animal, as well as the male; yet not thinking it neceſſary to produce the reaſons and experiences which deſtroy that opinion, this at leaſt is certain, that if the ſaid aſſertion ſhould be granted, it muſt be acknowledg'd, that the active vertue, which the Female may have, is much weaker in it, and that the Paſſive cauſe is the more predominant. Which is enough to prove, that the paſſive qualities are alſo the more prevalent in the ſame work.

And certainly, to make this truth the more clear, we need onely conſider the natural conſtitution of the Woman. For her weakneſs, as to body; a ſmaller conformation of the parts; the fearfulneſs, which is natural to her; the delicacy & ſoftneſs of the skin and fleſh, and the many humours wherewith ſhe abounds, are infallible demonſtrations of the cold and moiſt temperament ſhe is of.

Art.

Art. 7.

Whercin the Beauty of Sexes consists. That there are two sorts of general effects, ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

IT being therefore granted, that the Temperament of Man is hot and dry, and that of the Woman cold and moist, we are now to consider, what dispositions these Temperaments raise in the Soul, and what constitution the whole body receivs from them. For, the Perfection and Beauty of each Sex consists on these two things, for as much as the intellectual Beauty which ought to be in them, is nothing else than a combination or concurrence of all the faculties which are necessary to them, for the execution of those functions, whereto they are design'd; and that the corporeal Beauty is also nothing else, than a concourse and compliance of all the dispositions which these faculties require in the parts, to become organs subservient to their functions. For that part is beautifull, which hath the largeness, figure, and all the other dispositions, necessary for the performance of the action it ought to do: and if all these are not in it, or that it have any dispositions which are not requisite, it must needs appear ugly and deformed.

Howere it be, we are here to observe one thing, which is very considerable in this matter, and in all the effects of Nature, which is, that there are two kinds of these effects, some wrought for a certain end, which Nature proposes to her self; others wrought out of pure necessity, so as that Nature had not any design in

in the working of them. That a man ſhould have hair on the chin, the eye-lids, and eye-brows, is for ſome particular end, which Nature propoſes to her ſelf, wherein ſhe never fails of her purpoſe, ſhe diſpoſing the matter of the hair, and directing it her ſelf into thoſe parts. But, that he ſhould have any on his breaſt, is not an effect proceeding from the deſign of Nature, for if it were, all men would have ſome there, and therefore, abundance of matter is onely the cauſe thereof, it being the property of that, to make its way where ever it can.

This is alſo moſt evidently apparent in the Paſſions; for that a man tranſported with anger, ſhould keep a ſtirr; that he ſhould threaten, that he ſhould ſtrike; all theſe are actions whereby he pretends to revenge himſelf, which is the end of that Paſion. But that his countenance ſhould be enflam'd; that his forehead ſhould be wrinckled; that his words ſhould fall from him with certain interruptions; theſe are effects wrought by neceſsity, ſo as that the Soul had no deſign in the production of them, in regard they do not contribute to the revenge, whereto ſhe is inclin'd.

Art. 8.

That there are ſome Faculties and Inclinations, which it is Nature's deſign to beſtow on the Sexes, others not.

UPon theſe grounds, we may affirm, that there are ſome Faculties and Inclinations, which Nature hath, out of a formal deſign, beſtow'd on the ſeveral Sexes: ſuch as are the faculties of the Soul conſider-

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ed in themſelves, and in their origin, excluding all modification by the Temperament, as the rational, the ſenſitive, the vegetative Faculties, and conſequently the Inclinations, which accompany them; for every Animal power leaves in the Appetite, an inclination to perform its proper actions. But as to the powers and inclinations which proceed from the Temperament, as the ſtrength or weakneſs of thoſe firſt faculties, the Inclination to confidence or fearfulneſs, to liberality or avarice, *&c.* Nature hath not any deſign to beſtow them on either Sex, in as much as the natural perfection of the humane ſpecies do's not admit of any in particular, as oblig'd to be equally capable of all, by reaſon of its being indeterminate and indifferent, as we have ſhewn before. It is therefore out of pure neceſsity that they are raiſed in the Soul, and by the connexion and unavoidable conſequence there is between the effects and their cauſes.

True it is indeed, that Nature hath propos'd to her ſelf to beſtow on Man, beſides the Faculties convenient for his ſpecies, thoſe alſo which are proper to his Sex, to wit, the active vertue in order to generation, and heat and drought to ſerve as inſtruments to that vertue, as ſhe hath beſtow'd on the Woman the paſsive power, and cold and moiſture, to perform the function of the material cauſe. But all the Inclinations conſequent to thoſe qualities, as confidence or fearfulneſs, liberality or avarice, *&c.* are onely diſpoſitions fram'd in the Soul, without her knowedge, and beſide, or againſt her intention. It muſt be confeſs'd they are natural, becauſe they are by accident in the order of Nature, and follow the cauſes which depend on the matter. Nay, they are allow'd to be perfections, and if they ſhould be wanting, there would be a de-

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fect, in as much as the cauſes, from which they proceed, neceſſarily require that conſequence and concatenation which is between them. For, a Man who ſhould not be couragious, or a Woman who ſhould not be timorous, would be guilty of the ſame imperfection, as a Lion that ſhould be fearfull, and a Hare that ſhould be couragious.

Art. 9.

That there are ſome parts fram'd by Nature out of deſign, others not.

THE ſame thing may be ſaid of the Conformation of the parts; for Nature hath, in her Idæas, that figure which is moſt convenient to every ſpecies, and which ſhe would beſtow on every individual, were ſhe not prevented by the particular cauſes, ſuch as is the Temperament. And though ſhe gives each Sex a different ſtructure of body, yet does ſhe, as much as lies in her power, always preſerve the character of the figure, which is proper to the ſpecies. For, though the Conformation of the Woman's parts be different from that of the Man's, yet is there a greater reſemblance between her and Man, than any other Animal whatſoever.

Now, it is certain, there are ſome parts which are proper to each Sex, and ſuch as Nature hath a deſign to frame after ſuch and ſuch a faſhion; as thoſe that ſerve for organs to perform the functions, whereto each of them is ordered: But for the reſt, as height of ſtature, largeneſs of head, a ſquare figure of the face, *&c.* which are to be obſerv'd in Man, or lowneſs of ſtature,

ſtature, littleneſs of head, and roundneſs of face, &c. which are proper to the Woman, all this variety, I ſay, proceeds not from the deſign of Nature, but pure neceſſity, conſequently to the Temperament, which is proper to either, though it contributes to the perfection and beauty of the body, for the reaſons we have given already.

SECT. 2.

Wherein the Perfection of the Male conſiſts.

Art. 1.

Of the Inclinations proper to Man.

THis preſuppos'd, we now come to obſerve the Inclinations, conſequent to the Temperament of Man. Nature hath made him *hot* and *dry*, for the end we have already aſſign'd, But according to the proportion of his being *hot*, he muſt neceſſarily be *ſtrong*, and conſequently thereto, that he ſhould be naturally *Couragious*, deſirous of *Fame*, *Magnanimous*, *Sincere*, *Liberal*, *Merciſull*, *Juſt*, *Gratefull*; and conſequent to his being *dry*, he ſhould be *Reſolv'd*, *Conſtant*, *Patient*, *Modeſt*, *Faithfull*, *Judicious*.

The reaſons of all theſe effects are eaſily found. For, as the Soul makes uſe of theſe qualities, knows what ſhe is able to perform by their means, and is inclin'd to the actions conformable to their vertue:

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So upon her being ſenſible of the *heat*, which is the principle of *ſtrength* and *courage*, ſhe takes a confidence in her ſelf; and, upon that, ſhe would *command*, ſhe courageouſly undertakes, and ſlights ſmall *dangers*: And being *courageous*, ſhe is *forward*, *free*, and without *artifice*. She is alſo *liberal*, not onely upon this account, that it is the property of *heat* to dilate it ſelf, but alſo for this reaſon, that the confidence ſhe hath of her ſelf, takes away the apprehenſion of wanting thoſe things that ſhall be neceſſary for her. She eaſily *pardons*, becauſe ſhe thinks ſhe cannot be *injur'd*: She is *juſt*, becauſe ſhe deſires *little*, as being ſatisfy'd with her ſelf; in fine, ſhe is *gratefull*, becauſe ſhe is *juſt* and *liberal*.

On the other ſide, as *drought* obliges things to keep within their bounds, and hinders them from ſpreading and diſperſing themſelves; ſo ſhe accommodates her ſelf to this vertue, and is fortify'd within her ſelf, not eaſily changing the reſolutions ſhe hath taken, patiently enduring the inconveniences which happen to her, conſtantly endeavouring to perform the promiſes ſhe hath made, and not ſuffering her ſelf to be carried away with the vanity of thoſe honours, which ſhe deſerves not. In a word, *drought* contributes to the purity of the Spirits, and checks the impetuous ſallies of the Imagination, allowing the time, required by the underſtanding, for the conſideration of things, whence proceed *prudence* and ſoundneſs of judgment

Art. 2.

That the Temperament of Man is hot and dry in the first degree.

But it is here to be obſerved, that all theſe natural vertues are not conſiſtent with theſe two qualities if they be exceſſive. For, if the *heat* be too great, inſtead of *Courage*, it will raiſe *Temerity*; the deſire of *Fame* will be chang'd into *Pride*; *Magnanimity*, into *Inſolence*; *Liberality*, into *Prodegality*; *Juſtice*, into *Severity*; *Clemency*, into *Indulgence*; and *Gratitude* into *Oſtentation* and *Vanity*. In like manner, if *drought* be predominant, the *Conſtancy* of the Soul degenerates into *Obſtinacy*, *Harſhneſs*, *Inſenſibility*, *Auſterity*. The perfection therefore of the Temperament convenient to Man, in reſpect of his Sex, ſhould come as near as may be to the exact Temperature, proper to humane Nature, as we have ſhewn; And ſo it may be affirm'd, that it ought not to be hot and dry, but in the firſt degree, whatever goes beyond it leading to exceſs and imperfection. The reaſon this, that Nature, which always endeavours to give the ſeveral Sexes the Temperament convenient to the ſpecies, recedes no further from that Temperament, than is neceſſary for the diſpoſing of them into the order of thoſe cauſes, whereof they are to perform the function. Whence it may be inferr'd, that the leaſt degree of heat and drought which Man may have beyond the exact Temperature, is ſufficient to give him the vertue and efficacy of the efficient cauſe.

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The ſame thing is to be advanc'd, concerning the *Conformation* of the parts; for there is one conformation which is convenient to the ſpecies, and is a mean between thoſe which are proper to the ſeveral Sexes. For, as all things ſhould aim at a certain mediocrity in humane nature, for the reaſons before alledged; ſo ought the conformation of the body to be in the mean, between the exceſs and defect, which may be found therein. But, in regard the Temperament qualifies the formative vertue, and forces it to give the parts that greatneſs and figure which are proper for them; it was requiſite, that thoſe of Man ſhould be anſwerable to the two qualities, which were to be predominant in him, and that they ſhould be larger, not onely than thoſe of the Woman, but alſo than thoſe which were deſign'd to the humane ſpecies.

Art. 3.

A Model of Man's figure.

Ariſtotle hath deſign'd the figure of Man according to that of the Lion, as if there were no other Animal, in which the form of the male Sex were more perfect, and that it ought to be the Model, according to which that of Man ſhould be repreſented. But, not to urge that Man is the moſt perfect of all Animals, and conſequently, that he ought to be the meaſure of the reſt, the Lion is more proper to frame an Idæa of the *ſtrength*, than of the *perfection* of the Sex, for as much as that qnality requires more heat and drought than is neceſſary to the male Sex. And

accordingly the Lion is one of the leaſt fruitfull creatures of any, and conſequently hath not always the vertue and efficacy, convenient for that Sex: beſides that his Temperament recedes too much from the mediocrity moſt befitting humane nature, and whoever ſhall compare it to that of Man, which is hot and dry but in the firſt degree, will find that the Lion's reaches to the third.

Add to this, that the *atra bilis*, or black choler is predominant in the Lion, as alſo in a ſtrong and robuſt man; and therefore they have both large mouths, a harſh and thick hair, the forehead full of folds and contractions, between the Eye-brows, the extremities large and tough, the fleſh hard and muſculous, the voice bigg, and reſounding, as it were, out of the throat, the gate grave, with a certain weighing from one ſide to the other; all which are the ſignifications of an exceſſive heat and drought, as we ſhall ſhew elſewhere.

And it is probable, that *Ariſtotle* did not, in that place, conſider Man ſimply, according to the vertue of his Sex, but according to the quality which was moſt conſiderable in the opinions of men, to wit, *Heroick Fortitude*, which is the ſource of *Valour*, which hath the prerogative of *commanding*, and for which men always reſerv'd the greateſt honours, and the nobleſt rewards. Accordingly, when he propoſes the Panther for the Idæa of the Female Sex, it is eaſily perceiv'd, that his conſideration runs more upon the ſtrength of the Sexes, than their natural perfection, ſince that is a creature, which is indeed very ſtout and couragious, but hath not the docility, the fearfulneſs, and other qualities proper to the Woman

Art. 4.

Of the Figure of Man's parts.

BUt for our parts, who follow not the opinions of Men, but the deſigns and orders of Nature, we cannot repreſent a figure of Man convenient to his Sex, but according to a draught of thoſe qualities, which are natural to him, with reference to the compariſon to be made between them and thoſe of the Woman, there being not among Animals, any that hath a greater reſemblance to the Man, than She.

We are therefore to affirm, that as to his *ſtature*, it is of a greater height, and more unbounded than that of the Woman.

That his *head* is bigger.

That his *hair* is ſtronger, and inclining to a certain curle towards the extremities.

That his *Forehead* is leſs round, leſs ſmooth, and almoſt of a ſquare figure.

That his *Eye-brows* are bigger and ſtronger.

That his *Eyes* are more lively.

That the *Noſe*, deſcending in a ſtreight line from the forehead, is ſomewhat bigger at the extremity.

That the *Noſtrils* are a little more open.

That the *Mouth* is larger.

The *Lips* thinner.

The *Voice* bigger.

The *Chin* leſs round.

And the whole Face inclining to a ſquare figure.

The *Neck* ſhould be thicker.

The *Shoulders* and *Breaſt* larger and ſtronger.

The *Buttocks* and *Thighs* leſs fleſhy.

All the *Junctures* more free.
The *Extremities* larger and ſtronger.
The *Fleſh* harder and more muſculous.
The *Meen* more majeſtick.
The *Carriage* and *Deportment* of the body more noble.
The *Gate* more ſprightly and vigorous.

Art. 5.

The Reaſons of the figure of Man's parts.

NOw, whoſoever ſhall ſeriouſly conſider the whole buſineſs of this Conformation of the parts, ſhall find, that it proceeds from the moderation of the two aforeſaid qualities, as we have ſhewn. For height of ſtature, greatneſs of the head and mouth, the openneſs of the noſtrills, the thickneſs of the neck, the largeneſs and breadth of the ſhoulders and breaſt, the ſprightlineſs of the eies, the bigneſs of the voice, the freedom and activity of the junctures, the majeſty and nobleneſs of the meen, carriage and gate, are the effects of *heat*, which dilates the parts, and renders the motion of them more active and more vigorous.

On the other ſide, the harſhneſs of the hair, the hardneſs of the fleſh, the ſolidity of the junctures, the ruggedneſs of the forehead, and its figure leſs round, the thinneſs of the Lips, the more obtuſe figure of the chin, and that of the whole face inclining to a ſquare, are the effects of *drought*, which hardens the parts, and reſiſts the motions of the humours, not permitting them to aſſume the round figure, which is

proper

proper and natural to them, as we ſhall hereafter take occaſion to ſhew more particularly.

Art. 6.

That the figure of the parts denotes the inclinations.

BUt what calls upon our further obſervation in all theſe parts, is, that they have a certain rapport to and dependency on the faculties and inclinations, which the Sex beſtowes on the Soul, ſo that they ſerve for markes and ſigns to diſcover them: whether it proceeds hence, that they are the Inſtruments of thoſe powers, and that the knowledg of the inſtrument diſcovers the cauſe, to which it is ſubſervient; or that both the inclinations and ſigns proceed from the Temperament, as their common principle, and that the Conformation of the parts bewraying the Temperament, the Temperament afterwards bewrayes the inclination and faculties, whereof it is the cauſe.

Accordingly the largeneſs of the breaſt and ſhoulders, the nimbleneſs and ſtrength of the junctures, the openneſs of the noſtrills, and the greatneſs, or wideneſs of the mouth are markes of Courage. A thick neck, the fleſh hard and muſculous, the extremities large, are ſigns of Strength, as well of Body as Soul.

The ſquare forehead, the noſe ſomewhat big, the lips thin, the chin ſomewhat large, denote magnanimity, and greatneſs of courage.

The ſtature high and ſtreight, the ey-brows elevated,

ted, a majeſtick gate, and ſprightly eies, ſignify Glory, or a deſire of Fame.

The forehead and face of a ſquare figure, and the head of a convenient bigneſs, are marks of Wiſedom, Conſtancy and Juſtice; and ſo of the reſt, as we ſhall further ſhew in its proper place. Whence it may be affirmed, that, of all the parts, which make up the Male Beauty, or which is beſeeming a Man, there is not any but denotes an inclination to ſome particular virtue.

Thus have we diſcover'd wherein conſiſts the natural Perfection of a Man, as well in reference to the powers of the Soul, as to the Conformation of the body, which is convenient for his Sex.

SECT. III.

Shewing wherein conſiſts the natural perfection of the Woman.

WE come now to the examination of the *Woman's* perfection. But what a difficult, what a dangerous enterpriſe do we undertake! Since it cannot be attempted without engaging againſt the greateſt and moſt formidable power in the world. For, to make ſhort work of it, we muſt unthrone that Beauty, which commands Kings and Monarchs, which forces obedience from Philoſophers, and which hath cauſed the greateſt alterations, that ever happen'd upon earth. From that

that high pitch of glory and perfection, whereto it is now advanc'd, it must be pull'd down, and degraded into the order of vicious things, and we are to shew, that all those attractions, and charming graces, wherewith she is adorned, is nothing but a deceitful mask, hiding an infinit number of defects and imperfections. 'Tis neither better nor worse; for if there be any certainty in humane ratiocination; if the principles, which Nature hath scatter'd into our Souls, in order to the discovery of truth, have any thing of solidity, it will necessarily follow, that there is not any one of all the parts, requisite to the framing of the Woman's Beauty, but is the mark of an inclination to some Vice.

But what? Is there any necessity we should discover things, which Nature hath made it so much her business to conceal? Why should we be so forward to condemn those, who innocently force the adorations and respects of all the world? This onely we have to allege, that our case is much like that of a Judge, who, out of his obligation to Justice, is forc'd to pass Sentence against his friend. Who can forbear falling in love with Beauty? But who is it also that can oppose Truth, which is stronger than Beauty? It is Truth then that forces us to condemn that Beauty, and to pass judgment against her, which, though severe, is yet just and necessary. For, if it may be deduc'd, that it is onely a fair appearance, which hides an infinite multitude of defects, and so farr from being the flower of Goodness (as it hath been sometimes flatter'd) that we may as well affirme it to be the bark, which covers the vices of Nature; it is impossible, but it must abate much of the pride, whereby it is attended, and somwhat raise their spirits, who adore it with so much slavery.

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But all conſider'd, it is poſſible, we may repreſent the miſchief greater then it is, and we are ready to acknowledge as much. For we ſpeak onely of the *Inclinations*, that is, the *firſt ſeeds* of the Soul's *affections* which may be ſmother'd and weeded out, before they have fully taken root. And to ſpeak more preciſely, the *Inclination* is onely a ſecret *weight*, which gives the Soul a *bent* to certain actions, and which is eaſily balanc'd by ſome other advantages, ſuch as may be example, education, and contrary habits. As to which, we muſt make this acknowledgment, for the honour of the Women, that theſe means have a greater influence over them, then over the Men, and that commonly, we find the practice of the vertues more exemplary and exact in this Sex, than in the other.

With this precaution, we may preſume to affirm, upon the principle we have laid down, that the Woman is *cold* and *moiſt*, in order to the end, which Nature hath propoſed to her ſelf, and that from her being *cold*, it follows, ſhe ſhould be *Weak*, and conſequently *Fearfull*, *Puſillanimous*, *Jealous*, *Diſtruſtfull*, *Crafty*, apt to *Diſſemble*, *Flatter*, *Lie*, eaſily *Offended*, *Revengefull*, *Cruel* in her revenge, *Unjuſt*, *Covetous*, *Ungratefull*, *Superſtitious*. And from her being *moiſt*, it follows, that ſhe ſhould be *Unconſtant*, *Light*, *Unfaithfull*, *Impatient*, eaſily *Perſwaded*, *Compaſſionate*, *Talkative*.

Art. 1.

The Reaſons of theſe Incilinations.

THe reaſons of all theſe Inclinations are evident and neceſſary. For ſince *heat* is the principle of *ſtrength*,

ſtrength, courage and *confidence*; *cold*, on the other ſide, muſt be the principle of *weakneſs*, *lowneſs of ſpirit*, and *fearfulneſs*. And from theſe three proceed all the reſt, which are the attendants of a cold Temperament: for diſtruſt and jealouſie are the iſſue of weakneſs and fear; whence it is, that ſtrong and courag:ous men are neither diſtruſtfull, nor apt to ſuſpect. Artifice & craft are alſo the attendants of weakneſs, in as much as they ſupply the want of ſtrength; and we find moſt of thoſe creatures which are weak, to be more cunning than the others; on the contrary, all of great bulk are not malicious, in regard commonly ſtrength goes along with bulk. Diſſimulation follows artifice and diſtruſt, as flattery and lying follow diſſimulation. Beſides, weakneſs, in as much as it is expos'd to all manner of injuries, is eaſily offended; And thence it comes, that ſhe is revengefull, for that revenge, which hath no other end than to prevent the continuance of the injury, is commonly found in thoſe who are weak; and therefore old people, children, and ſick perſons, are more teſty and angry than others. But a Woman's revenge is cruel; for as much as cruelty proceeds from weakneſs and fear; for a generous perſon is ſatisfy'd with the victory, whereas a Coward having his enemy at mercy, revenges himſelf to the utmoſt extremity, out of a fear he may recover himſelf, and retort the revenge upon him. Superſtition follows from the ſame ſpring; for weakneſs, being ever more fearfull than it ſhould be, imagines Heaven hard to be pleas'd, and that all endeavours are to be uſed to gain its favour. Nor does Avarice proceed from any other principle; for the fear of falling nto want, raiſes a deſire of preſerving what one hath, and acquiring what one hath not;

whence

whence it comes, that old men, and perſons addicted to melancholy, are inclin'd to this vice. Now, it is impoſſible that theſe deſires ſhould be without injuſtice, or that they ſhould eaſily admit of gratitude, and acknowledgments.

On the other ſide, the Soul, complying with the nature of humidity, which is, as it were, its organ, and which is unconſtant, changeable and ſuſceptible of all the impreſſions may be given it, is alſo apt to receive an inclination to the vices which are correſpondent to thoſe qualities; ſuch as are Lightneſs, Inconſtancy, Impatience, Unfaithfulneſs, and Loquacity, which are the effects of Fickleneſs; as Credulity and Compaſion are the conſequences of a weak reſiſtance, and the eaſie impreſſion, which things make upon her.

Art. 2.

That the Inclinations of the Woman are not defects.

BUt whereas the Inclinations may be either ſtrong or weak, and the vices, whereto they are inclin'd, may have ſeveral degrees, it is certain, that thoſe which are conſonant to the Woman, with reference to the perfection of her Sex, are the weakeſt that may be, in regard her Temperament recedes very little from the juſt temperature, as we have ſhewn. So that the fearfulneſs, diſtruſt, avarice, and the reſt, are, in her, in the loweſt and weakeſt degree they can be. Nay, there are ſome of them, which, in that condition, may paſs for ſo many natural vertues. For Diſtruſt and Diſſimulation may deſerve the name of Prudence;

Prudence; a moderate Avarice, may fall under the notion of Frugality; a light Superſtition may paſs for Piety; moderate Revenge may aſſume the name of Juſtice; and that Timidity, which begets ſhamefaſtneſs, is the greateſt ornament and commendation of the Woman, and the bridle which is moſt likely to give her a check, in the bent ſhe might have to all the greateſt vices. But it is alſo to be inferr'd, that, when the coldneſs and moiſture exceed the degree of that moderation, all the Inclinations we have mentioned, are proportionably heightned, and become as vicious as their names imply them to be.

Moreover, thoſe Inclinations, which go under the name of vices, are not, to ſpeak exactly, ſo many defects, but rather, on the contrary, ſo many natural perfections, as being correſpondent and conformable to the feminine Sex. For, as it is no imperfection in a Hare to be fearfull, nor in a Tygre, to be cruel, for as much as their natures require thoſe qualities in them; ſo can it not be ſaid, that Timidity, Diſtruſt, Inconſtancy, *&c.* are defects or imperfections in a Woman, in regard they are natural to her Sex, which would be defective, if it were depriv'd thereof.

Yet is it to be granted, that, comparing them with the Inclinations of Man, they ſeem to be vicious; but the compariſon which is made between diverſe things, may not be the rule and meaſure of their natural perfection, in as much as it transferrs to one ſubject what appertains to the other, and there is not any thing, wherein ſome exceſs or defect may not be found, when it is ſo compar'd. Accordingly, the ſtrength of a Man, compared to that of a Lion, is weakneſs; and all the Inclinations, which are in-

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fus'd into him, upon the account of his Sex, though they ſeem vertuous, are nevertheleſs defects, in reſpect of the humane ſpecies, which ought to be indifferent, as we have ſhewn elſewhere. Nay, mediocrity it ſelf, which is ſo perfect in reference to things humane is a defect, as admitting any compariſon between them and the ſupernatural and divine.

The Inclinations then, which the Woman derives from her Sex, whatever they may be in themſelves, are to be accounted perfections, when they are confin'd within the moderation, correſpondent to the firſt degree of cold and moiſture, of which Temperament ſhe ought to be. If they exceed it, they are defects, declining from the perfection requiſite in her Sex; and the exceſs of that Temperament cauſes no leſs deformity in the Soul, than it does in all the parts of the Body.

Art. 3.

That the Inclinations of Man are defects in the Woman.

But what? Is it impoſſible that a Woman ſhould be of the ſame Temperament as a man, and conſequently that ſhe may have the ſame inclinations, and be couragious, magnanimous, liberal, *&c.* as we experimentally find many of them, who have all thoſe qualities? It muſt be acknowledg'd, but what is a perfection in one ſubject, may be a defect in another: as for inſtance, courage in a Lion, is a vertue, in a Hare, a vice; and ſo what is a perfection in the man, is a default, and imperfection in the Woman, becauſe it makes her recede from the natural perfection of her Sex. And if theſe Inclinations proceed not from

from inſtruction, education, example, or ſome rational habit, they are indeed ſuch qualities as ſeem vertuous, but have withall the attendance of farr greater vices. And thoſe Women, who are born with that confidence and audacity, which are proper onely to man, are commonly raſh, impudent, unthrifty, *&c.* there being a neceſſity, that whatever recedes from perfection, ſhould fall into defects; and the greater the receſſion is, ſo much the more remarkable are the vices. Whence it proceeds, that no body wonders ſo much to ſee a Woman very fearfull, very covetous, and very light and unconſtant, as to find her couragious, prodigal, obſtinate; in regard theſe laſt qualities proceed from a Temperament which is abſolutely oppoſite to that of the Woman, whereas the former are conſonant to that which is proper to her, though it exceeds the moderation it ſhould have. In like manner, to be cowardly, penurious, fickle-minded, are farr greater imperfections in a man, than if he were hare-brain'd, prodigal, ſelf-will'd, in as much as the latter are the effects of the hot and dry Temperament, proper to him; the former of the cold and moiſt, which is perfectly contrary to him.

Art. 4.

Wherein the Beauty of the Woman conſiſts.

WE come now to examine the Conformation of the parts, which is conſequent to the Temperament of the Woman, and to conſider, wherein the Beauty, which is proper and natural to her, conſiſts.

In the firſt place, as to her *Stature*, ſhe is lower, and ſmaller than the man. The

The *Head* is leſs and rounder, and the whole face inclining to the ſame figure.

She hath a great quantity of *hair*, and that very long, ſmall, and ſoft to the Touch.

Her *Forehead* is even, ſmooth, higher, and rounder towards the Temples.

The *Eye-brows* are ſlender, ſoft, at a little diſtance one from the other, and gently twining about the Eyes.

The *Eyes* are large, black, betraying a certain mildneſs and modeſty.

The *Noſe*, of a middle-ſize, deſcending in a ſtreight line upon the Lips, and gently inclining to a roundneſs towards the Extremity.

The *Noſtrils* narrow, and not opening much.

The *Cheeks* round.

The *Mouth* little.

The *Lips* red, ſomewhat bigg, or plump, not ſhutting cloſe together, nor moving, unleſs it be when ſhe ſpeaks or laughs.

The *Teeth* are ſmall, white, and orderly diſpos'd.

The *Chin* ſhould be round, ſmooth, not admitting the appearance of the leaſt hair.

The *Ears* little, ſoft, and of a convenient compaſs.

The *Neck*, round, ſomewhat long, ſmall, ſmooth, and even all about.

The upper part of the *Breaſt* plump, and fleſhy; and the Breaſt it ſelf, or Dugg, firm, and ſomewhat hard, round, and of a middle-ſize.

The *Shoulders* little, and cloſe.

The *Back* ſtreight, and weak.

The *Thighs* round, and fleſhy.

The *Knees* round, and ſo as there be not in them the appearance of any juncture.

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The *Feet* little, round, and fleſhy.

The *Arms* ſhort, and of a proportionable roundneſs.

The *Hands* long, little, and fleſhy.

The *Fingers* long, ſmall, and round.

The *Skin*, in all parts, ſoft, delicate, and of an exquiſite whiteneſs, ſave onely in thoſe places, which admit a mixture of carnation, as in the Cheeks, the Chin, and the Ears.

Laſtly, *Weakneſs* ought to appear in her *voice*, and all her motions; *baſhfulneſs* and a reſerv'd *modeſty* in her *countenance*, her *geſtures*, *carriage*, and *behaviour*.

Art. 5.

The Cauſes aſſign'd of this figuration of parts in the Woman.

OF all theſe parts, the little, ſhort, and ſlender, are the effects of the cold Temperament, which confines the matter, and hinders it from ſpreading and dilating it ſelf. The fleſhy and ſoft parts are the productions of the moiſture, for they denote abundance of flegmatick bloud. But of the round, ſome have their dependance on the cold, others on the moiſture: for they either proceed from the fat, which fills the vacant places of the muſcles, as in the arms, cheeks, thighs; or from the cold, which contracts the figure of the parts, and preſſes them of all ſides; whereas the heat, always ſpreading it ſelf forward, cauſes unevenneſs & angles, which prevent the roundneſs of them. Hence it comes that the forehead and face of the Man are of a ſquare figure, and thoſe who

are inclin'd to Melancholy, have corners of the forehead ending in a ſharp point, and long faces, contrary to the Flegmatick, who have them almoſt of a round figure. The mildneſs, modeſty, and the baſhfulneſs which appear in the countenance and actions of the Woman, are alſo effects of the cold, which abates the courage, and checks, or remits the motion of the parts. To the ſame principle is alſo to be attributed the ſmalneſs and weakneſs of the voice, by contracting the throat, in which it is framed, and weakning the vital faculty. But all theſe things fall more particularly under conſideration, in the Treatiſe of *Beauty*; it ſhall ſuffice here to obſerve in the main, that the natural conformation of the Woman follows the Temperament of cold and moiſt, in that degree, which Nature hath preſcrib'd for the perfection of her Sex.

Art. 6.

That all theſe parts denote the Inclinations which are proper to the Woman.

OUr next work muſt be, to ſhew, that all theſe parts have a dertain celation to the qualities of the mind, whereof we have given an account; that they are the ſigns which diſcover them, how ſecret ſoever they may be; and laſtly, that, of all the figures and lineaments which contribute to the Beauty of the Woman, there is not any one but denotes a vicious inclination.

We need produce no other proof of this truth than the natural weakneſs, which is remarkable in the body of the Woman, and the conformation of all her parts, whereof there is not any one, but is the effect, either

either of the coldneſs of her Temperament, or the moiſture predominant in her, as we have ſhewn already. For, ſince the weakneſs of the body, and of natural heat, is ever attended by an inclination to fearfulneſs, diſtruſt, avarice, *&c*, and that the ſuperabundance of moiſture accompanying it, cauſes ſoftneſs of nature, effeminacy, inconſtancy, and fickleneſs, *&c*. it follows, that ſhe hath not any part, which does not diſcover ſome one of the Inclinations beforementioned. But, for the further clearing up of a Propoſition that ſeems ſo ſtrange, we muſt fall into a more particular conſideration of things, and make it appear, by thoſe rules of Phyſiognomy, which *Ariſtotle*, and other great Perſons among the Antients, have left us, that there is no truth ſo well eſtabliſh'd as this.

Ariſtotle hath given us this obſervation, That a little face is a ſign of puſillanimity, and lowneſs of ſpirit. By that character, he deſigns thoſe who are not abe to bear good or bad fortune, who, upon the leaſt ſmile of proſperity, become inſolent; upon the leaſt frown of adverſity, are utterly caſt down and diſcourag'd; who entertain the leaſt delay or denial, as a great misfortune; a ſmall negligence for a great injury; continually complaining; diſtruſtfull of all they have to do with, full of ſuſpence in the taking of any reſolution, *&c*. as we ſhall ſhew more at large, when we come to the particular characters of this vice.

The round face denotes maliciouſneſs, and an eaſie inclination to anger.

The narrow forehead is an argument of a fickle and incorrigible diſpoſition.

The round forehead is a ſign of teſtineſs, and weakneſs of mind.

The high forehead, and very ſmooth, ſignifies flattery and diſſimulation.

Black eyes denote fearfulneſs; the large eye argues inconſtancy.

Thick and ſoft lips are marks of Loquacity, an over-buſie enquiry into the affairs of other people, and a negligence of their own. Some affirm, that they are the ſignificators of avarice and lying; which two vices are commonly obſervable in the *Moors*, whoſe lips are of that making.

The little mouth is a ſign of weakneſs and lying.

The round chin denotes envie.

The long and ſmall neck denotes a timorous diſpoſition, and a perſon inclin'd to loquacity.

When the upper part of the breaſt is ſmooth and fleſhy, it is an argument of credulity, and weakneſs of judgment.

The ſhoulders little and cloſe together, are ſigns of avarice

When the thighs, feet and hands are fleſhy, the back ſtreight and weak, the hands little, all theſe are ſigns of a ſoft and effeminate conſtitution, that is, they denote a delicate and voluptuous perſon, one who is not able to endure any hardſhip, or pains-taking, to whom the ſlighteſt inconveniences are inſupportable, and one that impatiently bears the want of the leaſt pleaſures and enjoyments of life.

Art. 7.

Wherein perfect Beauty conſiſts.

THis is all the account we have to give of the Beauty as well of the Man as the Woman. There remains yet onely one difficulty, which, no doubt, will

will occurr to all thoſe who ſhall read this Diſcourſe, and may, if not reſolv'd, bring the truth we have eſtabliſhed, into ſome diſpute: It is this, that the Beauty, whereof we have given a deſcription, is proper and correſpondent onely to our climats, and not to be accommodated to others: for there is no Countrey but admits a diverſity of judgments and opinions, concerning this point; nay, there are ſome Nations that are ſo much at a diſtance from the ſentiments we have of Beauty, that they account beautifull, ſuch perſons, as in our apprehenſions, are little remov'd from deformity it ſelf.

If the caſe ſtand thus, how can any one frame to himſelf a certain and determinate Idæa of Beauty, which is ſo indeterminate, and full of diverſity, and reſtrain, to the deſigns of Nature, a thing which ſeems wholly to depend on the opinions of men? Nay, it being ſuppos'd, that it is a natural perfection, what Judge ſhall be able to decide, which is the moſt perfect and accompliſh'd, ſince every People and Nation, will imagine, it hath good grounds to beſtow the prize on that which is proper to it ſelf?

We anſwer then, that Reaſon onely is that ſoveraign Judg of all Nations, who is able to pronounce a final ſentence, in a buſineſs ſo nice, and proſecuted with ſo much partiality. Yet is it not *particular* Reaſon that ſhall have this prerogative, but the *general* Reaſon, which is grounded on common notions, and principles not admitting of any diſpute.

This Reaſon it is which teaches us, that the Body is the Inſtrument of the Soul, and the greater number of faculties and different powers this latter hath, ſo much the greater diverſity of parts muſt the former have, to be employ'd as the organs thereof: for the

Inſtrument ought to be proportionate, both to the cauſe by which it is uſed, and to the action which it is, by its means, to perform. And whereas every power hath ſome, action proper thereto, it is accordingly requiſite that it ſhould have an Inſtrument, particular to it ſelf, that is, ſuch as may have the conſiſtence and figure proper to that very action. For, if the Saw had not the hardneſs and figure which are convenient for it, 'twould not be of any uſe to the workman, who hath any thing to do with it. Now, when an Inſtrument hath the qualities and diſpoſitions requiſite in order to the performance of its action, we may affirm it hath its perfection, in regard there is nothing wanting to it.

Moreover, it is certain, that in every order of things, there is but one onely perfection, in as much as there is but one principal end, whereto every one is deſign'd, and perfection conſiſts in the end. Whence it may be inferr'd, that every power of the Soul hath but one perfection, and that the Inſtrument, whereof it makes uſe, can alſo have but one. So that Beauty, which is the perfection of the parts, and conſiſts in the juſt Conformation they ought to have, can be but onely one, and that all thoſe, which have not that conformation, have not the exact and perfect beauty, which is conſonant to the nature of Man.

Now the queſtion is, to know, wherein this perfect and compleat beauty is to be found. To do that, let us proceed according to the principles which we have laid down before, and affirm, that the natural perfection of Man's body conſiſts in the mediocrity, or *æquilibrium* of the Temperament, and the conformation of the parts, for the reaſons we have already alledged; and that the Sexes, which could not retain

it,

it, by reaſon of the different qualities it was requiſite they ſhould have, recede but very little from it. For it follows thence, that the Climate wherein perfect beauty is to be found, is that which is leaſt oppoſite to that mediocrity, and which, by its exact temperature, preſerves it, and alters it not. Now, it is out of all diſpute, that thoſe Countries, where the Elevation is about fourty five degrees, are the moſt temperate, as being in the midſt of all the extremities, and conſequently, if we are to ſearch after perfect Beauty, in one place rather than another, 'tis in thoſe Countries, and the parts adjacent, that it may be found.

I know there are ſome Countries ſo ſcituated, where it is not to be met with, as in thoſe parts of *China* and *America*, which are under the ſame degree. But we are not here to conſider onely the Poſition of the Heavens; we muſt alſo examine the nature of the Soil, the origine, policy and government of the Inhabitants. For that of *China* is too moiſt, by reaſon of the many Lakes and Rivers that are thereabouts: and that which is in *America* is too cold, by reaſon of the Woods and Mountains, as *New-France* is. Add to this, that there are ſome Nations, which are ſeated in very temperate places, but are not the original Inhabitants of them, and yet have preſerved the conformation which they receiv'd from their firſt habitations. In fine, theſe Nations are barbarous, and deſtitute of policy, and it is not to be doubted, but that the diſorders and imperfections of the Soul are communicated to the Body, and, in time, alter its Temperament, and many times diſtort its figure. So that we are not to look after true Beauty out of *Europe*, and that, of the Countries, comprehended within this part of the World, *France* is the likelieſt ſeat of it,

as being ſcituated juſt in the midſt of the extremities of hot and cold, dry and moiſt; in a word, of South and North.

Thence it is, that we have taken our Model of the Beauty which is convenient for Man and Woman. 'Tis true, we have made but a rude draught, or rather but drawn the firſt lines of it; but we ſhall fully finiſh, and give it its abſolute perfection, in the Treatiſe we have pupoſely deſign'd for ſo noble a Subject.

CHAP. II.

Of the Inclinations.

SECT. I.

Of the Nature of Inclination.

TO underſtand what is meant by *Inclination*, methinks there needs no more than to conſider the very word it ſelf, for it ſufficiently diſcovers, either that it is a Motion cauſing the Soul to incline or bend her ſelf towards ſome Object, or that it is a Diſpoſition to move towards it, ſince it cannot be imagin'd, that a thing may have a bent, or to bow it ſelf, towards ſome place or part, without ſuffering any motion. Now, whereas it may be ſaid that a man is inclined to Choler, without being ſtirr'd

ſtirr'd or mov'd thereby, and without feeling the effects of it, the conſequence is, that Inclination is not a Motion, and that it is onely a diſpoſition to move. But, in regard there are ſome diſpoſitions tranſient, and others that are conſtant and permanent, and that it is commonly ſaid, a man is inclin'd to a Paſſion, when he is only diſpos'd thereto, by ſome extraordinary accident; it is expected, that the Inclination ſhould be a conſtant diſpoſition, by proceſs of time deeply rooted in the Soul.

Moreover, ſince it makes the Soul bend towards certain objects, it is requiſite, they ſhould have the appearance of good, for ſhe is never bent towards that which is evil; on the contrary, ſhe eſchews it. And though thoſe objects may, in effect, be evil, yet is it neceſſary, that, to her, they ſhould ſeem to be good, to raiſe in her the bent and inclination ſhe hath towards them. So, a Perſon inclin'd to Choler, finds a pleaſure in revenging himſelf; and accordingly, all the Paſſions, how troubleſome ſoever they may be, give a certain ſatisfaction to Nature, who, by them, provides for her own preſervation. For, though it be the judgment of Reaſon, that the Paſſion is evil, yet the ſenſitive part of the Soul finds in it a certain content, as in an action advantageous to it, in order to the end ſhe propoſes to her ſelf.

Art. 1.

The Object of the Inclination.

THe objects of the Inclination are of two kinds, Things and Actions, for a man hath an inclination for perſons, books, pictures, *&c.* There may alſo

alſo be an inclination to Paſſions, Vertues and Vices. But there is this difference, that it may be ſaid, people are inclin'd to actions but it is not in like manner ſaid of Things; for though it may be ſaid of one, that he hath an inclination *for* a certain perſon, yet it is not ſaid that he is inclin'd *to* that perſon. Whence it may be eaſily apprehended, that there are two kinds of Inclination in general, one juſtly and properly ſo called, the other improperly and figuratively.

That kind which communicates its form and name to the ſubject wherein it is, ought to paſs for the proper and true Inclination, whereas the other is rather the effect of the Inclination, then the inclination it ſelf; ſince it is the very motion, which the Appetite ſuffers, in loving and deſiring ſomething, and the other kind of Inclination is not the motion, but the diſpoſition to move. So that, when it is ſaid of ſome body, that he hath an inclination for ſuch a perſon, it is meant of the friendſhip he hath towards him, or the diſpoſition he hath to love him. This is the true inclination, the other onely the effect of this.

Art. 2.

The diſtinction of Inclinations.

HAving nothing to ſay here of that kind of inclination which is improperly ſo called, we ſhall ſpeak onely of that which truly deſerves that name. Of this alſo there are two kinds; one *Natural*, and proceeding from Nature; the other *acquir'd*, and proceeding from habit and cuſtom. There are ſome men naturally inclin'd to Love, Anger, Juſtice, *&c.* others

others acquire an inclination to Vertues, Vices, and Paſſions, whereto they were not naturally inclin'd.

Art. 3.

The Seat of the Inclinations.

BUt the kinds before mentioned reſide in the Soul as their true and proper ſeat. For beſides that, of the Inclinations, ſome are wholly *Spiritual*, as thoſe which Arts and Sciences leave in the mind, others are *Corporeal*; as for example, the eaſe and facility, wherewith a Trades-man works, when he hath good tools; for this facility is not in the tools, though it proceeds from them. In like manner, the inclination which a man hath to be angry, is not in the organs, though it proceeds from the conſtitution of the organs; in as much as the diſpoſition, , which a thing hath to move, as well as the motion, whereby it is afterwards agitated, ought to be in the thing it ſelf, and not in the cauſes, from which it receives that diſpoſition and motion. It follows therefore, ſince it is the Soul which ought to move, that the diſpoſition to move ſhould be in the Soul.

From hence it may be eaſily inferr'd, that the *Appetite* is the ſeat of the Inclinations, in regard that is the onely part of the Soul, which may be moved. And whereas there are three ſorts of Appetite, the *Will*, the *Senſitive* appetite, and the *Natural* appetite, each of them hath ſuch inclinations as are ſuitable and conformable thereto: that is to ſay, the ſpiritual are in the Will, as thoſe which Arts and Sciences leave in the mind; the Senſible are in the Senſitive appetite, as thoſe which a man hath to the paſſions of the ſenſitive

ſitive Soul; and thoſe which are purely *corporeal* make their aboad in the Natural appetite, ſuch as are thoſe which Nature hath for certain motions of the humours in diſeaſes, and for all the actions, for which the organs are deſign'd. For, even before the parts are in a capacity and condition to act, the Soul hath an inclination to the functions, which they ought to perform. Whence it comes, that a young Ramm runs his head againſt things before his horns are in ſight; a young wild Boar will offer to bite, before his tusks are grown out; and Birds endeavour to flie, though though they are not fully fledg'd. Yet are we to make this obſervation by the way, that the inclinations of one Appetite are many times communicated to another: For the Inclination a man hath to paſſions is at laſt entertain'd into the Will, and thoſe of the Natural appetite commonly ſpread themſelves into the Senſitive, as the examples we have alledged ſufficiently evince.

Art. 4.

How Inclination is to be defin'd.

FRom all theſe conſiderations, me thinks it were no hard matter to frame an exact definition of Inclination, which may be this. *Inclination is a certain diſpoſition deeply rooted in the Appetite, which receives from it a bent towards certain objects acceptable thereto.* But to ſpeak more ſignificantly, we are to acknowledge that theſe *Metaphorical* kinds of expreſſion are not proper to define *things*, and the words of *bending*, or *bowing*, or *weighing*, whereby Inclination is commonly defin'd, cannot be properly ſaid

ſaid of any thing, but *bodies*, and are not to be attributed to the ſoul Let us endeavour then to find out ſome other expedient to clear up this matter, and to look after ſome other notions and terms, which may be more proper to the thing, now under our examination.

Art. 5.

Whence proceeds the Diſpoſition, wherein the Inclination conſiſts.

OUt of all controverſie then it is, that the Appetite hath certain motions, whereto it is commonly more inclin'd then to others, and it may be ſaid, that it hath a diſpoſition to perform them, and that the ſaid diſpoſition conſiſts in the facility, which it meets with, in the performance of them. The queſtion then is, to know, whence it receives this diſpoſition and facility: for it cannot proceed from the weight, ſcituation, figure, or any other circumſtances of that kind, which cauſe, in Bodies, a diſpoſition and facility to move themſelves.

To diſcover this ſecret, it is to be laid down as granted, that the Inclination is a diſpoſition, and a fixt and permanent facility, that happens to the Appetite, and conſequently it is neceſſary, that the cauſe which produces it, ſhould alſo be durable and permanent. Now all the cauſes of that order which may be imagin'd, as to the preſent enquiry, are reducible either to the diſpoſition of the organ of the appetite, or to the habit, which it may have acquired, or to the images which are preſerv'd in the memory, and

frame

frame the knowledge precedent to its motion: for theſe things onely are permanent, and may cauſe that diſpoſition and conſtant facility, wherein the inclination conſiſts. It might then be affirmed, that, if the Spirits are the organs, and immediate ſeat of the Appetite, as we ſhall have occaſion to ſhew hereafter, it muſt follow, that according as they are more ſubtile or more groſs, they are the more or the leſs eaſily mov'd, and that the Appetite, which moves along with them, receives its motion with greater ſlowneſs or activity. And that hence it proceeds, there are ſome conſtitutions which are ſo changeable, love with ſo much facility, and deſire things with ſo much earneſtneſs; and on the contrary, there are others, whoſe Souls are ſo heavie, that it is almoſt impoſſible to ſtirr them, and proſecute the attainment of their deſires with a lethargick ſupinity and negligence.

But this reaſon is not general for all the Inclinations; for, beſides that there are ſome which proceed from the inſtinct, and have no dependance on the qualities of the ſpirits, there are ſome alſo in the Will, which is not engag'd to any organ; nay, we acknowledge, that there are ſuch even in Angels, in whom it is out of all diſpute, that neither that cauſe, nor any other corporeal diſpoſition, can have any place. The ſame thing is to be ſaid concerning the habit, which the Appetite may have contracted, ſince the habit is a quality acquired by many actions, and that there are ſome natural inclinations, which are derived from the very birth.

If theſe things be as they are laid down, there remain only the Images, preſerv'd in the memory, which may be the general and immediate cauſe of this diſpoſition and facility, wherein the Inclination conſiſts.

Art.

Art. 6.

How the motions of the Appetite are wrought.

TO underſtand how this is done, we are to obſerve, that the Appetite, what order ſoever it be of, is a blind power, which, of it ſelf, hath not any knowledge, but ſuffers it ſelf to be guided by another faculty, that hath the priviledge of diſcerning, whether the things are good or evil, and afterwards to command the Appetite, to move conformably to the judgment it hath paſs'd of them. This Faculty is called the *Practick Underſtanding*, in the Superiour part; and in the Senſitive, it hath the name of the *Eſtimative faculty*. And there is not any motion wrought in theſe two parts of the Soul, which is not preceded by the judgment of one of theſe two faculties.

The ſaid faculties have alſo this further property, that they do not paſs their judgment according to the nature of the things, but according to the Sentiment they have of them. For it ſomtimes happens, that thoſe things may be profitable, which they judge evil, and, on the contrary, thoſe may be evil, which, according to their judgment, ſeem good. Nor is this to be wondred at at all, in as much as Good and Evil are of things relative, which yet are not known to be ſuch, but according to the compariſon made by the Soul between them; things which have no particular ſpecies to ſmite the Senſes, as all ſenſible qualities have; and which are not known, but onely by the Images which theſe faculties frame of themſelves, without borrowing of them elſewhere. Whence it comes,

comes, that it is ſaid in the Scholes, the knowledge of them is attain'd, *per ſpecies non ſenſatas*. In a word, what is good to one, is not ſuch to another, nay, one and the ſame perſon thinks that delightfull to him now, which, a little before, he had thought troubleſome; whence it may be eaſily ſeen, that Good and Evil depend on the opinion conceiv'd thereof.

To find out now whence the opinion may derive this knowledge, and what obliges it to judg that things are good or evil, is a buſines that requires a more particular conſideration, than to be fully determin'd here. Let it then ſuffice, that we give this ſatisfaction at preſent, That it is the Inſtinct, experience, & the true or falſe ratiocination which it makes of things. For, upon the knowledge it hath of the Temperament, and the parts organically ſubſervient thereto; upon that which it receives from the conceit of its own ſtrength or weakneſs; and laſtly, upon that, which proceeds from the defect or abundance wherein it is, it judges, that the things are conformable, or contrary to it, advantageous or hurtfull, in a word, good, or bad.

Art. 7.

Of the Judgments of the ſaid Faculties.

AS ſoon then as either of theſe two Faculties hath thus fram'd to it ſelf an Idæa of Good and Evil, it ordinarily makes two judgments; according to the former whereof, it is convinc'd, that the Good ought to be perſu'd, and the Evil avoided, and this is that which is ſimply called *Practick*. By the ſecond, it effectually commands the Appetite to perſue, or to avoid; and

and accordingly it is called in the Schools actually Pratick, *Practicè practicum*. Thereupon the Appetite moves, commanding the motive vertue, which is in the members to perform the motions neceſſary, either to attain the Good, or avoid the Evil.

All theſe actions are performed conſequently, and commonly wrought in a moment; but ſometimes they are alſo diſtinct and ſeparate, and that eſpecially in Man. For the underſtanding may know a thing to be good, yet without judging that it ought to be perſu'd; and many times it judges that a thing is to be perſu'd, and yet does not order the will to do it. Nay, it often happens, that, after all theſe judgments, the Will, which is at liberty, follows not thoſe orders, and may remain immovable, or make a contrary motion. But in other Animals, the Practick Judgment, and the motion of the Appetite, cannot be ſeparated, and as ſoon as the Eſtimative faculty hath known a thing to be good, there is a neceſſity, that, in the ſame moment, it ſhould judge, and command the Appetite to perſue it; and this latter punctually obeys, and never fails moving, conformably to thoſe judgments.

There remains then onely the command, which the Appetite lays on the motive vertue of the members, that may be ſuſpended. For we commonly find, that a Beaſt deſires ſome thing, which it dares not take, by reaſon of the awe it is in. In which caſe, the Appetite moves and frames the deſire, but it proceeds no further, ſuſpending the concurrent action of the members.

However it be then, it may be eaſily inferr'd, from all we have already delivered, not onely, that the Appetite moves conformably to the Practick

Judgment, that is to ſay, that its motions are ſtrong or weak, according as the Eſtimative faculty does ſtrongly or weakly command it to perform them; but alſo, that the Practick Judgment anſwers the Notion which the Eſtimavite faculty hath fram'd to it ſelf of the good or evil, and that the command is more or leſs preſſing, according to the imagination it frames to it ſelf of higher or lower degrees of goodneſs or evil in the things. For a greater good requires a more imperious command then a leſſer, and ſuch a command raiſes a paſſion ſo much the more violent.

Art. 8.

That the Images which are in the memory, are the cauſes of Inclination.

NOw, if the motions of the Appetite have this dependance on the judgments of the Eſtimative faculty, it muſt follow, that the diſpoſitions, which make it inclinable to thoſe motions, ſhould alſo have ſome relation to the ſaid judgments. Yet ſhall not this relation be to thoſe, which the eſtimative faculty frames to it ſelf when it knows; for they are tranſient, and the Inclination is a permanent diſpoſition; but it ſhall be to thoſe, which are preſerv'd in the memory, as we ſaid before. Of theſe, there are two kinds; for they are either *Natural*, or *Accidental*. The natural conſiſt in the Images which Nature imprints in the Souls of Animals at their coming into the World, and this is that which is called *Inſtinct*, as we have ſhewn in our Treatiſe, concerning the *Knowledge of Animals*. The acquired or accidental conſiſt alſo in the Images, which

which remain in the memory, after the action of the Eſtimative faculty. Under this name I comprehend alſo the Practick Underſtanding.

Now, as theſe two ſorts of Images ſerve for Models to the eſtimative faculty, in order to the framing of its Judgments, according as they ſhall be more expreſſive, and have a greater repreſentation of the goodneſs or evil of the objects; ſo will they be more proper to raiſe, in the Eſtimative faculty, ſuch commands as ſhall be more preſſing, and in the Appetite, greater motions.

In the mean time, it is certain, that the Natural are perfectly repreſentative, in as much as they are of Nature's own framing, in order to the conſervation of the Animal, and that they are the more deeply graven in the Soul, to the end they might not be blotted out. But the acquired are but ſuperficial, and if they be not often renewed, they are ſo loſt or weakned, that they cannot make a perfect repreſentation of things. 'Tis true, there are certain objects, which upon the firſt ſight make ſo ſtrong an impreſſion in the Soul, that the ſpecies thereof are preſerv'd a long time in the memory, and that the firſt apprehenſion, which is had of them, hath as great an influence upon him, as many ſeveral apprehenſions often reiterated would have, upon ſome other occaſion. Hence it comes, that the firſt ſight of a very beautifull perſon, many times, raiſes a Love which continues many years. Upon this account, it is ſaid commonly in the Schools, that there are certain acts, which, alone, and upon the firſt performance of them, may produce habits. But otherwiſe, that is, thoſe onely excepted, there is a neceſſity, that the Images, which the Soul frames, and continues in the me-

mory, ſhould be often renew'd, and, as it were, receive a ſecond touch, by ſeveral ſubſequent reflections, that they may be perfectly expreſſive and repreſentative. For as often as ever the Soul makes an apprehenſion, or a commemoration of ſome object, ſo often does ſhe frame an Image thereof to her ſelf; in regard that, by apprehending or remembring, ſhe acts, and that ſhe can have no other action, then the production of Images; which Images, joyn'd with thoſe that are in the memory, render them ſtronger, and more lively, much after the ſame manner, as the colours, which are often touched over; as we have ſhewn in the place before alledged.

Art. 9.

That the diſpoſition and facility of the Appetite's motion proceeds from the ſame Images.

THeſe Images therefore which are in the memory, and are accordingly perfectly expreſſive, are thoſe, from which, the diſpoſition and facility, which the Appetite hath to motion toward certain objects, does proceed.

And certainly, it may be affirm'd, that the Soul, which finds her ſelf ſtored with theſe Images, and ſees her ſelf in a condition to produce the apprehenſions neceſſary to her, is raiſed up to a certain confidence in her ſelf; and, without any reflection of hers thereupon, ſhe is ſenſible of her own ſtrength and courage. And as a man who hath a vigorons body, much wealth, or is of noble extraction, aſſumes a confidence in himſelf, and is at all times in a condition

tion to undertake things conformably to his power, though he thinks not of it: in like manner, the Soul does the ſame, when ſhe hath the Images in a readineſs, in order to the making of her judgments; ſhe hath all her faculties in a diſpoſition fit to act; and, when ſhe is in action, it may be eaſily perceiv'd ſhe was prepar'd thereto.

And thence it will not be hard to judge, that the Inſtinct, the Temperament, the Habits, *&c.* cauſe the inclinations, becauſe all theſe things preſuppoſe Images perfectly expreſſive. For thoſe of the Inſtinct are ſtrong and deep, as we have already ſhewn; thoſe of the Habits ought to be often reiterated: and the Temperament, the Conformation of the parts, kind of life, *&c.* which the Soul knows, and is ſenſible of, have the ſame effect on the Images, as the Habit. Whence it may be inferr'd, that, in all theſe the Images are perfectly repreſentative, the Appetite is in a condition to move, as ſoon as the Practick underſtanding, or the Eſtimative faculty, ſhall preſent them to it. And here does conſiſt the facility which it hath to be inclin'd thereto, as the Inclination conſiſts in that facility, as we have already affirmed. Theſe things thus laid down, we may define the Inclination, by proper notions and terms, thus: *The Inclination is a permanent diſpoſition, and a facility, attain'd by a long progreſs of time, which the Appetite hath to move towards certain objects, which are acceptable and delightfull thereto.*

SECT. 2.

What are the Cauſes of the Inclinations.

Art. 1.

The ſeveral diſtinctions of the ſaid cauſes.

THus farr have we diſcourſed concerning the nature, object, and ſeat of the Inclinations; we now come to an examination of the cauſes thereof. For, though we have already ſpoken of the principal cauſe, and that which is the immediate ſource of them, to wit, the Images, which are preſerv'd in the memory, yet are there yet remaining ſome others, which, albeit not ſo nearly adjacent to the Inclination, are nevertheleſs, in a certain degree, neceſſary thereto; nay, they are ſuch, as, being better known, and more manifeſt, will accordingly give a greater light to a thing ſo obſcure as this is.

Beſides therefore that ſecret and immediate Cauſe we have treated of before, there are two other kinds, to wit, *Next* cauſes and *Remote*, and both of them are either *Natural*, or *Moral*.

Of the *Natural*, the *Next* are, the Inſtinct, the Temperament, and the Conformation of the parts. The *Remote* are, the Starrs, the Climate, difference of Age, of Suſtenance, and indiſpoſitions of the body.

The *Moral* are, nobleneſs, or meanneſs, of Extraction,

traction, Riches and Poverty, Power and Subjection, good and bad Fortune, and kind of Life, which comprehends Arts, Sciences, Habits, and Counſels, Examples, Puniſhments, and Rewards. For all theſe things raiſe particular inclinations, by diſpoſing the Soul, to judge, whether the things are good, and givng her a bent towards them. We are now to conſider how this is done.

Art. 2.

That the Inſtinct is one of the cauſes of the Inclinations.

AS to the *Inſtinct*, there is no doubt, but that it muſt be numbred among the ſaid Cauſes, when it ſhall be found, that it conſiſts in the Images, which have their birth with the Animal, in order to its apprehenſion of thoſe things, which are neceſſary for its conſervation, and whereof he cannot come to the knowledg by the Senſes. For as theſe Images are perfectly expreſſive, as being perfectly preſent to the Soul; ſo, upon all occaſions, they are the Sollicitours and remembrancers of the Eſtimative faculty, that it would propoſe them to the Appetite, and raiſe, in that, as we ſaid before, the inclination it hath to the action, which they command ſhould be done.

Thus is it, that the Soul apprehends, and is inclin'd to the functions, whereto ſhe is deſign'd, and to a ſearch after moſt of thoſe things, which are neceſſary for her. For thence proceeds the inclination which Birds have to flie, Fiſh to ſwim, Men to diſcourſe; and which all living Creatures have, to ſeek

out the ſuſtenance and remedies, which they know are naturally fit and profitable for them.

Art. 3.

That the Temperament is one of the cauſes of the Inclinations.

AS concerning the *Temperament*, it is unanimouſly acknowledged by all, to be the moſt general, and moſt eminent cauſe of the Inclinations; that, according to that quality of the humours which is predominant in the body, men are inclin'd to ſuch and ſuch paſſions; that ſuch as are ſubject to Melancholy are naturally ſad, and ingenious; the Cholerick, active and angry; the Sanguine, jovial and affable; the Flegmatick, ſtupid and ſlothful. As to *Climates*, there are ſome, in which men are more ingenious, and more civiliz'd; in others, more dull and ſavage, according to the quality of the air they breath, and which produces that effect, by the impreſſion it makes upon the Temperament. Laſtly, that the very Animals themſelves are fearful, or venturous, docile or untractable, proportionably to the coldneſs or heat, the thickneſs or ſubtility of their blood.

The reaſon, for which the Temperament is the cauſe of all theſe effects, is deduced from the ſecret knowledge which the ſoul hath of the inſtruments whereof ſhe makes uſe in her actions; for being ſo neerly united or joyned to them, ſhe knows the weakneſs or ſtrength thereof, and conſequently is ſoon ſatisfi'd what ſhe may, and what ſhe may not do by their means.

Now

Now though this knowledge be ſecret, yet does it not proceed from the inſtinct, for the inſtinct is a clear and diſtinct knowledge, which is beſtow'd only on the ſpecies, and conſequently ought to be common to all the individuals that are under it, whereas this knowledge is different in every one of them, and is withall obſcure and confuſed. For the Soul hath but a confuſed knowledge of choler: and thence it comes, that ſhe repreſents it to her ſelf in dreams, by certain Images, which do not abſolutely reſemble it, but have only a certain conformity to it, ſuch as are thoſe of fire, fighting, bright colours, &c. She does the ſame thing in Melancholy, which ſhe figures to her ſelf by ſpectres, obſcurity, and inextricable diſturbances; and ſo proportionably of the others, as we ſhall preſs more particularly in the Treatiſe of the *TEMPERAMENTS*.

Now this knowledge, how confus'd ſoever it may be, is ſufficient to inſtruct the ſoul, how far ſhe may be able to act, or not to act, by the aſſiſtance of theſe humours. For it teaches her, by the experience ſhe makes of it ever and anon, that choler is an active and unconſtant humour, and that it may be ſerviceable to her, in aſſaulting, fighting with, and deſtroying whatever injures her: That, on the contrary, Melancholy is not eaſily ſtirr'd, troubleſome, and oppoſite to the principles of life; and ſo of the reſt. And upon this knowledge, the Eſtimative faculty frames its judgment, conformably to the effects produced by theſe humours, which it keeps in the memory, and every foot, refreſhes by new apprehenſions, by that means rendring them perfectly repreſentative, and capable of producing the inclinations, which we commonly obſerve therein.

Art.

Art. 4.

That the Conformation of the parts is a cauſe of the Inclination.

AS to the *Conformation of the parts*, I do not think any body doubts, but that it is a certain ſign of many Inclinations, in as much as it is obſervable, that, without any art, but only, by the bare inſpection of the lineaments of the face, the humour and thoughts of ſome perſons may be, in ſome meaſure, diſcovered; That thoſe men, in whom there is a certain reſemblance to certain other Animals, are inclinable to the ſame paſſions as they are; That ſuch as deal in Horſes, and Huntſmen, conſult it very exactly, that they may thereby judge of the docility and tractability of Horſes and Dogs; And laſtly, that it is come into a Proverb, affirming, that thoſe are not to be truſted, who are guilty of any ſtrange default or miſcarriage of Nature.

But I am further to add, that this Conformation of the parts is not only the ſign, but is alſo the cauſe of thoſe inclinations, for it gives the ſoul a bent to certain actions, as the Temperament doth. Yet is it not to be ſaid, that the Conformation is the effect of the Temperament, and conſequently, that it does not denote the inclinations upon any other ground, then that it denotes the Temperament, which is the true cauſe thereof, and not it. For though this may be true, in many occaſions, and that it is certain alſo, that ordinarily the parts are lengthned, contracted, and aſſume ſeveral figures, according to the quality of the

the predominant humour; yet does it very often happen, that the Conformation agrees not with the Temperament, and that, for inſtance, a cold complexion may be conſiſtent with a Conformation, which ſeems to denote heat. Accordingly the heart and brain are ſometimes too great or too little in the ſame Temperament; which muſt needs cauſe a notable difference in the paſſions, over which thoſe two parts have any power. Add to this, how many cholerick perſons are there who have thick and ſhort noſes; and how many ſubject to melancholy have them long and ſharp, contrary to the nature of thoſe humours? Who would affirm, that all the *Tartars* and all the *Chineſes* are of the ſame Temperament, becauſe all the former have large faces, and that the latter are all flat-nos'd? Are there not ſome creatures of different ſpecies, that have the ſame Temperament, and yet the figure of their parts is wholy different?

To be ſhort, it is not the Temperament which penetrates the veines and arteries, which makes the articulation of the bones, divides the fingers, and builds up that admirable ſtructure of the parts of every animal. But it is the formative vertue is the Architect, which the ſoul imployes to build up a body, ſuch as may be fit to perform the actions, whereto it is deſigned; and whereas this vertue alwaies endeavours to make the Animal it frames, like unto that which produces it, if this latter have parts of ſuch a largneſs and figure the aforeſaid vertue, which bears the character of it, alwaies frames the like, if it be not obſtructed. It is true, that many times the Temperament oppoſes its deſign, and hinders the parts from receiving that figure, which the formative vertue

vertue had deſign'd to give them: but many times alſo, it does not oppoſe, but leaves it to act, according to the meaſures it hath taken. Hence it comes, that the imagination of Women with child cauſes it to change the figure of the Embryo's parts, ſo as that the Temperament makes no oppoſition: Thus the Stars imprint on the body ſuch marks as are not correſpondent to the natural complexion thereof, &c.

Art. 5.

How Figure acts.

ALl this preſuppos'd, the next queſtion is, to know, how *Figure*, which is a barren quality, and does not act at all, may cauſe inclinations. Nor is it to be imagin'd, that it produces them by an active vertue: for the Temperament it ſelf, though it have that vertue, yet does not employ it upon the ſoul, which is not ſuſceptible of material qualities: there being not any thing, that can really either warm or cool the ſoul. So that both the Temperament and Conformation of the parts, are only occaſional cauſes and motives, which excite her to the performance of her actions. When ſhe hath taken cognizance of the heat which is predominant in the body, ſhe frames her judgements conformably to the effects, which ſhe is able to produce, and afterwards diſpoſes her ſelf to ſet the organs on work, according to the deſign ſhe hath taken. The ſame thing is to be ſaid of Figure, ſhe knows which is, which is not proper for certain functions, ſhe afterwards makes her judgment of them, and laſtly ſollicits the Appetite to

to move conformably to the reſolution ſhe hath taken.

Now as there are ſome figures, which are fit for the motion of natural bodies; others, oppoſite thereto; ſo is it certain, that every organicall function hath a certain figure, that is ſuitable to it, and without which it cannot be otherwiſe then imperfectly performed. Thence it comes, that every part, nay every ſpecies of living creature, hath a different figure, becauſe the functions of it are different. And as the body, which ſhould have been ſquare, and was conſequently deſign'd for reſt, receives a property and aptitude to motion, when it is reduc'd to a round figure; in like manner, when any one of the organical parts, which ſhould have been of ſuch a figure, receives ſome other, it is deprived of the diſpoſition it had for the function, for which it was deſign'd, and acquires that which hath ſome correſpondence with the extraordinary figure it hath receiv'd.

The caſe is the ſame, as when an Artiſan makes uſe of an Inſtrument, which is not convenient and fit for the deſign he had propos'd to himſelf; for inſtead of doing what he intended, he does the quite contrary; he cuts off that which he ſhould have bored, he makes uneven, what he ſhould have ſmooth'd, and whereas his deſign was to caſt the ſtatue of a man, he does that of a Lyon, if the mold he makes uſe of be ſuch as may repreſent that creature.

Such is the procedure of the ſoul, when ſhe hath ſuch organs as have not the natural figure they ought to have. For there is nothing more certain, then that man, as well as all other Animals, hath a proper and peculiar figure, deſign'd by nature to every one of his

his parts. And therefore as the ſoul hath an inclination to perform the actions, which are proper to the organs, ſhe ought to have, ſo muſt it needs follow, that that inclination will be chang'd, when the organ is chang'd.

But there remains yet a difficulty which ſeems not eaſily reſolvable. It is this, that the ſoul knows, by the inſtinct, the action, which the organs ought to perform, when they have the conformation proper and natural to them. On the contrary, this cannot be ſaid, when the organ hath not the figure it ought to have, becauſe the Inſtinct gives her not the apprehenſion of the action, which is not proper to her, ſince it is a particular default, and that the Inſtinct is a general apprehenſion beſtow'd on the whole ſpecies.

To rid our hands of this difficulty, we are to obſerve, that the figure of the parts is the effect of the formative vertue, and that the ſaid vertue follows the Temperament, or the impreſſion, and image it hath receiv'd from the animal engendring. If it follow the Temperament, the figure is not the cauſe of the inclination, it is only the ſign of it, in regard the Temperament is the true cauſe thereof, and in that caſe, the ſoul knows the action of the part by means of the Temperament, as we have ſaid before. But if it follow the impreſſion, or the image of the animal which engenders, the formative vertue is the cauſe of the inclination, inaſmuch as it is a faculty, which brings along with it, not only the character of the parts of the animal engendring, but alſo the diſpoſition which it had to act conformably to their figure. And this is ſo unqueſtionable, that, many times, the child betrayes the ſame inclinations as his parents

parents had done before him, though he do not reſemble them, the Temperament having oppoſed the figure of the parts, yet not had ſtrength enough to deface the diſpoſition to the inclination, which they had. Now it is certain, that it is only the formative vertue which brings the character of theſe inclinations, there being not any thing which the animal engendring communicates to that which is engendred, but only that vertue, as ſeveral modern experiences have made apparent.

Now as the formative vertue, which is in the organs of the animal engendring, moves with thoſe organs, ſo it acquires the ſame bent, and the ſame diſpoſition to move, which thoſe organs have; ſo that, coming to frame another animal, it carries along with it that very ſame diſpoſition, which it hath acquir'd, and communicates it thereto. And whereas this diſpoſition is as it were a weight, continually preſſing and ſolliciting the ſoul to move; the ſoul ſenſible of that ſollicitation, at laſt frames the judgment conformable to the impreſsion ſhe hath receiv'd from it, and afterwards derives it to the Appetite, which entertains the ſame bent: and this bent is the true Inclination, in regard the Inclination cannot be any where but in the appetite.

Art. 6.

How Inclinations are produc'd by the remote Cauſes.

THus far have we diſcours'd of the *Natural* and *Next* cauſes of the Inclinations. As to the *Remote*, they are all in a manner reducible to the Temperament.

perament. For the Stars, the Climate, Age, Aliment, and the Indiſpoſitions of body, have no other influence on the inclinations, then what is caus'd by the alteration they make in the temperament. True it is, there are ſome diſeaſes, which alter them, by deſtroying the Conformation of the parts, as a man, who is maim'd in the hand or leg, looſes the inclination he had to play on the Lute, or dance.

As concerning the *Moral* Cauſes, they diſpoſe the *Eſtimative faculty* to make its judgments, according to the apprehenſion it receives from them, of the ſtrength or weakneſs they have: as Nobleneſs of birth, Wealth, good Fortune, raiſe in men an inclination to Ambition, Pride, and Courage, in regard they are perſwaded, by the power they derive from them, that they deſerve honours, and that there is not any thing, which they may not attempt; whereas, on the contrary, the inclinations ariſing from meanneſs of birth, poverty, and ill fortune, are oppoſite to the other. All the reſt, as courſe of Life, Arts, Sciences, Vertues, and Vices, are grounded on Cuſtome, which renders things eaſie and agreeable, upon the recommendation of the profit or pleaſure, that may be reaped thereby. For all this being frequently repreſented to the Eſtimative faculty, it makes favourable judgments thereof, which are preſerv'd in the memory, and at laſt cauſe the Appetite to incline, as we have ſhewn elſwhere.

But we muſt not in this place omit one advertiſement, which is abſolutely neceſſary in reference to the ſubject we treat of. It is this, that, when we ſpeak of the Temperament, we do not underſtand only, by that word, the conjunction and mixture of the firſt qualities, but our meaning is, to add thereto the

the ſecond qualities. And therefore we do not ſpeak only of the hot, cold, dry, or moiſt Temperament, but alſo of the Sanguine, Cholerick, Flegmatick, and Melancholick Temperament, in regard the humours, which give the denominations to theſe Temperaments, comprehend theſe two ſorts of qualities. But, of all the ſecond qualities, there are not any ſo conſiderable, in reference to the Inclinations, as *ſubtilty* and *groſſneſs*, for every humour may be either ſubtile or groſs, and a ſubtile Melancholy is more different from a groſs, then it is from choler. Accordingly, the effects of it are promptitude, inconſtancy, anger, as they are of choler; whereas the productions of the groſs melancholy are ſlothfulneſs, ſtupidity, obſtinacy. And it is upon this particular, that medicine hath not ſufficiently explicated it ſelf, in the diviſion of the Temperaments; for it hath ſet down but nine, one temperate, and the other eight in exceſs, which might have been multiplied, by addition of ſubtilty and groſſneſs, and by the interchangeable mixtures, which may be aſſign'd in men; as the Cholerick-Sanguine; the Melancholick-Sanguine, *&c.* as we ſhall ſhew more exactly in the *Treatiſe of the Temperaments.*

Art. 7.

Of the nature of Averſion.

THus have we given an account of all we could diſcover in a buſineſs, which haply is the moſt obſcure, and moſt abſtruſe, of any relating to Animals. I muſt, for my part, ingenuouſly confeſs, that I

never met with any thing, more hard to conceive, then the nature of the inclination, the manner after which it is fram'd in the ſoul, and how it cauſes the Appetite to move. But if I have perform'd what I aim'd at in this diſquiſition, I may ſay, that I have made two diſcoveries for one; for the reaſons I have uſed to clear up theſe difficulties, may alſo ſerve for thoſe that may occur in the knowledge of *Averſion*, and are in all reſpects like unto them.

Accordingly the tearm *Averſion* is not here taken for that motion of the Appetite, which frames *Hatred*, but only for a Diſpoſition and facility that it hath to aſſume that motion, the account we have to give of this, as to our meaning thereby, being the ſame we have already given of the word *Inclination*.

Suitably to this explication, we are to affirm, that as the Inclinations are either *Natural* or *Acquired*, ſo are there the ſame diviſions of *Averſion*. The Appetite alſo is the ſeat of both. All the ſame cauſes, whether *Natural*, or *Moral*, or *Next*, or *Remote*, act therein after the ſame manner, and equally diſpoſe the ſoul to move. All the difference is, that they have contrary objects, and that they alwaies tend to contrary motions. For the inclination looks only after things agreeable, and gives the ſoul a bent towards them; but Averſion is for thoſe that are unpleaſant, and diſpoſes the Appetite to avoid them.

So that it may be thus defin'd, *Averſion is a permanent Diſpoſition, and a facility attain'd by a long progreſs of time, which the Appetite hath to recede from certain objects, which are diſagreeable thereto.*

There is no neceſsity of any further explication, how the ſoul comes to attain and contract this facility; for

for whatever we have ſaid concerning that which is in the Inclination is common to both.

CHAP. III.

Of the Motions of the Soul.

SECT. I.

That the Soul moves.

ALL people talk of the motions of the Soul; 'tis generally ſaid, that ſhe is inclin'd towards the good, and avoids evil; that ſhe grows reſolute, or is diſcourag'd, at the meeting of difficulties; and there is no language but hath certain terms, whereby to expreſs the agitations ſhe gives her ſelf: ſo that it is a thing manifeſt, and ſuch as ought not to be admitted into diſpute, that the ſoul can move, and that ſhe effectually hath ſuch motions as are proper and peculiar to her.

And certainly, as it is to be granted, that ſhe ought to know the things that are good and evil, and that this knowledge were of no advantage, nay would be prejudicial to her, if ſhe had not the means to enjoy the good, and ſhun the evil; In like manner, is it neceſſary, that, with the ſaid knowledge, ſhe ſhould have the vertue of moving, that ſo ſhe may

approach the good, and recede from the evil, which ſhe knows.

Art. 1.

What part of the Soul moves.

FOr this reaſon therefore hath the Soul two principal *faculties*; one, in reference to her *knowledge*, the other, to her *motion*; which faculties are in all the orders of the ſoul. For in the *Intellectual* Soul, the *Underſtanding* knows, and the *Will* moves; in the *Senſitive*, the *Imagination* ſupplies the place of the *knowing* faculty, and the *ſenſitive* Appetite frames the motions: And in the *Natural*, there is alſo a certain vertue, which, after its manner, knows what is good or bad for it; and an *appetite* which cauſes all the motions that we obſerve therein.

Art. 2.

That the motions of the Soul are not metaphorical.

THe greateſt difficulty of all, is, to know, of what nature theſe motions are, and whether the ſoul does effectually move, or that this is a figurative manner of ſpeaking, repreſenting the actions of the ſoul, according to a certain conformity, which may be between them and the motions of the body. For my part, I am fully ſatisfy'd as to the queſtion, and

and therefore affirm, (though contrary to the Tenents of all Philoſophy and the Schools, maintaining that they are only metaphorical motions) that they are true and real motions, whereby the Soul changes place, and puts her ſelf into diverſe ſituations.

Art. 3.

That the rational Soul hath a real motion, as the Angels have.

TO eſtabliſh therefore this doctrine, which muſt ſerve to explicate the nature of the Paſſions, we are, in the firſt place, to conſider the motions of the rational Soul. For if it can be ſhewn, that, being wholy ſpiritual, as ſhe is, ſhe nevertheleſs moves, it will be a great preſumption for the others, which are faſten'd and chain'd to matter.

Now to do this would be no hard task, could we but comply ſo far with Theology, as to grant that Angels really move, that they paſs from one place to another, that they dilate and contract themſelves, taking up a greater or leſſer ſpace. For this verity preſuppos'd, it may be inferr'd, that the rational ſoul, which is of the ſame nature with them, ought to have the ſame advantage.

But what, is not the ſoul dilated when a child grows bigger? Is ſhe not contracted, and reſtrain'd into a leſs ſpace, when ſome members are cut off? And when one dies, does ſhe not depart out of the body, and remove into ſome other place? Which, if

it is not to be doubted, that ſhe is ſuſceptible of a reall motion, ſince that in all theſe, there is a change of ſituation and place, as in the Angels.

And certainly it cannot well enter into a man's imagination, that being Noble, as ſhe is, ſhe ſhould be depriv'd of a vertue, which is common to all things created. For there is not any body, but hath the power to move it ſelf, either by the weight or lightneſs it hath; all things having life grow and diminiſh; all animals move of themſelves; and if, to all this, we add the motion of Angelical ſubſtances, it is not probable, the ſoul ſhould be the only thing in the Univerſe, that hath not any motion, and ſhould, of its own nature, be immovable.

Art. 4.

That the motions of the Will are reall motions.

I imagine to my ſelf there are few perſons will oppoſe this kind of motion, but they will haply object, that it is not in this the knot of the difficulty conſiſts; and that the queſtion is, to know, whether the internal motions of the Will, as Love, Hate, *&c.* are of the ſame kind with the foremention'd.

To make our way into this deep and ſubtile part of Philoſophy, we are to preſuppoſe, that all the intellectual ſubſtances, which are created, have certain bounds and limits, in regard Immenſity is one of the incommunicable attributes of the Creator. Now, that which

which hath limits, muſt of neceſſity have extenſion, and that extenſion ought to have parts; for a man cannot conceive limits without extenſion, nor any extenſion without parts, at leaſt virtual and aſſignable, as they are called in the Schools. True it is indeed, that this extenſion, and theſe parts, are of another kind then thoſe of bodies; for they are ſpiritual, indiviſible, aud may be penetrated, without being ſubject to any place, whereby they ſhould be limitted or confin'd: wheras thoſe of bodies are material, diviſible, and impenetrable, and really take up place, which limits and contains them. Upon this ground we may affirm, that the Rational Soul hath extenſion, and the parts that are proper to ſubſtances ſeparated from matter, that is to ſay. ſuch as are ſpiritual, indiviſible and penetrable, and that, by their means, ſhe takes up ſome certain ſpace, wherein ſhe is.

If the Soul moves then, as we have ſhewn ſhe does, as being movable in all its ſubſtance, it is in her power, not onely to paſs from one part to another, and take up another ſpace, then that which ſhe had before; but ſhe may alſo, without changing the place, or part where ſhe is, cauſe her parts to move in her ſelf, after the ſame manner, as the water, contain'd in a Veſſel, may be agitated in its parts, without changing its place. For ſince ſhe hath parts, and that thoſe parts are movable, as her ſelf, ſhe may move ſuch as ſhe pleaſes, and as ſhe thinks fit. And thence it is conſequent, that one appetite may be moved, while the other reſts, or ſuffers a contrary motion; as it is ſaid, that an Angel may have ſome parts that move, while others reſt. When therefore the Soul changes place, ſhe makes that kind of motion, which is called *tranſient*, which is like that which the Angels make, when they remove

from one place to another. But when ſhe changes not, and is onely mov'd within her ſelf, ſhe makes the interiour motions of the Will: for, according as ſhe either ſends forth, or calls in her parts within her ſelf; according as ſhe dilates or contracts them, ſhe frames all the Paſſions, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.

And certainly the Soul may, with juſt grounds, be compar'd to a great abyſs, which, without exceeding its bounds, ſuffers all the motion, which the tempeſt can raiſe therein: one while it is violently forc'd againſt the banks, and then immediately to recede again; another, it ſeems to be forc'd out of its profundities, and then again to enter into them; but how impetuous ſoever the tempeſt be, the other never exceeds its bounds.

The caſe is much the ſame with the Will, when it makes after the good, or ſhuns the evil, it makes place for it ſelf; if it go forward, or retreat, it neither gains nor loſes any thing of the ſpace, which it took up, in ſo much that it may be ſaid, that it is already where it would go, and that it ſtill continues in the ſame place whence it went. For, in fine, we muſt neceſſarily acknowledge, that there are in this vaſt and profound power many, and thoſe different, parts, which like waves follow one in the neck of the other, and keep in motion the current, into which it ſuffers it ſelf to be carried away. When one is advanc'd to the higheſt pitch, another that follows takes its place, which it as ſoon reſigns to another, and ſo ſucceſſively, till ſuch time as the Soul gives over moving!

True it is, that the agitation, which the Will raiſes in the ſpirits, and humours, makes its motion laſt much longer then it intended it ſhould: for when they are groſs and denſe, the impetuoſity, which they have re-

ceiv'd,

ceiv'd, cannot be ſo ſoon calm'd, as when they are rare and ſubtile, and the Soul ſuffers her ſelf to be carried away by the motion, whereby they are agitated. Thus is it, that the Paſſions continue longer in Men then Children: for theſe latter paſs in a moment from joy to ſadneſs, nay, when they give over laughing, we ſee the lines and lineaments of the precedent laughter immediately vaniſhed: whereas in Men, they paſs away ſlowly, and leave in the face, for the ſpace of ſome minutes, the impreſſion they have made therein. For all this difference proceeds hence, that the ſpirits of Children are more delicate and ſubtile, and conſequently, as all other things of the like nature, do not long retain the violence of the motion, which is imprinted in them, and that thoſe of Men, being more groſs, preſerve them a long time.

How ere it be, according to the principle we have laid down, it may be eaſily conceiv'd how the Soul is mov'd in the paſſions, and the mind remains much more ſatisfy'd with this manner of acting, which is conformable to that of corporeal motions, then when it is affirm'd, that there are no real motions in the Soul, and that they are onely Metaphorical. For, if by that word, it be not underſtood, that they are not abſolutely like the motions of the body, the thing it ſelf remains as obſcure as it was before.

Art. 5.

The Objections made againſt the motions of the Soul conſidered.

I Know very well, what Objections *Ariſtotle* made againſt *Plato*, who maintain'd, as we do, that the Soul

Soul really moves? I have alſo look'don thoſe, which the Schools have added unto *Ariſtole*. But there is but one anſwer to be made to them all which, is this, that taking away the motion of the Soul, they take away that of angels, upon which the ſame inconveniences, which are attributed to the other, muſt neceſſarily fall, though, that Angels do move, be a truth, not to be brought into diſpute.

It is argu'd further, that whatſoever moves ought to take up ſome places, and, as place, to have quantity; that the Soul hath no quantity, ſince ſhe is indiviſible, and wholly in every part of the body, and conſequently that ſhe cannot move. Moreover, it is requiſite that in all motion, what moves ſhould be different from that which is moved; and that the Soul, which is ſimple and indiviſible, cannot have things ſeparate and different, and conſequently, that it is impoſſible ſhe ſhould move. But do's not al this reflect on the Angels as well as on the Soul, who, notwithſtanding theſe reaſons, are yet granted to move of themſelves? But when all is done, theſe maximes are proper onely to corporeal motions, and not to thoſe of ſpiritual ſubſtances, as we learn in the Metaphyſicks.

What might be objected of greateſt weight, is, that Motion is, of its own nature, ſucceſſive, and that ſucceſſion implies time, whereas moſt part of the Souls motions are inſtantaneous, that is, made in an inſtant. But we have ſhewn in our Treatiſe, *Of Light*, that there are real motions of thoſe taht are momentany; That thoſe of Light, and thoſe of Angels, which after they have been contracted, reſume their former dilation or extent, are ſo wrought; And conſequently, that the motions of the Will, being eminent, are of that order, ſince it is a thing affirm'd by many eminent Philo-

Philoſophers, that thoſe Motions of immaterial ſubſtances, which are tranſient, are made in an inſtant.

It is therefore a thing to be maintain'd as manifeſt, that the rational Soul moves; That, being a limited ſubſtance, ſhe hath ſome extenſion, without which, we cannot conceive any limits; That the ſaid extenſion cannot be without parts, and that thoſe parts are movable, as well as the whole; That accordingly ſhe may move within her ſelf, by moving her parts, and that thence proceed all the interiour motions of the Will.

Art. 6.

The Motions of the Appetites.

NOw, if this be true of the Rational Soul, which is ſpiritual, it will be much more eaſily comprehended to be ſo in the others, which are faſtened to matter, and there will be no queſtion made, but that they are ſuſceptible of the ſame motions, in as much as motion belongs principally to things material. Accordingly therefore, the ſenſitive and natural Appetites, ſuffer the ſame agitations as the Will, when it loves, when it hates, *&c.* and theſe motions are interiour and immanent, and are fram'd in a moment, as thoſe of the Will.

But what? wil ſome body ſay, If theſe two Appetites are chain'd to matter, there is a neceſſity the matter ſhould move along with them; aud how can matter move in an inſtant? It may be ſaid in the firſt place, that we are not to imagine the matter, whereto the Appetite is chain'd, to be groſs and weighty, as moſt of the parts of the body are, but it is requiſite that the

power

power have a ſubject proportionable to it ſelf, and that the Appetite, which is the moſt movable part of the Soul, ſhould have a ſubject the moſt movable of any. Thus, though the Appetite have its ſeat in the heart, yet it is not to be inferr'd, that the whole heart is its firſt and principal ſeat. No, that ſeat is the ſpirits, and that moiſt heat, which is the ſource of life, and ever in motion, as *Hippocrates* affirms. So that it is not to be admir'd, the matter whereto it is faſtned, ſhould ſo eaſily and ſo readily follow the agitation, which it gives it ſelf.

Secondly, it is to be noted, that matter doth not always hinder things from moving in an inſtant, in regard there are maſſie bodies, that do move ſo. For it is not to be doubted, but that a weighty body, ſuſtain'd in the air, makes ſome effort to deſcend, that it preſſes upon the hand that ſtays it there, and that a man feels every moment the impulſion which it makes therein, which impulſion is, no doubt, a real motion.

Moreover, Light, which is a material quality, and requires a ſubject to ſupport it, does nevertheleſs move in an inſtant, as we have ſhewn in its proper place. Now, theſe two examples do not onely make it manifeſt, that material things are mov'd inſtantaneouſly; but they alſo give us a certain apprehenſion of the manner, whereby the Appetite moves the Soul, and whereby it moves it ſelf in the body. For it may be ſaid, that it is like a weight, which thruſts the Soul to that whereto it would have her to go. And it moves in the heart, as Light does in a tranſparent body; that is, it enters into it; it comes out of it; it dilates it ſelf in it; it alſo contracts it ſelf; yet ſo as the diaphanous body hath no ſenſe of all thoſe motions, though it be the ſubject, whereto the light is annexed.

The

The caſe is the ſame with the Appetite, which, though faſtened to its ſubject, may dilate it ſelf in joy, contract it ſelf in grief, iſſue out of, and return into, it ſelf in love and hatred, and all, ſo as that the body ſuffers nothing of all theſe motions. True it is, that the heart and ſpirits are agitated and ſtirr'd in great paſsions; but, not to urge that they are effects which follow and come after the emotion of the Soul, it is to be obſerv'd, that there are ſome paſſions, which continue in the Appetite, without making any impreſſion on thoſe parts. And this may ſuffice, to ſhew, that the Appetite may move, ſo as that the body be not chang'd thereby.

SECT. 2.

How Good and Evil move the Appetite.

BUt in order to a more exact knowledge of all theſe motions, we are yet to find out, what it is that engages and excites the Appetite to make them, which is one of the moſt abſtruſe things, of any in the nature of the Soul, and the moſt hard to be conceiv'd, according to the maximes of the Schools. For, though it be out of all controverſie, that Good and Evil are the onely objects, which cauſe all the motions of the Appetite, yet is it not eaſie, to expreſs the manner, how it is done, ſince Good and Evil make no impreſsion on the Soul, otherwiſe then by the Images, which the knowing Faculties frame thereof

of, and that thoſe Images have not any other vertue, then to repreſent.

For, if that repreſentation be not ſubſervient to the knowledge of things, it will not be any way uſefull to the Appetite, which is a blind power, and, as it is affirmed, not capable of any knowledge. I am content that the *Practick Underſtanding*, and the *Eſtimative faculty* ſhould judge, whether things are Good or Evil; that they ſhould preſent them to the Appetite, and command it to move, in order either to its union with them, or receſsion from them. But how does the Appetite ſee? How does it know, when it neither ſees nor knows any thing but thoſe Images, thoſe judgments and commands being fram'd in the ſaid faculties? What is it that teaches the Appetite, that it ought, at that time, to move after ſuch or ſuch a manner, in order to its union with the Good, and, after another manner, to recede from the Evil, when it knows not whether the Good or Evil have been preſented to the Soul?

All theſe difficulties are the brood of two principles, which ſome have brought into the Schools. One is, that the Images, which are fram'd in the Soul, depart not out of the faculty, whereby they are produced: the other, that the Appetite, of what order ſoever it be, hath no any knowledge. And upon theſe two foundations, they imagin'd that this inference muſt neceſſarily be built, that the faculties act one after another, by a certain ſympathy there is between them, or by the direction of the Soul, in the ſubſtance, unto which they are reunited. Now, we ſhall elſewhere make it appear, that theſe two means cannot be maintain'd; and therefore ſome other muſt be found, to take away the difficulties propoſed, without deſtroying thoſe principles.

We

We muſt then ſubſcribe unto, as certain, That the Image, Idæa, and Conceit, which the knowing faculty frames, goes not out of it; and that the Appetite, of what order ſoever it be, hath not any Animal knowledge, which it may frame by Images, as the Underſtanding and Imagination. But it is as certain alſo, that the Image, which the Underſtanding and the Imagination frame, produces another, which is ſpread into all the parts of the Soul; And that the Appetite hath a natural knowledge, which is common to all things, by which knowledge they know what is good, what evil, for them, as alſo the actions whereto they are deſign'd.

Art. 1.

How Knowledge is wrought.

TO make an abſolute eſtabliſhment of this Doctrine, it is to be preſuppos'd, that *Knowledge* is an *action*, and that, without doubt, the nobleſt of all thoſe that are performed in Nature, and that the Soul *acts* and *does* ſomething, when ſhe *knows*. Now, in regard we cannot make any other conceit of Knowledge, then as the repreſentation of things, which is made in the Soul, it follows, that the Soul, which acts, while ſhe knows the things, muſt her ſelf make this repreſentation, that is, frame the Pourtraiture and Image of the things. For there is no other action then that, that the Soul can do in knowing, and ſo to *know*, ſignifies as much as to *frame* the *Image* of the Objects, as we have ſhewn at large in our Treatiſe, *Of the Knowledge of Animals*.

Now, whereas there are ſeveral faculties that know, it is requiſite, for the reaſons by us before alledged, that every one of them frame its image. For my part,

part, who acknowledge but three principal ones in the ſenſitive ſoul, to wit the *Senſe*, the *Imagination*, and the *Eſtimative faculty*, and two in the Intellectuall, to wit, the *Speculative* Underſtanding and the *Practick*, I muſt accordingly allow, that there may be framed but five ſorts of Images in general. And though they all repreſent the ſame thing, yet are they different one from another, not onely by reaſon of the ſubtilty which they acquire by ſo many different examinations, but alſo by that of the ſeveral circumſtances, which each of the faculties add thereto.

For the external Senſe frames its Image, according to the model of the ſenſible ſpecies, which come from without, and repreſents the object, with the circumſtances of Time, Place, *&c.* as a Whole, whereof it diſtinguiſhes not the parts. From this firſt Image, the Imagination afterwards produces, that which is proper to it; but it diſtinguiſhes the circumſtances, and the parts of the object; it ſeparates, or unites them; and ſo frames its judgments, which may be called, in ſome ſort, ſpeculative, becauſe the Animal makes no advantage of them, in order to action, but onely in order to knowledge. Then the Eſtimative faculty makes its Image, according to the model of that of the Senſes and Imagination; but it adds thereto the notions of Good and Evil, which it alſo unites, and which it ſeparates, that ſo it may make the Practick judgment, which is to move the Senſitive Appetite.

But if, after all this, there be a neceſſity, that the underſtanding ſhould take cognizance of the ſame object, according to all the precedent material Images, it alſo frames its own, which is wholly ſpiritual, which it ſeparates from all material accidents, and whereof it conſiders all the parts, and the relations it may

may have, uniting, or dividing them, in order to the making of ſpeculative propoſitions: And then it adds thereto, the notions of conformity, or contrariety, goodneſs or evil, from which it frames the practick Judgment, which excites the Will and Senſitive Appetite. All this would require a long elucidation; But it would not be proper for this place; and therefore let it ſuffice, that we have given an account, in general, of the progreſs made, in the buſineſs of Knowledge.

Art. 2.

That the Images are multiply'd.

BUt however the caſe may ſtand, this Image, ſo framed as before ſhewn, of what order ſoever it may be, is a quality, which, after it is once produced, is multiply'd, and diffuſed into the parts of the Soul, as was ſaid before. For, ſince there is not any ſenſible quality, which hath not the vertue of multiplying it ſelf, and diffuſing it ſelf into the air, and other bodies ſuſceptible thereof, as may be obſerv'd in light, colour, ſound, ſcent, *&c.* it is not likely, that this, which is the nobleſt of all, as being the term and effect of the moſt perfect action of all, ſhould be depriv'd of an advantage, common to all the reſt. Beſides, were it not for this multiplication, it would be impoſſible, to give any reaſon, for moſt things that happen in Animals.

For example, we ſhould not be able to comprehend, how the formative faculty does ſometimes change the order, which Nature hath preſcrib'd it, in the Conformation of the parts, to follow the deſigns which the

Imagination propoſes to it, without judging whether it ought to participate of the Images, which the latter hath framed, ſince there is ſo great a reſemblance between its work and the imagination. And as theſe images cannot get out of the Imagination, ſo is it neceſſary, they ſhould produce others like themſelves, which ſhould deſcend to the lower part of the Soul, to deſign to her the figure which it is then giving to the organs.

Moreover, if the Memory be a power, different from the Imagination, it is neceſſary, that all the ſpecies, which it hath in keeping, ſhould be of this nature, and the effects, and, as it were, the copies of thoſe firſt Images, which were produced by Knowledge, and which can no more paſs from one power to another, then any of all the other accidents.

In fine, there will be no ground to make any doubt of this truth, if it may be ſhewn, that after the Images of the Imagination are blotted out, there are ſtill found ſome remainders thereof in the other powers, and ſubſiſt there a long time, after the others are loſt. Now, beſides that the proof of it is clear in the Memory, which ſo preſerves its images, is prejudic'd by a too intentive application of ſpirit, and grows leſs faithfull, when the Imagination would relieve it. It may be alſo drawn, from thoſe marks, which Mothers give their children, during their being with child; From that kind of Reminiſcency which remains in the fingers of a Luteniſt, even after he hath forgotten the Leſſons he could have play'd; And from thoſe deep impreſſions and inclinations, which certain objects leave in the Appetite and Will. For it is impoſſible all this ſhould happen, as it does, but that there muſt remain ſome Character of theſe firſt Images, which the Underſtanding or Imagination

gination frame, and are preſerv'd in thoſe other faculties, a long time after the former are vaniſhed.

Yet it is not to be imagin'd, that the faculties, into which thſee Images are diffus'd, ſhould be of the rank of the knowing faculties, becauſe they have the Inſtruments of knowledge; for we have ſhewn in the place alledg'd, that a faculty cannot know, but it muſt withall produce in it ſelf the images of the things. So that theſe, not producing the images which they have, and onely receiving them, as an effect of the firſt image, fram'd by the Imagination, they cannot know it by a clear and perfect knowledge, but onely, according to that which is competent to all natural things, which, if we may uſe an odd kind expreſſion, Know without knowing, what is conformable or contrary to them. Thus is it, that the Magnetick vertue, which is communicated to Iron, makes it know, and ſenſible of, the preſence of the Load-ſtone, and afterwards excites it to move, and make towards it.

When therefore there is an image fram'd, in any one of the knowing faculties, it is, as it were, a Light, which is multiply'd, and diffuſes it ſelf into all parts of the Soul ſuſceptible thereof. Our meaning is, that thatwhich is ſpiritual is communicated to the ſpirial faculties, and that which is material, to the corporeal faculties, and both kinds act therein according to the nature of the faculty, into which they are entertain'd. For, if it be movable, as the Appetite, that Image moves: if it hath no action, as the Memory, it produces nothing, but is onely preſerv'd in it: if it be alterative, as the formative vertue, it ſerves for a model for the alteration, which it cauſes in the members; and ſo of the reſt. The caſe is the ſame with it, as with that Magnetick vertue we ſpoke of before,

which, though equally communicated to all bodies, does not equally act upon them; it alters and moves the Load-ſtone, Iron, and glaz'd Tiles, yet without cauſing any alteration or motion in all the reſt.

If it be ſo, it will be no hard matter to affirm, how the Appetite, blind as it is, may know Good and Evil, and move conformably to the nature of either. For ſince the Image, which the *Eſtimative faculty*, or *Practick Underſtanding*, hath fram'd thereof, is multiply'd, and diffus'd through all the parts of the Soul; the Appetite receives it, feels it, and afterwards moves, as it ought, in order to its union with the Good, or receſſion from the Evil, to its aſſaulting, or oppoſing of it, according to the inſtruction receiv'd from the Inſtinct, and the knowledge which all natural things have, either to be united to that which is conformable, or to avoid and reſiſt that which is contrary to them.

SECT. 3.

What are Motions of the Soul.

TO reſume the Diſcourſe we have interrupted, we ſay further, that, of what kind ſoever the motions of the Appetite are, whether real, or metaphorical, they are thoſe which frame the Paſſions of the Soul. For though the Schools have reſtrained that name, to the Motions of the ſenſitive Appetite, either by reaſon of the violence they do Reaſon, or that the body ſenſibly ſuffers thereby; yet, if we conſider the agitation, which the Soul endures, we ſhall find

find, that not onely that which is made in the Will, but alſo that in the natural Appetite, is like that, which the Senſitive Appetite ſuffers. For the Will loves and hates, rejoyces and is ſad, as well as the other: and there are in the natural Appetite, ſuch motions as are anſwerable to thoſe others, ſince Nature ſeeks that, which is behovefull, and ſhuns what is prejudicial to it, is ſatisfy'd, or troubled, at the occurrence thereof, is heightned or diſcourag'd, as we ſhall ſhew more particularly hereafter. And as to the violence which the Senſitive Paſſions do Reaſon, and the alteration they cauſe in the body, they are the effects which they produce, yet enter not into their eſſence, but are common to all the motions of the Appetite, of what order ſoever it be, and do not always accompany the emotions of the ſenſitive Appetite.

Accordingly, as the Appetite is the principle of all corporeal motions, ſo is it requiſite, that it ſhould be moved, before any Part of the body can be; and conſequently the agitation of the Spirits, which is obſerv'd in the Paſsions, and cauſes all the changes, that happen in the body, is not wrought, till after the Soul is moved. Moreover, the Motions of the Will are, many times, contrary to reaſon, as well as thoſe of the ſenſitive Appetite, and in the moſt ſpiritual Paſſions, ſuch as Ambition, Envie, *&c.* it alters the body, as well as the other. Nay, it may be affirmed, that, in the motions of the natural Appetite, the body ſometimes endures a greater alteration, then in thoſe of the ſenſitive Appetite, as it appears in a Fever, which is the choler of the natural faculty. To be ſhort, neither doth that violence, nor that alteration always follow the emotions of the ſenſitive Appetite. Of theſe, there are ſome conformable to Reaſon; there

are ſome that remain in the Soul, and do not deſcend to the corporeal faculties, as being raiſed up and diſpers'd ſo of a ſudden, that they have not the time to ſpread themſelves into them. Whereto may be added, that Angels are ſuſceptible of love, hatred, joy, ſadneſs, *&c.* as Theology teacheth.

Whence it may be inferr'd, that there is no ground, for the taking away of the name of Paſsions, from the motions of the Will and natural Appetite, and conſequently, it may be affirm'd, that all the motions of every Appetite are Paſsions, ſince the agitation, which the Soul endures thereby, is equal in them all, and that the end, which ſhe propoſeth to her ſelf therein, is, as to them, alſo alike: for by them all ſhe is agitated and mov'd, either towards the enjoyment of Good, or the eſchewing of Evil.

True it is, that theſe motions are called by divers names, according as they are more or leſs vehement. For, as we call thoſe winds which are more then ordinarily violent, by the name of Storms and Tempeſts; ſo, when the Paſsions are great and extraordinary, they are called Perturbations. And certainly, it may, with ſome ground, be affirm'd, that the Paſsions are, as it were, the winds of the Soul. For, as the Air, which continues in a conſtant calmneſs and tranquility, is unwholeſom; and yet is purify'd by moderate winds, but if they are too violent, they raiſe tempeſts in it: in like manner, the Soul, which is not ſtirr'd by any paſsion, muſt needs be heavie, and of an unhealthy conſtitution; and therefore it is requiſite, it ſhould be moderately agitated, that it may be the more pure and more ſuſceptible of vertue. But if it happen that the Paſsions become too violent, they raiſe in her ſuch tempeſts, as di-

ſturb

ſturb Reaſon, confound the humours, and alter the whole conſtitution of the body.

SECT. 4.

Of the Number of the Paſſions.

THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, Having promiſed to diſcover the motions of the Soul, we now come to examine, how many ways it may be mov'd, and what number there may be of the Paſſions, whereby it may be ſo mov'd. In order to the proſecution of that deſign, it is to be preſuppoſed, that every Appetite hath two parts, the *Concupiſcible*, and the *Iraſcible*; by the former, it perſues Good, and ſhuns Evil; by the latter, it either oppoſes, or complies with, the difficulties, which preſent themſelves. For, as the Univerſe conſiſts, and is full of things contrary and oppoſite one to another; ſo is there not any thing can continue in it, without meeting with enemies, which aſſault and endeavour to deſtroy it. So that it was the work of the providence of Nature, to beſtow on every thing, not onely the vertues, which were neceſſary for the execution of its ordinary, and, as it were, domeſtick Functions, but alſo thoſe, which ſhould ſecure it againſt the attempts of others, and prevent the violences which it might be expoſed to abroad. Upon this account it is, that all things have ſome qualities, conducing to the preſervation of their being; and others, enabling them to oppoſe what is contrary thereto; and

that the Animals, wherein theſe vertues are more diſtinct, have beſtow'd on them two different Appetites; the Concupiſcible, to ſeek out what is convenient for them, and avoid what is hurtfull; and the Iraſcible, to reſiſt Evil, to ingage againſt, and deſtroy it, if there be a neceſſity. In fine, the Iraſcible is that part of the Soul, which governs the forces of the Animal, and manages them, according as the Evil ſeems to require a weak or powerfull reſiſtance.

Now, theſe two parts of the Appetite may move either together, or diſtinctly: for, in Grief, onely the Concupiſcible part is mov'd; in Courage, onely the Iraſcible; but in Anger, both are mov'd at the ſame time, in as much as Anger is a combination of Grief and Courage. When they move diſtinctly, they frame *Simple* Paſsions; when they move together, they make *mixt* Paſsions.

Art. 1.

What the Simple Paſſions, and how many there are.

THe Schools ſet down eleven *Simple* Paſsions; in the *Concupiſcible* Appetite, ſix; to wit, *Love*, *Hate*, *Deſire*, *Averſion*, *Pleaſure* and *Grief*: and in the *Iraſcible*, five, to wit, *Hope*, *Deſpair*, *Confidence*, or *Audacity*, *Fear*, and *Anger*.

But we are to obſerve, that, in this diviſion, *Conſtancy* is forgotten, which is a real Paſsion, and ſerves for matter to the vertue of *CONSTANCY*, Patience, and Perſeverance, Obſtinacy and Hardneſs of heart; as alſo, that among the *Simple* paſsions, Anger

Anger and Hope are numbred, which, no doubt, are *mixt* paſsions; the former, conſiſting of Grief and Courage; and Hope being framed of Deſire and Conſtancy. Moreover, Averſion is propos'd, as a Paſſion diſtinct from Hate, though it be the ſame thing. Nay indeed, Deſire ought not to have been put into the number, as being a ſpecies of love, and having not any motion, different from that of the other.

Art. 2.

That there are but eight ſimple Paſſions.

HAving therefore taken off theſe four paſſions, and eſtabliſh'd Conſtancy in their ſtead, there remain but eight ſimple Paſſions; four in the Concupiſcible Appetite, to wit Love, Hate, Pleaſure and Grief; and four more in the Iraſcible; that is to ſay, Audacity, Fear, Conſtancy, and Conſternation, under which Deſpaire is comprehended,

Art. 3.

Why there are but eight ſimple Paſſions.

THis is the natural diviſion of the Paſſions, as being grounded on the ſeveral kinds of motions, whereby the Soul is ſtirr'd: for ſince the Paſſions are the motions of the Soul, it is according to the diverſity of the motions, that the Paſſions ought principally to be diſtingiſh'd. It is alſo eaſie to be comprehended, by the conſideration of the motions, which

which the Spirits ſuffer in the Paſſions; for being like thoſe of the ſoul, which communicates to them the agitation that ſhe endures, it is manifeſt, after how many faſhions ſoever the Spirits are moved, ſo many ſeveral waies is the Soul alſo moved.

Now the Spirits are ſuſceptible of four motions, which are common to all natural bodies, and are the firſt and ſimpleſt of all motions; to wit, thoſe of Aſcent, Deſcent, Rarefaction, and Condenſation. For when they iſſue out of the heart, to ſpread themſelves into the exteriour parts, the motion is from the centre to the circumference, and that is, to aſcend; and when they make their retreat into the heart, 'tis the contrary motion, from the circumference to the centre, that is, deſcent: they are rarified, when they ſpread and are dilated; and laſtly, they are condens'd, when they are contracted in themſelves.

The Appetite ſuffers proportionably the ſame motions; for though it changes not place, as they do, and that its motions are interiour and immanent, yet does it nevertheleſs cauſe thoſe parts to move, which are in the extenſion of the Soul; ſo that, one while, it forces them to iſſue out; another, it makes them retreat in again; one while, it dilates; another, it contracts them,

When therefore theſe four motions are made in the concupiſcible Appetite, they frame the four firſt Paſsions, of that Appetite, to wit, Love, Hate, Pleaſure and Grief. For the Soul does as it were iſſue out of her ſelf in Love; ſhe retires into her ſelf in Hate; ſhe dilates her ſelf in Pleaſure, and ſhe contracts her ſelf in Grief.

But when the ſame motions are made in the Iraſcible Appetite, which is that part, which hath a reſpect

ſpect to the difficulties that encompaſs Good and Evil, they frame the four firſt Paſſions of that Appetite, to wit, Audacity, Fear, Conſtancy, and Conſternation. For in Audacity, the Soul iſſues out, as in Love, in Fear, ſhe retires, as in Hate, in Conſtancy, ſhe contracts her ſelf, and is confirmed, as in Grief; and in Conſternation, ſhe dilates herſelf, and is enlarged, as in Joy.

So that there is a reſemblance, between the motions of both Appetites, and they differ only in reference to the power, whereby they are excited, and the end, which the Soul propoſes to herſelf therein. For, in Love, the Soul iſſues out of her ſelf in order to the embracing of the Good ſhe perſues; but in Audacity, ſhe iſſues out of her ſelf, to engage the Evil ſhe would oppoſe; and ſo of the reſt, as we ſhall ſhew more particularly in the Diſcourſe of every Paſſion, and as may be obſerv'd in the ſeveral definitions we ſhall give of them, in the ſubſequent Article.

Art 4.

The Definitions of the Simple Paſſions.

THere are therefore, according to the precedent deduction, four *Simple* Paſſions in the *Concupiſcible* Appetite; to wit,

Love, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul is inclin'd towards the Good, in order to its union thereto.

Hate, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul ſeparates her ſelf, and recedes from the Evil.

Plea-

Pleaſure, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul is dilated, and ſpreads her ſelf into the Good, in order to her more abſolute poſſeſſion thereof.

Grief, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul contracts her ſelf, to ſhun the Evil that preſſes upon her.

The four other Paſsions, which belong to the *Iraſcible* Appetite, are,

Conſtancy, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the ſoul is fortifi'd, and grows reſolute, in order to the reſiſtance of thoſe Evils which ſet upon her.

Conſternation, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul is weakned, and gives way to the violence of the Evil.

Audacity, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul violently beſtirs her ſelf againſt the Evil, to overcome it.

Fear, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul retreats, and with a certain precipitation, ſhuns the Evil, which ſhe perceives coming upon her.

Art. 5.

The definitions of the mixt Paſſions.

AS concerning the *mixt* Paſſions, which are made up of the Simple, and are framed, when both the Appetites are moved at the ſame time, the moſt conſiderable of them are theſe:

1. *Hope.* 2. *Arrogance.* 3. *Impudence.* 4. *Emulation.*

lation. 5. *Anger.* 6 *Repentance.* 7. *Shame.* 8. *Jealouſie.* 9. *Compaſſion.* 10. *Envy.* 11. *Agony.*

Hope is a mixture of the deſire of the Good, and the Conſtancy a man expreſſes, in oppoſing the difficulties, whereby it is encompaſſed.

Arrogance proceeds from Self-love, and the Audacity a man hath to ſurpaſs others.

Impudence is fram'd of the Pleaſure and Confidence a man hath to do unhanſome things.

Emulation is a mixture of Grief which a man is apt to be ſubject to, that he is not maſter of thoſe perfections, of which he imagines another to be, and the Hope of being able to acquire them.

Anger conſiſts of the Grief, which a man endures for an injury receiv'd, and the Audacity he hath to retort it.

Repentance proceeds from the Grief, which a man conceives for the evil he hath committed, attended by a Deteſtation of it; which may be termed a kind of Audacity, as we ſhall ſhew in its proper place.

Shame proceeds from a mixture of Grief, and Fear of infamy.

Jealouſie is a confuſion of Love, Hate, Fear and Deſpair.

Compaſſion conſiſts of the Grief, which other mens misfortunes raiſe in us, and a Fear leſt we our ſelves may fall into the like inconveniences.

Envy is a mixture of Grief, and a certain Deſpair of coming to the enjoyment of that Good, which we ſee happens to others.

Agony is a mixture of Grief, Fear, and Audacity.

Art.

Art. 6.

The Natural order of the Paſſions.

THe order, which all theſe Paſſions ought, naturally, to obſerve among themſelves; requires that the *Simple* ſhould be rank'd before the *mixt*, ſince theſe laſt are but ſo many compoſitions of the others; as alſo that the Paſſions of the *Concupiſcible* part ſhould have precedence of thoſe of the *Iraſcible*, in regard the Concupiſcible Appetite, being employed about the ſimple conſideration of Good and Evil, and the Iraſcible conſidering the ſame with the difficulties whereby they are encompaſs'd, the ſaid difficulties are only ſubſequent circumſtances.

But if we compare them, according to their particular kinds, Love and Hate ought to have precedence of all the reſt. For there is not any one of thoſe, which have the Good for their Object, but it is preceded, and accompany'd by Love, as all thoſe that have Evil for their Object are the ſame, by Hate. Accordingly, he, who is ſenſible of the Evil, or oppoſes it, who engages againſt it, or ſhuns it, does infallibly hate it: in like manner, Love is the firſt motion which the Appetite makes towards the Good, as Hate is the firſt it makes, in reference to Evil.

But what Love and Hate are in reſpect of all the Paſsions, the ſame is Conſtancy, and Conſternation, in reſpect of all the Paſsions of the Iraſcible Appetite, whether they be ſimple, or mixt. For it is requiſite, that the Soul ſhould be fortify'd, in Audacity, Hope, Arrogance, Impudence, Emulation, Anger and Repentance: on the contrary, in Fear, Shame, Jealouſie,

Compaſsion and Envy, it is expected ſhe ſhould be enlarged, or admit of ſome relaxation.

Love alſo hath the precedence of Hate, becauſe Good ought naturally to have it of Evil, as the form precedes privation. Pleaſure ſhould alſo go before Grief, in as much as the former proceeds from the preſence of the Good, the latter, from the preſence of Evil. The ſame thing is to be affirm'd proportionably of Conſtancy and Audacity, in reference to Conſternation and Fear. And according to theſe rules, the mixt Paſsions ought to be ranked, as we have done it: for Hope ought to be the firſt, becauſe it conſiſts of Love and Conſtancy, which are the firſt Paſsions of both the Appetites. Arrogance hath the next place, as being a mixture of Love and Audacity; and ſo of the reſt.

Art 7.

That there are three Orders of the Paſſions.

NOw all theſe Paſsions, as well the Simple as the mixt, are of three Orders, or Claſſes; for they are framed, either in the Will, or in the ſenſitive Appetite, or the natural Appetite, each whereof hath its diſtinct concupiſcible and iraſcible parts. But there is nevertheleſs this difference between them, that thoſe parts are more diſtinct, and more compleat in the Will, then they are in the Senſitive Appetite, and more perfect yet in this latter, then in the natural Appetite. For there are ſome, eſpecially of the mixt paſsions, which can hardly be obſerv'd in the ſenſitive Appetite, and in caſe they be fram'd therein, they

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are (if we may uſe that expreſsion) but ſhadows and rude images of thoſe, which are rais'd in the Will. Accordingly, though Anger, Hope, Arrogance, Jealouſie, Emulation, and Envy are apparent in Beaſts, yet are all the reſt but *trick'd* and rudely drawn; and therefore it is not eaſie, to make, in them, any obſervation of Shame, Impudence, Compaſsion, and Remorſe, though they may diſcover certain obſcure lines and tracks thereof. But all, even the Simple paſsions themſelves, are ſo obſcure in the natural Appetite, that never any body yet gave them the name of Paſsions, though they be really ſuch, and ought to be ſo called, as we ſaid before.

We are however to obſerve, that thoſe Paſsions which belong to the Iraſcible Appetite, are more apparent in the natural Appetite then the others: for it is certain, that Nature oppoſes Evils, that ſhe engages againſt them, that ſometimes ſhe is diſcourag'd, and quits the field, and there is not any thing ſo common in Medicine, as to ſay, that ſhe is ſtirr'd and provoked; nay, we have ſhewn elſwhere, that a Fever is the anger of the natural faculty, ſo that it is not to be doubted, but that Audacity and Anger, Conſtancy, and Conſternation, are framed in that inferiour part of the Soul. But as to thoſe of the concupiſcible Appetite, they are not ſo manifeſt in it; neither are Love, Hate, Pleaſure and Grief, to be obſerv'd in it ſo ſenſibly as the others: and yet there is a neceſsity they ſhould be framed therein. For it is not to be imagined, that the evil can be ſhunn'd, unleſs it be firſt hated, ſince Hate is the firſt motion, which Evil excites in the Appetite. Neither can Anger be without Grief, ſince it is part thereof. So that the natural Appetite is ſuſceptible of Hate and Grief,

Grief, and conſequently of Love and Pleaſure, ſince they are contraries compatible to the ſame ſubject.

Moreover, if nature knows and ſhuns what is hurtful to her, it is requiſite that ſhe ſhould alſo know and purſue that which is good for her; and this cannot be done unleſs ſhe have a love to it, ſince Love is the firſt motion fram'd by the Appetite, in order to the purſuit of Good: and as the preſence of evil procureth Grief to her, ſo is it neceſſary, that the preſence of Good ſhould cauſe pleaſure to her.

But, as we ſaid before, theſe paſsions are ſo weak and obſcure, that the ſenſes cannot eaſily take notice of them; and indeed they are not eaſily diſcoverable, otherwiſe then by reaſon and diſcourſe.

The cauſe of this diverſity proceeds not only hence, that theſe Appetites are more inclin'd to motion, one then another. For the Will, being diſengag'd from matter, moves more eaſily then the ſenſitive Appetite, and this more eaſily then the natural, in regard it hath, for its ſubject, a more ſubtile matter, and conſequently more inclinable to motion then it. But it proceeds alſo from the more or leſs perfect knowledge, which directs them. For as the Underſtanding knows more perfectly, and more things, then the Imagination, ſo does it withall inſpire the Will with a greater variety of motions, then the other does; and this latter alſo, having a greater and more exact knowledge, then the natural faculty, does accordingly frame more Paſsions in the ſenſitive Appetite than there are in the Natural Appetite.

SECT. 5.

How the Paſſions of one Appetite are communicated to another.

THere is yet another thing to be conſidered, which is of very great importance, to wit, that the Paſſions, framed in either of the three Appetites, are ordinarily communicated from one to another; ſo that thoſe of the Will deſcend into the ſenſitive Appetite, and the natural Appetite, as theirs do aſcend into the Will. For it is certain, that the Will does many times ſuffer it ſelf to be tranſported with the Love, Pleaſure, and Grief, by which the ſenſitive Appetite is ſtirr'd, in the ſame manner as Love, and the gladneſs and ſadneſs of the mind ſpread themſelves into the body, and cauſe conformable emotions therein.

But the difficulty is, to know how this communication is wrought. For it might ſeem, ſince things material can have no action upon the ſpiritual, that neither ſenſible goods nor ſenſible evils can touch the Spirit; nor conſequenly, be acceptable or delightful objects thereto. On the other ſide, though the Underſtanding may heighten the Phantaſmes of the Imagination, and render them ſpiritual, yet is it not in the power of the Imagination, to change the Idæa's of the Underſtanding, which are ſpiritual, into corporeal Phantaſms: conſequent whereto it is, that the goods and evils of the mind cannot touch the ſenſitive

ſenſitive Soul, nor raiſe any Paſsion therein.

To anſwer theſe reaſons, and reſolve this great difficulty, we might affirm, with the Schools, that there is a Sympathy between the faculties of the Soul, and that they are ſo ſtrictly combin'd together, that it is impoſsible, one ſhould not have a ſentiment of what paſſes in the other; or haply, that, being all reunited in the ſubſtance of the Soul, which is the Centre and principle thereof, and, as it were, the main wheel, which keeps them all in their ſeveral motions; It is the Soul her ſelf that cauſes them to act, one after another, conformably to the actions that are to be done. So that, for example, the Appetite moves, after the knowledge of Imagination, and the members move after the emotion of the Appetite, in regard there is a certain ſympathy betwixt theſe faculties, or that the Soul excites them, and diſpoſes them to act in that order.

This being ſo, it would be no hard matter to tell how the Paſſions of one Appetite paſs into another, in as much as theſe powers acting one after another, according to the ſympathy there is between them, or by the particular direction of the Soul, it is neceſſary, not onely that the Soul ſhould move, after ſhe hath been enlightned by the Underſtanding, but it is alſo requiſite, that the Senſitive Appetite ſhould ſtirr after her; in the ſame manner as we apprehend, that the Will is oblig'd to move, as ſoon as the Imagination hath excited ſome motion in the Senſitive Appetite.

But to deal ingenuouſly, we muſt acknowledge, that theſe opinions do not fully ſatisfie the mind. For, beſides that the word Sympathy is one of thoſe tearms that ſerve to elude difficulties, and flatter our ignorance; it may be farther preſs'd, that if, by it onely,

the rational Soul and the ſenſitive communicate their paſſions to each other, it will be requiſite, that there ſhould not be any paſſion in the latter, which does not aſcend into the Will, and that all kinds of ſadneſs ſhould be attended by grief, and in like manner all grief by ſadneſs. But this is not true; ſince they are onely the greateſt ſadneſſes whereof the body hath any reſentment, and that light griefs reach not the mind, and caſt it not into ſadneſs.

Beſides, this Sympathy does not exclude that manner of acting, which is natural to the faculties: it is an order eſtabliſh'd by Nature, that the Senſitive Appetite ſhould be enlightned by the Imagination, and that the Imagination ſhould take cognizance onely of things ſenſible. How comes it then to paſs, that it ſhould know the object of a ſpiritual paſſion? On the other ſide, how are we to conceive, that the Underſtanding and Will, which are ſpiritual powers, ſuffer themſelves to be mov'd by corporeal objects? And how can Grief, for example, be ſaid to excite ſadneſs in the mind, what Sympathy ſoever may be imagin'd between theſe powers? In fine, Sympathy does always preſuppoſe ſome knowledge; for the Iron ought to feel the preſence of the Load-ſtone, that it may move towards it. And conſequently it is requiſite, that every Appetite ſhould know the judgment of the faculty, which enlightens it; whereas, in the mean time, the Appetite is a blind power, and ſuch as hath not any knowledge.

Again, if it be ſaid, that it is the ſubſtance of the Soul which ſets theſe faculties in action, which yet cannot be done without her having a knowledge of the order they ought to obſerve in their actions, and a particular cognizance of the manner, after which the Appetite

petite ought to move in every paſſion ; it will follow, that the Soul ought to have in her ſelf the knowledge of an infinity of things, and that ſhe ſhould know them by her own proper ſubſtance, without the aſſiſtance of any faculty; an excellency not to be found in any created Being, and to be attributed onely to Divine Nature.

Let us therefore endeavour to find out ſome other plauſible means, whereby the Body & Soul may be ſaid to communicate one to the other, the good and evil they reſent. To do that, we are to obſerve, that the Mind, which is the nobleſt, and moſt excellent part of Man, is alſo, as it were, King of that little Monarchy, taking notice of whatſoever paſſes therein, that is worth the conſideration, and having a particular care of the Body, as being the inſtrument of moſt of its actions, and, together with it, making up a Whole, in the ſubſiſtence and preſervation whereof it is no leſs concern'd, then in its own. In ſo much that it is not to be admir'd, that it ſhould have a certain ſentiment of the good or evil things which happen to the other, and that it ſhould frame the ſame paſsions, which they raiſe in the Senſitive Appetite. And this is no hard matter for it to do, in as much as it ſees the phantaſms, which the imgination hath made thereof, upon which, it frames its idæas and judgments, and afterwards preſents them to the Will.

By this means is it then, that the paſsions of the Body are ordinarily communicated to the Mind. But the caſe is not the ſame with thoſe of the Mind, in reference to the Body, in as much as it is not by knowledge that the Underſtanding communicates them to the Senſitive Soul, for the reaſon by us before alledged; but it is immediately done by the motion,

which the Will imprints in the ſenſitive Appetite. For there is no inconvenience in affirming, that the Will moves the Appetite, becauſe motion is common as well to things ſpiritual as corporeal; but in maintaining, that the thoughts of the Underſtanding are communicated to the Imagination, there is, in regard ſpiritual things cannot ever become corporeal.

To clear up this Propoſition a little further, we are to obſerve, that the Will hath an immediate command & ſuperintendency, over all the parts of the Soul and Body, which are moved voluntarily. For it is in its power to move the members, without any interpoſition of the Senſitive Appetite; it being unlikely, for example, that, in a reſolution which the Underſtanding hath made to ſtretch forth the hand, it ſhould be requiſite, that that motion be made by the directions of the ſenſitive Soul, which hath not any apprehenſion of the object, or the motive of that action. Now, if it hath this power over the members, with much more reaſon ſhall it have the ſame over the Appetite, which being nearer, and more apt to move, then they are, ought accordingly to be the more ſubject thereto; and conſequently, the Will may ſtirr it, and imprint in it the ſame motions which it hath given it ſelf.

Hence it alſo follows, that all thoſe things which are in motion, as well the corporeal as the ſpiritual, produce, in thoſe others whereto they are apply'd, a certain motive quality, which may be called Impetuoſity, and that is, as it were, an impreſſion and communication of their motion. For, it is by this communication, that the bodies, which are forced or darted, continue the motion they have receiv'd from the hand, though they be at a diſtance from it. By the

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ſame communication is it alſo, that Angels do enforce bodies, & chaſe away evil Spirits, in regard they have not any vertue or means to act really and phyſically on things, other then the motion they imprint in them.

This being certain, it follows, that the Will, which moves, ſhould imprint its motion in the ſenſitive Appetite, and that it ſhould ſtirr, yet ſo, as that the latter ſtand not in need of any precedent knowledge of the imagination. For, though it be true, that the ſenſitive Appetite cannot move, but it muſt receive a previous illumination from that Faculty, yet is this to be underſtood onely when it moves of it ſelf, and ſuffers no violence, by any other ſtrange cauſe, as it is here.

Now, as the Will imprints in this Appetite the emotion it gives it ſelf; in like manner, when this latter is ſtirr'd, it communicates its motion to the Will, in regard that, whatſoever moves may imprint its motion on the things which are near it, if they do not oppoſe it either by the weight, or ſome contrary motion. For the Will and Appetite do many times oppoſe one the other, by their contrary agitations; Nor do the members, and other bodies, always obey them, by reaſon of their weight, which is ſtronger then the motion imprinted in them by the Will and Appetite.

All that may be ſaid hereupon, amounts onely to this, that, in this caſe, the motions of the Will and Appetite would not be vital actions, which cannot be forc'd, nor proceed from without, but ought to iſſue from the ground of that power, by which they are performed. But it may be anſwer'd, that the Will and Appetite, having receiv'd that external motion, move

themſelves, and produce their own proper, immanent and vital actions, after the ſame manner, that a man, who is thruſt forward, moves afterwards and goes of himſelf; or as he who is forc'd to do ſomething againſt his will: For his Will is immediately ſhaken, by the violence that had been done him; but at laſt it conſents thereto, and moves it ſelf, in order to the performance of the action. So that thoſe external motions which the Appetite and Will reciprocally give and receive, one from the other, are not real Paſſions, while thoſe powers move not of themſelves. But as there are ſome ſprings, or reſorts, which immediately move upon the leaſt touch; in like manner, theſe faculties have ſuch an aptitude to motion, that as ſoon as ever they have received the impreſſion one from another, they are ſtirr'd, & produce real Paſſions. Not but that it happens very often, they are ſhaken, yet do not move themſelves; and no doubt, when the Will, which would not be tranſported with any Paſſion of the ſenſitive Appetite, does nevertheleſs feel a ſweet violence, which gives her a certain bent towards it, it may be ſaid, that the Will then ſuffers the impreſſion of the motion, which it receives from the Appetite; but not that it does ſtirr, or that any emotion can be attributed thereto.

Now the difference there is between the Paſſions, which are thus excited, conſiſts in this, that the Underſtanding hath an immediate ſight of the object, whereby the ſenſitive Appetite hath been moved; But the Imagination, which cannot know the object of the Will, obſerving the motion excited by this latter in the Appetite, frames to it ſelf an object and motive conformable to that motion, and ſo renders

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the Paſſion compleat, juſt as it does in dreams, in that kind of Love which proceeds purely from Inclination, and in thoſe Paſſions, which Muſick inſpires, as we have ſaid elſwhere. For we have ſhewn, that, when the Soul obſerves, in the Appetite or Spirits, ſome motion, which is proper to Paſsion, though ſhe be ignorant of the object, which raiſes that motion, frames to her ſelf another of it, which is proportionable to that Paſsion. Hence it comes to paſs, that a man, who falls aſleep upon his anger, repreſents to himſelf, in his dreams, enemies and fighting, in regard the diſturbance rais'd in the Spirits is obſerv'd by the Imagination, which afterwards frames to its ſelf objects, conformable to that motion.

The ſame thing may be ſaid of Muſick, and the foremendoned Love of Inclination; for both of theſe imprint in the Spirits ſuch motions, as being like thoſe of the Paſsions, cauſe the Soul, which takes notice of them, to repreſent to her ſelf ſuch objects, as are proper to thoſe Paſsions, and ſo to frame the Paſsions themſelves.

However it be, this is deducible hence, that when the Imagination hath felt the emotion excited by the Will in the Appetite, it frames to its ſelf ſuch an object, as is requiſite, for the producing of that Paſsion. But it is an uncertain, and confuſed object, which does not preciſely determine it; and therefore it many times happens, that in ſuch a caſe, a man cannot give any reaſon why he is ſad or merry, and though he be ſenſible of the Good or Evil, yet can he not ſpecifie which it is.

SECT.

SECT. 6.

What is the Seat and firſt Subject of the Appetite.

BY all we have hitherto ſaid, it is ſufficiently apparent, that the Appetite is the firſt Subject of the Paſſions, becauſe they are motions, and that the Appetite is the only part of the Soul, which moves. But as the Soul is the Form of the Body, and the faculties have certain proper Organs, wherein they reſide, and where they act, we are now to examine, what part of the Body it is, which ſerves for a Seat to the Appetite, and where it frames its firſt motions; for this examination is neceſſary to our deſign, ſince we ſhall be ever and anon oblig'd, to ſpeak of the place, whence the Paſſions have their firſt riſe.

We are then in the firſt place to ſuppoſe, that the Faculties of the Soul are inſeparable from its ſubſtance, and that whereever ſhe is, they alſo are. But in regard that, of theſe, there are ſome, which ſtand in need of Organs, in order to action, though they are in all places where the Soul is, yet they act only in their own Organs.

Thoſe Faculties which are Spiritual, being not confin'd to matter, do not ſtand in need of Organs, and conſequently, they are, and act, in all places, where the Soul is, as the Underſtanding and Will. For though the actions of the Underſtanding are more apparent in the Head, and thoſe of the Will, in the Heart,

Heart, then they are any where elſe, yet is it not to be conceiv'd, that theſe two parts are the Organs thereof; but, becauſe the faculties, ſubſervient to them, are in thoſe places, and that we commonly attribute, to thoſe high powers, the actions of thoſe faculties which are ſubſervient thereto, as we attribute to the Prince, what is done by his Miniſters.

But the caſe is otherwiſe in the Corporeal Faculties, for it is requiſite, that they ſhould be reſtrain'd to ſome part of the Body, which ſerves them for a ſubject, and inſtrument, in order to the performance of their functions. And it is out of all doubt, that the Senſitive and Natural Appetites are of that order; but there is a great diſpute among Philoſophers, to know, which is the proper ſeat of either of them.

Art. I.

What is the Seat of the Senſitive Appetite.

AS to the Senſitive Appetite, we find by experience, that, in any Paſſion whatſoever, the Heart is troubled and mov'd, and that there are very few, how ſecret ſoever they may be, which may not be diſcover'd, by the beating of the Arteries. The ordinary manner of ſpeaking, nay indeed Religion it ſelf, will have it, that this part ſhould not only be a ſource of all the Paſſions, which cauſe any alteration in the Body, but alſo, of all the affections and motions of the Soul; ſo that we may affirm it to be the Seat, Subject, and principal Organ of the ſenſitive Appetite.

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But we ſee further, that in Inſects and Serpents, the parts, after ſeparation from the Heart, diſcover ſenſe and motion, when they are touch'd. Nay ſome have obſerv'd, that, in the more perfect Animals, the Members move for a certain time, after this part hath been taken away from them. And we are aſſur'd, by our late obſervations, that, before the formation of the Heart and Brain, there is motion and ſentiment in the Embryo. To be ſhort, Hunger and Thirſt are two ſenſitive Appetites, and it is generally acknowledg'd, that the mouth of the Stomach, and not the Heart, is the real ſubject thereof. Nay, there is no ſenſible part can be ſo ſlightly wounded, as not to move at the ſame inſtant, and yet it cannot be ſaid, that the Heart is the cauſe of that motion. And therefore, it ſeems probable, that the Appetite ought to be whereever there is ſentiment, ſince the Senſe enlightens the Appetite, and that the latter cannot move without it. And thence ſome have imagin'd, that the Brain, which is the principle of ſentiment, and the Organ of the Imagination, ſhould alſo have the ſame relation to the ſenſitive Appetite.

From all theſe obſervations it may be concluded, that there are two kinds of ſenſitive Appetite; one, which is *general* and *common*, regarding the conſervation of the whole Animal, ſuch as is that which frames the ordinary Paſsions of Love, Hate, &c. the other, *particular* and *proper* to every part. The *firſt*, no doubt, is plac'd in the Heart, which is the ſpring of Life, and the Centre, from which do proceed all the powers, whereby the Animal is govern'd. The *ſecond* hath its ſeat in every part, as Hunger and Thirſt, in the Stomach.

But conſidering further, that theſe two Appetites are

are of one and the ſame nature, having the ſame motions, the ſame objects, and the ſame end, and that they differ one from the other, but as homogenial parts of the ſame whole, it is accordingly requiſite, that they ſhould have one ſubject, which ought alſo to be of the ſame nature; And conſequently, it is neceſſary, that there ſhould be in the Heart, and in every part, ſome Organ, which may be common, in order to its being the chief Subject of that Faculty, which is common to them.

To diſcover this, we are to remember, and reflect on what we ſaid before, to wit, that all the powers of the Soul are inſeparable from her ſubſtance, and that, nevertheleſs, they do not act whereever ſhe is, but only in certain parts. Now, this cannot proceed from any thing, but the particular diſpoſition, which thoſe parts have, to be aſsiſtant to their actions, whether they be more proper to receive the Impreſſion of the objects, as for inſtance the Eye, which ought to be tranſparent, that it might give paſſage to Light, and the viſible Species, and ſo of the other Senſes; or that they are more proper to execute the motion, which the Soul ought to make; as the Muſcles are the inſtruments of voluntary motions, in regard they conſiſt of tendons and fleſh, which are capable of contraction, without which theſe motions cannot be made.

This preſuppos'd, as a truth not to be brought into diſpute, it is requiſite, that the part, wherein the Appetite hath its immediate reſidence, ſhould be proper to the action it ought to do; and whereas there is no other action then motion, it is alſo neceſſary, that the ſaid part ſhould have the diſpoſitions proper to motion. Now there is not any diſpoſition more

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proper to motion then Levity and Rarity, and conſequently, it is requiſite, that the Organ, and firſt Subject of the Appetite, ſhould be of a rare and light matter, and that it ſhould be preſent in all thoſe places, where all the motions of the Appetite are made. So that there not being any part, whereto this may be attributed, but only the Spirits, it follows, that the Appetite hath its reſidence in them, as its firſt and chiefeſt ſubject.

But in regard there are two kinds of Spirits in general, thoſe that are *fixt* and reſtrain'd to ſome part, which are the firſt Bonds, whereby the Soul and Body are joyned together; and thoſe, which are *errant* and unconfin'd, which diſtribute to all the members, the heat particularly aſſign'd them by the heart: it is requiſite, that they ſhould be the fixt Spirits, that have the Prerogative, of being the firſt ſubject of the Appetite, for it is the part the moſt apt to motion, of any that enter into the compoſition of the Members; one that hath a durable and permanent conſiſtence, as the Appetite, and is without diſpute animate; it being certain, that the faculties of the Soul cannot be in a ſubject, which is not animate. For it is not to be imagin'd, that the errant Spirits, which are not only depriv'd of Soul, and Life, as it is commonly held, but alſo have not any durable ſubſiſtence, no more then the Flame, which aſſoon as lighted is thence-forward continually decaying, can ſupport a Faculty of the Soul, which is fixt and permanent, as the Appetite is.

Whence it may be concluded, that the Heart is indeed the Seat of the generall Appetite, but it is, by reaſon of the fixt Spirits, which enter into its compoſition; and the caſe is the ſame of every Member,

ber, in reference to the particular Appetite.

Art. 2.

The Seat of the naturall Appetite.

ALl that we have ſaid of the *Senſitive* Appetite may be apply'd to the *Naturall* Appetite. For of this alſo there are two kinds; one, *Generall*, which hath a care of the whole Body, and is accordingly plac'd in the heart; and this is the ſame with that which diſperſes the Spirits and humours into all the parts, which ſhakes them in Fevers, and makes the Criſes, and ſuch like motions, which regard the whole Body. The other is *Particular*, and hath its Seat in every part; it attracts what is good for it, it drives away what is hurtfull, it cauſes the contraction of the Fibres, the convulſion of the Nerves, &c.

But whereas the *Senſitive* Appetite is not plac'd in the Heart and other parts, but upon the accompt of the fixt Spirits, which enter into their compoſition, the caſe is the ſame with the Naturall Appetite; they are alſo the ſame Spirits, which ſerve it for a firſt ſubject, and firſt Organ, upon the ſame grounds as they are ſo of the other. For ſince that part is the moſt apt to motion, of any of the Vegetative Soul, it ſhould accordingly have a Subject, furniſhed with the diſpoſitions proper to make its motions, and there are not any other then theſe Spirits, as we ſaid before.

I queſtion not but ſome will make this Objection againſt what hath been deliver'd, That diverſe Faculties require diverſe Organs, and that theſe two Appetites

petites, being different, not only in the Species, but alſo in the Genus, as belonging to ſeveral orders of the Soul, cannot have for their ſubject the ſame Spirits. But it is eaſily anſwer'd, ſince we have experience on our ſide, and oppoſite to theſe maximes: for the ſame animal Spirits diſpoſe of ſentiment and motion; the ſame Subſtance of the Brain becomes the ſubject of all the ſuperiour powers of the Senſitive Soul; and the fleſh, as ſimple as it is, hath both the ſenſitive and vegetative vertue.

But after all, the motion of the ſenſitive Appetite is not different from that of the naturall Appetite, as to the nature and ſpecies of motion; it is made after the ſame manner in both, and all the diverſity found therein is accidental, and not relating to the motion. For it proceeds only from the cauſe and condition of the object that moves it, which are things not relating to the motion. For it proceeds only from the cauſe and condition of the object that moves it, which are things not relating to the motion. In the one, it is the Senſitive faculty, that moves for the ſenſible good or evil; in the other, the natural faculty moves, for the natural good or evil: but both move after the ſame manner, and frame the ſame Paſſions; as we have ſhewn, and conſequently, there is not any inconvenience, that theſe two powers ſhould have the ſame Subject, in order to the ſame action.

We have not any thing to add hereto, ſave that, according as the parts have a greater or leſſer portion of theſe fixt Spirits, they have proportionably one or the other Appetite more ſtrong and vigorous. As alſo, that the general Appetite and particular Appetite, do many times aſſiſt one the other, and many times alſo they act diſtinctly. But we ſhall ever and

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anon have occaſion to hint at theſe matters, when we come to treat of the Paſsions in particular.

Art. 3.

How the Paſſions are compleated.

NOw to put a period to that which appertains to the general diſcourſe of the Paſsions, we are to conſider all the paſſes in the body, after the emotion of the Soul, and the fixt Spirits. For though the nature of every Paſsion conſiſts in this emotion, yet may it be ſaid, that it is not compleat, if there be not joyn'd thereto the agitation, which the Heart endures, and the alteration which is occaſion'd in the whole body.

We are therefore to obſerve, that, after the Soul hath been mov'd, the Heart and vital Spirits follow her motion; and if ſhe would execute without, what ſhe hath propos'd in her ſelf, ſhe at laſt cauſes the Muſcles to move, in the Paſsions of the Will and ſenſitive Appetite, and the Fibres, in thoſe of the natural Appetite; in regard the Muſcles are the inſtruments of voluntary motion, as the Fibres are of that which is made by the natural Appetite. But how theſe motions are made, we ſhall treat more at large in the enſuing Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Motion of the Heart, and Spirits, in the Paſsions.

THE motion of the Heart is made for the Spirits, and that of the Spirits, for the whole Body. For the Heart is mov'd in order to the production and conſervation of the Spirits, and theſe are alſo moved, for the communication of the vital heat to all the parts, to bring into them the aliment, whereby they are to be nouriſh'd, and to tranſport the humours from one place to another, as the Soul thinks it neceſſary; as it happens in the Paſsions, as alſo in Criſes, and upon other occaſions.

That this may be the better comprehended, it is requiſite, that we aſcend to a higher diſquiſition of things, and ſince there is ſo much ſpoken of the Spirits, our next examination muſt be, to find out, what they are, of what matter they are compos'd, and how they are framed. And indeed, it may be affirm'd, that neither Philoſophy nor Medicine have ſufficiently explain'd themſelves, upon this Subject, and the difficulties they have left therein give every man the liberty, to propoſe his conjectures, in order to the clearing up of a thing ſo obſcure, and ſo intricate.

Art.

Art. 1.

Of the Nature of the Spirits.

WIthout engaging our ſelves upon an exact diſquiſition of the Elements, whereof bodies are compos'd, it is a thing both certain, and ſenſibly acknowledg'd, that there are three ſorts of parts, which enter into the compoſition of all mixt bodies. Of thoſe parts ſome are ſubtile, active and volatile; others groſs, paſsive, and heavy; and the third are moiſt, as being deſign'd to joyn together thoſe two ſo oppoſite extreams. For they have ſomewhat of the ſubtilty of the firſt, and of the groſſneſs of the others; and when theſe are reſolved, the whole mixt body is deſtroy'd, in regard they are the cement, whereby all the parts are united together.

Thoſe ſubtile parts are called Spirits; inaſmuch as they have ſo little matter, and ſo much activity, that they ſeem not fit to be ranked among bodies; and while they are united with the others, they ſerve for principal Organs to the forms, as being the moſt active parts; and they are as it were the bond, which keeps them within the body. The reaſon whereof is, that Nature, which ever joyns the extreams by a certain mean, that hath ſome rapport thereto, employs the ſubtile parts, which have little of matter, to joyn and unite the forms, which have not any, to the groſſer parts, that have much.

True it is, that they may be ſeparated, and yet be afterwards conſerv'd, as we find by experience, in diſtillations; for ſo it is, that the Spirit of Wine, Sul-

phur,&c.is extracted. And being ſo extracted,though they loſe the uſe they had when they were united to their natural forms, yet do they not loſe any thing of their ſubſtance, or ſubtilty.

Art. 2.

Of the matter of the Spirits.

NOw as Plants are nouriſh'd by the juices which they draw out of the Earth, ſo have theſe juices their ſubtile and ſpirituous parts, as well as all the other Mixt bodies; which parts, not being loſt, as we ſaid before, paſs into the Animals, which feed on thoſe Plants as thoſe of the Animals paſs into ſuch, as they become nouriſhment to. So that it is not to be doubted but that the blood is full of theſe ſubtile eſſences, which the natural heat afterwards digeſts and refines in the veins, to be made the inſtruments of the Soul: and that they are the matter us'd by Nature to frame, and entertain the vital Spirits; ſince ſubtile things are to be made of thoſe which are of the ſame nature with them.

Art. 3.

How the Spirits are framed.

BUt to find out the ſecret of all this Oeconomy, we are to repreſent to our ſelves, that the blood, which

which is in the *Hollow Vein*, enters into the right ventricle of the Heart, where it is warm'd, by the heat and motion of that part, which is the hotteſt of any about the body. After its being warm'd there, it iſſues out boyling and reeking, and enters into the Lungs, where it meets with the air, attracted in by reſpiration, which by its coolneſs thickens the fumes, which it exhales from all parts, which fumes are no other then the ſpirituous parts, wherewith it is fill'd, and which, upon the acceſſion of the leaſt heat, are ſeparated and evaporated. So that Nature does, in this, what commonly happens in the diſtilling of *Aqua-Vitæ*, in which work, there is cold water caſt about the Recipient, as it were, to gather together, and reduce into a body the ſpirits of the wine, then chang'd into vapour, and to promote their paſſage along with the others. Thence it comes, that the vein, which carries this reeking blood into the Lungs, is as big as an Artery, as it were to prevent the diſſipation, which might be made thereof, before it be ſo cooled. On the contrary, the Artery which receives it, after it hath been cool'd, is as ſmall as any vein; there being not then any fear of diſſipation. And it is not unlikely, that this is the reaſon, why that Artery hath but two *valvulæ*, whereas the other Veſſels which enter into the Heart have three. For as theſe *valvulæ*, whatever ſome others may be pleaſed to ſay, were made only to prevent the impetuoſity of the blood, which is to enter into the heart, and afterwards to come out of it; ſo was there not any neceſſity that the veiny Artery ſhould have ſo many obſtacles, to retain the impetuoſity of the blood it carries, in regard it muſt needs have left much thereof,

after it hath been cool'd, and temperated, by the air, which is in the Lungs.

But however it be, hence proceeds the indiſpenſable neceſſity of reſpiration; for if thoſe parts of the blood, which are ſo reduc'd into fumes, ſhould not be condens'd, and reaſſume a kind of body, they would be immediately diſſipated: And whereas this muſt be the matter of the Spirits, as being the moſt ſubtile, and moſt pure portion thereof, there would not be made any new generation, if nature had not found out a means to condenſe theſe vapours, by the coolneſs of the air, which is continually attracted by the Lungs. Thence it comes, that there is no poſſibility of continuing long without reſpiration, in regard that, all parts of the body ſtanding in need of the continuall influence of the Spirits, it is requiſite, the Heart ſhould continually repair them, and that cannot be done without reſpiration, for the reaſon we gave before.

Art 4.

An Objection againſt the precedent Doctrine anſwered.

I Know well enough that the common Doctrine would have the Air to enter into the compoſition of the Spirits, and that natural heat, nay indeed fire it ſelf, ſtands in need of air to moderate them, as not being able to conſerve themſelves without it; And that this is the reaſon why reſpiration is neceſſary, in regard it conducts air to the Heart, and moderates the

the exceſſive heat thereof. But we are taught by Anatomical obſervations, that there is not any veſſel, which conducts the air into that part, and that the veiny Artery, which was heretofore conceiv'd to ſerve for that uſe, is alwaies full of blood, and does undoubtedly convey, to the Heart, all that which is entered into the Lungs. Beſides, it may be urged, that Fiſhes have their vital Spirits, though there be not any air, which may contribute to their production. True it is, they have the motion of the Gills, as alſo of the holes, at which they ſprout out the water, and that is anſwerable to that of the Lungs, and cauſes the ſame effect, with the water, which they ever and anon attract, as the Lungs do, with the air they reſpire.

Yet is there not any thing to be deduc'd hence, which may imply my not being of opinion, that the air reſpir'd, which is all full of theſe ſpirituous parts exhal'd by all bodies, do not furniſh the vitall Spirits, with ſome portion of themſelves, which being mixt therewith, paſſes and inſinuates it ſelf into the Heart and Arteries, through the Pores of the Veſſels. Hence it comes, that Animals are ſenſible of the qualities of the air, which they reſpire; and *Hippocrates* affirms, that the moſt ſudden nouriſhment is wrought by odors. But this is a thing happens by chance, and is not to be admitted into the deſign of Nature And as to the cooling or refreſhment, which is cauſed by the air, it is not intended to moderate the exceſs of the heat, but for the reaſon given by us before, which is common to fire and the ſpirits: For the coldneſs of the air condenſes the exhalations which ſhould be enflam'd, it gathers them together, and hinders their rarefaction and diſperſion. And therefore, when it

is very cold, the fire is the more violent and ſcorching, in regard the matter of the flame ſuffers a greater contraction; And the light of the Sun diminiſhes the heat of the fire, in regard it rarifies and diſperſes the exhalation, which feeds it. Not but that the air does moderate the heat of the Heart, when it is violent; but that is not the main end, at which Nature aims; it is only a ſlender ſervice, and convenience, which ſhe derives, by the by, from her principal deſign.

But howere it be, this is certain, that after the blood, which came out of the right ventricle, hath travers'd the Lungs, it is diſcharged into the left, where, it may be ſaid, it is return'd into the furnace, and is ſtirr'd and agitated afreſh, and where its more ſubtile parts are ſo refin'd, that they acquire all the diſpoſitions, neceſſary to Spirits, to make them vital; and then they are endu'd with the form and vertue thereof, and aſſume the place and function of thoſe, which have been diſtributed to the parts.

Art. 5.

Why the heart moves.

FRom what hath been deliver'd, it may be inferr'd, that the motion of the Heart ſerves for the generation of Spirits; But that that ſhould be the principal motive, which oblig'd Nature to give it that motion, is what cannot be eaſily affirm'd. For, in a word, all Animals have thoſe ſorts of ſpirits, but all have not that motion; ſo that this may be ſtood upon,

on, that it is not abſolutely neceſſary to their generation.

For my part, I am of opinion, that, in this, Nature had a greater regard to the conſervation of the Spirits, then to their production. For whereas things are conſerv'd, by that which is conformable and natural thereto, and that motion is natural to the Spirits, which are of a fiery nature, and proportion'd to the Element of the Stars, as *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks; it is accordingly requiſite, that they ſhould be in perpetual motion, as thoſe bodies are. And in effect, we cannot ſtop the motion of fire without quenching it, and all thoſe things, which hinder the Spirits from moving, as Narcoticks, and fulneſs, deprave them, and deſtroy the Animal. It therefore concern'd the providence of Nature to find out ſome artifice, whereby the vital Spirits ſhould be continually ſtirr'd, to the end they might be conſerv'd by that which is moſt proper and natural to them. And there could not be a more commodious way found, then the motion of the Heart and Arteries, which ever and anon excites and awakens the Spirits, which are intermix'd with the blood. For that humour being groſs and heavy, there would have been ſome danger of its ſmothering them by its weight, if that miraculous reſſort, which gives a continual motion to the arterial blood, ſhould not hinder that diſorder. Hence it comes, that the arteries alwayes accompany the greater veins, that their agitation might excite the Spirits, which are mixt with the blood; the leſſer veins ſtanding not in need of that attendance, by reaſon of the ſmall quantity of humour which they contain, as ſuch as is not capable of hindring their motion. And in thoſe Animals, which have no blood, that motion is neither ſo ſenſible

ſible nor ſo neceſſary, in regard the humours there are more ſubtile, and for the moſt part are only ſeroſities, which are in a more eaſie ſubjection to the Spirits.

It was therefore the principal intention of Nature, to beſtow motion on the Heart, in order to the conſervation of the Spirits; yet with this precaution, that it hinder not, but that ſhe may employ it to other uſes. For, as a frugal and provident Houſewife, ſhe makes that which is neceſſary to her main deſign, to be ſubſervient alſo to other conveniences, which, were it not for that, ſhe might have been without: Upon this account is it, that ſhe employes the motion of the Heart, to ſubtilize the matter of the Spirits, to force away the impurities that are therein, to moderate the heat thereof, which might become exceſſive, and to force the Spirits to the extremities of the Arteries, ſo to diſperſe the heat and vital vertue into all parts. Now of all theſe employments there are certain advantages, yet are they not abſolutely neceſſary, ſince all this is done in many Animals, without any motion of the Heart.

Art. 6.

That the Spirits are moved for three ends.

TO reſume our diſcourſe of the motion of the Spirits, we ſaid before, that it was deſign'd for the communication of the vital heat to all the parts, to convey into them the blood, whereby they are to be nouriſh'd, and to tranſlate the humours from one

place

place to another, as it happens in the Paſſions, in Criſes, and upon ſuch other occaſions.

As to the firſt, it will be no hard matter to prove it; for it is generally acknowledg'd, and ſenſe and reaſon teach us, that all the heat and vigour of the parts proceeds from the vital Spirits, which are produced by the Heart, and as ſoon as this influence ceaſes, they become cold and languiſhing.

Art. 7.

That the Spirits convey the blood into the parts.

But for the conveyance of the blood into the ſeveral parts, there are not any Philoſophers that have made it the employment of the Spirits, but it is generally attributed by them, either to the impulſion which it receives from the beating of the Heart, or to ſome attractive vertue, which draws it forth into every part. It is therefore requiſite we make it appear, that theſe opinions cannot be maintain'd, and that it is the proper work of the Spirits, to diſpoſe it into the veins. For there is a neceſſity, that it ſhould be either forc'd out, or attracted, or convey'd; ſo that when it ſhall have been ſhewn, that there is not any thing whereby it is either forc'd out, or attracted, it will follow, that there muſt be ſomething to convey it, and that only the Spirits can be capable of the employment.

Moſt of thoſe, who maintain the *circulation* of the blood, do not admit of the Spirits, at leaſt as bodies diſtinct from the blood, and affirm, that it is not mov'd

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in the veins, but only by the impulſion which it receives from the beating of the Heart, and that it admits not of any motion, but that which proceeds from the effort of that part. We ſhall not make it our buſineſs to oppoſe this *circulation*, and, though it be accompany'd with great difficulties, yet may it nevertheleſs be affirmed, that it is true, and that it is effectually wrought, though haply not after the ſame manner, as is held by the maintainers thereof. It is ſufficient, for the proſecution of our deſign, to ſhew, that the beating of the Heart is not the cauſe of the blood's motion, eſpecially that which comes into the veins. For, that done, it will be eaſie to make it appear, that they are only the Spirits, which can tranſport it to the places whither it goes, and conſequently, that they are bodies diſtinct from the humours, which follow the motions of the Soul, and not that of the Heart, and may be mov'd by an agitation different from that of the latter.

Art. 8.

The beating of the Heart forces not the Blood into all the Parts.

IT being ſuppos'd then, as the Patrons of this opinion would have it, that the Heart, by a certain compreſſion, or contraction of it ſelf, drives out, into the arteries, the blood, which it hath receiv'd into its ventricles, and that, by the violence of that motion, it forces it even to their extremities, ſo to make its paſſage into the ſmall veins which are near them, and thence into the hollow vein, and at laſt to the Heart, whence

whence it afterwards paſſes back again into the arteries, and then into the veins, perpetually running out of one into another, by a continuall circulation:

This, I ſay, being ſuppos'd, it might be ſaid, that there is ſome probability, that this impulſion, which it receives from the Heart, may cauſe it to flow along into the arteries, but it can never be conceiv'd, how this impulſion ſhould be continu'd even into the veins, after that its force hath been check'd and broken, by ſo many windings, and ſo many obſtructions which the blood muſt needs meet with in its way.

What! it ſhall open the mouths of the veſſels; it ſhall force its paſſage through the fleſhy parts, as they pretend; it ſhall ſurmount the impreſſions which the air and other external cauſes every moment make in the parts; and after all this, by vertue of that firſt impulſion, it ſhall reaſcend to the Heart with the ſame agility that it deſcended thence? But this is a thing cannot enter into a man's imagination. I am content, that, as it paſſes through the ſmall veſſels, the compreſſion it ſuffers therein may continue the impetuoſity of its motion; but that it ſhould be ſo when it flows into the greater veins, and the ſpaciouſneſs of their channels gives it more liberty, is a thing which cannot be affirm'd, without a defiance of experience and reaſon; and there is a neceſſity, it ſhould have the ſame fate, as rivers and torrents, which, flowing out of a narrow into a broad channel, abate much of the impetuoſity of their courſe.

And certainly, if the beating of the Heart and arteries cauſes the blood to be thus moved, Nature hath forgot her ſelf extreamly, that ſhe gave not the

ſame

ſame agitation to the veins, eſpecially thoſe in the lower parts, where the blood is more groſs and heavy, and hath ſo great a way to get up to the Heart. For there it is, that the cauſe and inſtruments of this miraculous tranſportation ought to be the more powerful, having a greater and heavier weight to conduct, nay indeed to force upward, then is the arterial blood, which is more ſubtile, more ſuſceptible of motion, and, at that time, only deſcends downwards.

It may then be conceiv'd, that thoſe, who firſt advanc'd this opinion, never conſider'd, that fluid bodies cannot long conſerve the vertue and impulſion, if it be not extreamly ſtrong, and that that which is made in the Heart is too weak, to maintain the motion of the blood in ſo long a courſe, and through ſo many obſtacles; That if it were forc'd out, as they pretend, it would ſo much ſwell the veins, that they would alwayes ſeem full and ſtretch'd out, eſpecially when it ſhould be forc'd to aſcend: And, in fine, that, opening the veins, it ſhould iſſue out by certain ſallies and reiterations, as that which comes out of the arteries, ſince it is the ſame impulſion that makes both move, and that we find in Water-Engines, that the water alwayes flows proportionably to the violent ſhocks it received at the entrance of its channell.

But why ſhould there be imagin'd in the veins a motion of the blood, different, not only from that which is made in the bones, into the depth whereof it penetrates, in order to their nouriſhment, but alſo from that which conveys the ſap of plants to all their parts? For this ſap, and the blood, we ſpeak of, is the laſt Aliment, whereby they are ſuſtein'd, and there-

fore

fore it is but one and the ſame Faculty, that hath the direction and conveyance thereof; and Nature, who loves uniformity in all her operations, will not eaſily change this, ſince it may, and ought to be performed, after the ſame manner.

Moreover, if the impulſion be the only cauſe of the motion of the blood, it muſt be alſo the ſame of all the natural motions, whereby it is agitated. And yet that tranſportation of the humours, which Nature makes in Criſes, and the regularity punctually obſerv'd by her, when ſhe conveys them from one place to another, depends on another principle. For the violence done in the Heart, ought to be equally communicated to all the veſſels, and cannot determine the blood to flow towards one part rather then another. How ſhall it then cauſe it to aſcend to the left noſtril, in Inflammations of the Spleen, rather then to the right? Shall it be alſo the impulſion that ſhall force choler to the Inteſtines, in Fluxes without inflammation? And convey the ſeroſities to the skin, in critical ſweats? For all theſe ſorts of motions proceed from nature, and are made, or at leaſt begun in the veins, though the beating and impulſion of the Heart and Arteries contribute nothing thereto.

To conclude, ſince Nature multiplies not the ways of acting, in thoſe operations, which are of the ſame kind, it is neceſſary, that ſhe cauſe the blood to aſcend by the ſame vertue, whereby ſhe cauſes the *chylus* to do ſo, making it to paſs out of the Inteſtines into the Veſſels, and afterwards conducting it, to thoſe places, where it is neceſſary. Now, I do not think there is any body will affirm, that the beating of the Heart contributes ought to this motion, as having no communication

munication with the Inteſtines, at leaſt ſo great as to force the *chylus* upwards; and conſequently, it may be ſaid, that the blood is no more mov'd then it, by that impulſion.

We muſt therefore find out ſome other cauſe then that, whereto we may referr not only the ordinary tranſportation of the blood, and all its other motions, which, though they ſeem extraordinary, are nevertheleſs natural thereto, as thoſe which happen in the Paſſions; but alſo thoſe of the *chylus*, and the other humours which are mov'd in the body. Now after we have throughly examin'd all the reſſorts and inſtruments which Nature may make uſe of, to that purpoſe, it will be found, that ſhe cannot employ any other then the Spirits.

Art. 9.

That the blood is not attracted by the Fibres.

WE ſhall not here bring any thing upon the ſtage, concerning Attraction, though it were the only means, whereby the Antients were of opinion, that the motion of the blood was to be wrought, inaſmuch as it is an imaginary motion, which oppoſes reaſon and experience.

Nor indeed can it be conceiv'd to be done but two wayes, to wit, either by ſome *Boay*, which, touching the blood, brings and draws it to it, or by ſome *Magnetick vertue*, which may be in the parts, and ſpreading it ſelf into the veſſels, ſeizes on, and drags it towards them, much after the ſame manner, as the quality of the Loadſtone draws iron, and cauſes it to approach

approachit. And theſe two wayes of attraction have bred two opinions, which ever ſince the birth of Medicine, even to the preſent age, have been follow'd by ſome or other.

For ſome have imagin'd that the ſtreight Fibres, which enter into the ſtructure of the veins, had the power of attraction, and that it was by their means the blood was convey'd to the ſeveral parts. But they never conſider'd, that when ſome body is to attract a fluid and ſlippery thing, there is a neceſſity it ſhould touch it, that it ſhould ſeize on it, and retain it in all its parts; otherwiſe thoſe which ſhall be at liberty will eſcape, and will not be attracted. Of this we have an experiment, when we would take any liquor with our hand; for thoſe parts which ſhall not be comprehended within the hand will get away and not be gather'd in with the reſt. Now it is certain that the Fibres touch only the ſuperficies of the humour which is in the vein, and ſo whatſoever is in the bottome of the veſſel will ſlip away, notwithſtanding all their endeavour to retain it.

To this we may add, that the Fibres have no other way of attraction, then by ſtraining and compreſsing the veins; and if ſo, then would the ſenſes perceive ſomething of that motion, as they do of that of the Inteſtines, which is made after that manner. Whence it follows, that, ſince we do not ſee any ſign thereof, how ſtrong ſoever that contraction and compreſsion of the veins might be, for the making of that motion, there is juſt ground to imagine, that it is not made after that manner.

But what abſolutely decides this queſtion, is, that the aliment of Plants is convey'd by their channels after the ſame manner, and by the ſame vertue as the

blood may be in Animals, and yet their Fibres ſuffer no ſuch contraction as is imagin'd in the veins. It is requiſite therefore, that we find out ſome other means, whereby the moiſture, which nouriſhes them, may aſcend into the branches, and withall ſuch as may be found alſo in Animals, to convey the blood into all the parts.

I add further, that the bones attract (as the common expreſſion hath it) their nouriſhment, without any aſſiſtance of the Fibres, and that ſometimes the blood is ſo violently mov'd in the Paſsions, that this pretended motion of the Fibres cannot be any way anſwerable to that ſwiftneſs, as being made but ſlowly, and by ſucceſsive contractions, which require much time, in ſo long a tranſportation and conveyance, as that of the blood is.

Art. 10.

That the blood is not attracted by any Magnetick vertue.

AS to the other opinion, which admits a Magnetick vertue, though it hath been more generally receiv'd, yet is it not confirm'd by any other reaſon then the weakneſs of the precedent, and the impoſsibility it imagin'd to it ſelf, of finding any other means then theſe two to make the blood flow into the veins. So that it is maintain'd only upon the accompt of certain examples and inſtances, as that of the Loadſtone, which draws iron to it, and thoſe of ſome purgative Medicines, which attract the humours, and ſome others of the like kind. But this

this is a very weak proof, and ſuch as the very ground thereof is of little certainty; ſince we pretend to make it apparent, that neither the Loadſtone, nor purgatives, nor any other thing whatſoever, have any attractive vertue.

But whether it be maintainable or not, the Patrons of this opinion ought to ſuppoſe, as they have done, that this vertue is in every particular part, ſince there is not any but does, as they affirm, attract blood for its nouriſhment. The caſe being thus laid down, they may be asked, Whether all parts have this vertue equally or not? For if it be equal in all, there being ſuperiour and inferiour parts, it is impoſsible the blood ſhould march up into the ſuperiour parts, in regard the inferiour have as powerful an attraction as the other; there being no reaſon, why they ſhould follow the impreſsion of the one rather then that of the other. On the other ſide, if there be any parts have this vertue in a higher degree then others, they will attract all the blood to themſelves, and that juſt diſtribution, which ought to be made thereof all over the body, will never be perfected and compleated, ſince it muſt needs be obſtructed, where that Magnetick vertue is moſt vigorous. For, to explain it by the example, it muſt be done in the ſame manner, as is obſerv'd in the iron, which being plac'd near ſeveral Loadſtones will alwayes make towards that which is moſt attractive. Beſides, if it be true, that the influence of natural vertues is performed by direct lines, How is it to be imagin'd, that the Attractive vertue ſhall obſerve that regularity in the innumerable turnings and windings of the veins and arteries? What intermixture, or, to ſay better, what confuſion will there not be in the veſſels, wherein every part will ſpread its Magnetick vertue?

To conclude, if the conformity of ſubſtance be the ground-work of this Attraction, as is affirm'd by the maintainers of the foreſaid opinion, how is it to be conceiv'd, that the blood, which is alter'd and corrupted, ſhall be able to flow into the veins? By what means ſhall the mineral waters, which admit not coction, and are incapable of receiving the form of blood, be able to paſs wholly pure into the veſſels? What conformity or ſympathy can we imagine between all theſe ſubſtances, which are ſo different among themſelves, and the Liver, or the Heart, or any other part, which attracts them to it ſelf? And laſtly, why ſhould the blood ever go out of the body, ſince that quality attracts it inwards, and that it ſhould be like the powder of ſteel, which the Loadſtone holds faſt and ſuffers not to fall?

Art. 11.

That there are not any Attractive vertues.

BUt I ſhall proceed further, and affirm, that it is an errour to imagine, there are, in Nature, any of theſe Attractive vertues; ſhe acknowledges not any other then that which is wrought by the motion of the body, and ſo all thoſe things which are ſaid to be attracted by theſe qualities, are mov'd by another kind of motion, then that of Attraction. And indeed, who can eaſily conceive, that a ſimple quality ſhould be able ſo of a ſudden, and ſo powerfully to offer violence, to things ſolid and weighty? What motion can have an incorporeal vertue, to go, and find out, and bring away maſſy bodies? How is it to be apprehended,

hended, that, contrary to all other qualities, which advance forward, this only ſhould return back? Would there not be a neceſsity, that, while it brings back the bodies, which it draws after it, it ſhould quit the ſpace where it found them, which yet continues ſtill full of the ſame quality?

True it is, and muſt be acknowledg'd, that the Loadſtone hath a magnetick vertue, which it diffuſes out of it ſelf. But this vertue is not attractive, it only cauſes in the iron a certain feeling of its preſence, and thereupon, the iron makes towards it of it ſelf, as it is in like manner inclin'd towards the iron. For if they be both ſet on the water, ſo as that they may freely ſwim on it, they will approach one another, if they be of equal force; and if the iron be the more weighty, or that it be ſtopp'd, the Loadſtone only will move towards it. So that it is clear they draw one another no otherwiſe, then as it is ſaid the Sun draws the vapours, which, by reaſon of their lightneſs, aſcend of themſelves, after they have felt the heat.

Art. 12.

That there is not any attractive vertue in Purgative Medicines.

NOr is it by Attraction that purgative Medicaments do operate. For, of theſe, there are ſome, which cauſe vomiting, being apply'd to the ſoals of the feet, and other inferiour parts; then which there cannot be a more certain argument of their not attracting the humours, ſince that, inſtead of obliging

them to come to themſelves, they cauſe them to make a contrary motion. Beſides, the purgative vertue, being a natural Faculty, ſhould attract the humours which are conformable and conſonant to it ſelf, in what ſubject ſoever they are found; whereas, far from that, it attracts them not at all in bodies which are weak or depriv'd of life. And indeed thoſe, who have more exactly examin'd the manner how purgation is wrought, have ſhewn, that purgatives have no other vertue then that of diſſolving and ſeparating the humours, as the Rennet does the parts of the Milk; And that the ſeparation being made, Nature, being incens'd thereat, expels and drives them out; So that the evacuation thereof is wrought, not by Attraction, but Impulſion.

Art. 13.

That Grief and Heat are not attractive.

THere are yet others who affirm, that grief and heat are attractive; but they are only the Spirits, which Nature ſends with the blood, into the parts, for their ſupport and aſsiſtance: And this is no true attraction, no more then that which is made by a *vacuum*. For a privation, which, in effect, is nothing, cannot have any vertue. But in this caſe, the bodies put themſelves forward, to prevent a diſorder, which Nature cannot bear withall.

There are not therefore any Attractive vertues, and conſequently, we are not to look for any in Animals, in order to the cauſing of any conveyance of the blood into the veins.

But

But there remains this yet to be urg'd, to the particular in diſpute, that it is true, the Blood is not attracted, but that it moves of it ſelf, as does the iron, which is ſenſible of the magnetick vertue of the Loadſtone, and that having in like manner a certain feeling of the ſympathetical vertue, inſpir'd by the parts, it is, of it ſelf, inclin'd towards them. It muſt be acknowledg'd this expedient would do pretty well, if this ſympathetical vertue could be well eſtabliſh'd. But how ſhall we imagine it can ſubſiſt in ſuch different ſubjects, as Plants and Animals are, or members of a different conſtitution and temperament, ſuch as are thoſe of ſound and unſound or diſeas'd parts? Nay, though it ſhould be granted in them, What allyance can there be imagin'd between that vertue, and the blood, which is often alter'd or corrupted; between it, and the mineral waters which are drunk; in fine, between it, and the poiſons, which are diſpers'd all over the body?

Nay, when all is done, neither this means, nor any of the others that have been propos'd, doth ſatisfie the regularity which Nature obſerves in the motions of the blood, nor moſt of the agitations it ſuffers in the Paſſions of the Soul; nor yet the tranſportation of the *chylus* and other humours, which is wrought in the body: So that there is a neceſſity of having recourſe to the Spirits, as the general cauſe of all theſe effects.

And certainly, whereas the Blood moves not of it ſelf, and that whatſoever is mov'd by another muſt be either forc'd, or attracted, or inclin'd; neither impulſion nor attraction having any place here, it is accordingly neceſſary, that ſome Body, which hath the vertue of moving it ſelf, ſhould combine with it, and

convey it whereever it goes. Now, ſince we know that the Spirits are the chief inſtrmments of the Soul, ſent by Nature to all the parts, to diſpoſe them to action, mixt by her with the blood to render it fluid, and which ſhe inſinuates even into the humours againſt Nature, as well to concoct, as force them away; there is no queſtion to be made, of their being the tranſporters of the moiſture which is in the Veſſels, ſince they are beforehand in them to keep them fluid, and that there are not any other ſubſtances, which may be mixt with them, to convey them to the places, whereto they ought to go; And conſequently, that they are bodies moſt ſuſceptible of motion, which, being animated, or immediately mov'd by the Soul, are the only inſtruments that can move the blood, in all the differences of ſituation, which we obſerve therein.

Art. 14.

That the Blood is convey'd to the parts only by the Spirits.

FRom what hath been deliver'd, it is apparent, that in the ordinary courſe of the Blood, the Spirits are the only inſtruments, which cauſe it to aſcend without trouble, deſcend without precipitation, and direct and convey it into all the parts, nay even to the depth of the Bones, for their nouriſhment. By the ſame Spirits it is diverſly ſtirr'd in the Paſſions, according to the different deſigns, which the Soul propoſes to her ſelf; they convey it to the wounded parts to relieve them, and confine it to an exact obſervance of

of that rectitude and regularity which is remarkable in all its motions. In a word, Nature is the principle and ſource of all theſe operations, and that Nature is no other then the Soul and her Faculties, all which ſtand in need of Organs, in order to their action, and can have no other then the Spirits, whereto all theſe effects may be referred.

They are therefore intermixt with the Blood; and as the Air, being ſtirr'd, carries along with it the vapours that are got into it; or as the exhalations of the Earth raiſe up the matters that are join'd with them; ſo the Spirits, having receiv'd the motion and direction of the Soul, carry away the blood and humours to all thoſe places which they have orders to convey them. For it is not to be doubted, but that an œconomy ſo juſt, and ſo regular in the variety of its operations, is guided and govern'd by ſome power which hath a preheminence above the elementary vertues, and participates of that ſecret intelligence, which God hath been pleas'd to entruſt the Soul withall, for the conſervation of the Animal. It is therefore ſhe alone that cauſes the Spirits to move, and gives them orders for the conduct of the humours.

SECT I.

Of the animation of the Spirits.

THe difficulty now remaining is, to know, how the Soul cauſes the Spirits to move; whether it be,

be, as inſtruments, ſeparated from the Body, or as Organs, animated by her. In a word, the queſtion is, to know whether they are animated or not. The common opinion is for the Negative, and maintains, that they are only diſtinct inſtruments, which communicate the vertue of the Soul to the parts, and are themſelves guided by the direction they receive from her, as the Arrow, which is ſhot by the Archer, and flies towards the mark, at which he took his aim. But if we conſider this Direction a little more narrowly, as alſo the manner whereby it may be made, we ſhall find all this to amount to no more then fair words, which do not explain the thing, but leave in the mind a thouſand difficulties inducing it to affirm the contrary.

Now, if this Motion and Direction ought to be given to the Spirits, as to diſtinct inſtruments, it is neceſſary it ſhould be done in the Heart, which is the place where they have their birth, and from which they derive all their force and vertue. Nay, it is further requiſite, that the whole maſs of Spirits, which iſſue thence, ſhould receive the ſame impreſſion, in aſmuch as they are not divided one from the other.

If it be ſo, this queſtion will ariſe, How it comes to paſs, that ſome of them go to one place rather then another? As alſo theſe others, How comes it, that in one Paſſion they are directed to the forehead, as in Love? How in another to the eyes, as in Anger? How in others, to the lower part of the cheeks, and the ears, as in Shame? How happens there a greater confluence of them on the indiſpos'd parts, then on thoſe which are ſound and well? For as in the ſprings, the impetuoſity of the water is equally communicated,

ted to all the channels or rivulets, and that the art of the Deſigner cannot make the water flow into one rather then another, if they be all equally open; ſo can it not be conceiv'd, that the Spirits ſhould rather go to one part then another, ſince the ſeveral branches of the Arteries, through which they are to flow, are all equally open.

Moreover, he who ſhall conſider, how that, in Anger, they chooſe out the venome, which is in the veins, that it may be convey'd to the teeth of Animals; how that in diſeaſes, they diſcern the humours, from which they have proceeded, to the end they might be forc'd out; will eaſily find, that there is not any direction of the Soul, which can ſatisfie all theſe effects, and there is requiſite a vital knowledge and diſcernment, ſuch as cannot proceed from any other then an animated inſtrument. For if any ſhould affirm, that the ſoul makes this diſcernment and choice, there will follow a neceſſity, that ſhe ſhould be mixt with thoſe humours, that ſo ſhe may be able to ſeparate them, and they will be forc'd to acknowledge, that the Soul is in thoſe humours, which will be a far greater inconvenience then to maintain the animation of the Spirits. Now, we have already ſhewn, that it is by their means theſe motions are wrought.

We may adde further, that the Direction of things forc'd or thruſt forward does only regulate their motion towards the mark, whereto they are to tend; it does not diminiſh ought of the impetuoſity which hath been imprinted on them and it is neceſſary their motion ſhould perſiſt to the end, with all the force the mover hath given them. And yet the Spirits go many times to other places, then thoſe whereto the

Soul

Soul had ordered them to repair, when they receiv'd her firſt impulſion; And ſometimes, in their courſe, they move more vigorouſly, or more faintly, then the impetuoſity they had receiv'd might require. For example, in Shame, they have order to ſpread the blood over the whole face, as it were to cover and conceal the Soul from the infamy ready to fall on her: and yet they caſt themſelves on the extremities of the eares, and the lower part of the cheeks, contrary to her firſt deſign. Many times they begin a Criſis of ſweats, which they end by Urins, and ſome times they grow faint and retreat, in the conflict wherein Nature had engag'd them.

It may be more cloſely urg'd, that the Soul does not only cauſe the Spirits to advance, but ſhe alſo makes them retreat; ſhe dilates them, and contracts them. And if ſo, what ſhall this pretended Direction do upon all theſe occaſions? How ſhall it cauſe them to rally about the heart, when they have ſtraggled from it? There muſt then be ſuppos'd ſome Attractive vertue, whoſe work it ſhall be to ſeize on them at the extremities of the Body, and bring them back to their firſt rendezvous. But we have made it clear, that this vertue is but an imaginary one, and that, however the caſe ſtands, there muſt be ſome ſubject to convey it to the place, where it ought to do its operation; which is not to be imagin'd.

There is yet a greater difficulty, in aſsigning the manner, how the ſoul is able to dilate and contract them, when they are at ſome diſtance from the heart. For there is not in nature any impulſion or direction whereby theſe motions may be communicated. There is is only Heat and Cold that can do it; and whereas theſe qualities require a conſiderable time, for the

per-

performance of their action, it follows that they cannot be cauſes of that dilatation and contraction of the Spirits, which are wrought of a ſudden. Adde to this, that there is a neceſsity, the Soul ſhould ſend theſe qualities into the veſſels, to produce that effect; and that in Fear, for example, ſhe ſhould cauſe Cold to riſe, to make a contraction of the Spirits; which can neither be ſaid, nor imagin'd, without abſurdity. For if the Cold be diſcover'd in ſome Paſsions, it is not a cauſe of the contraction of the Spirits, but the effect of it.

In fine, it is generally acknowledg'd, by all the great maſters of Medicine, that the vital, ſenſitive, and motive faculties are convey'd to the parts by the Spirits. And Experience confirms this truth, in aſmuch as life, motion, and ſentiment ceaſe in them, when they have not a free paſſage into them. How can this be done, unleſs they be animate? for the faculties of the Soul are not ſeparated from her. Some indeed have maintain'd, that they convey'd not the faculties, but only a certain quality, which put them into the exerciſe, and without which they could not act. But they do not make it out, of what nature that quality is, and there is no great probability, that one ſingle quality ſhould relate to ſo many different faculties and functions.

But how ere it be, the greateſt Philoſophers, who have examin'd theſe matters to the bottome, have found themſelves ſo much at a loſs, to give a reaſon of the motion of the Spirits, according to the common opinion; have ingenuouſly acknowledg'd, that it is one of the hardeſt things to comprehend of any in Nature; and all they have ſaid thereof hath neither ſatisfy'd themſelves, nor thoſe who would have follow'd their ſentiments. What

What inconvenience then is there, in maintaining, that the Spirits are animate, ſince that poſition takes away the difficulties which ariſe in others, and that there is a neceſſity, the Organs, which act with ſo much diſcernment, and move in all ſituations, and perform ſo many different actions, ſhould have in themſelves a principle of life?

Art 1.

Objections anſwered.

ALl this preſuppos'd, there remain yet two things which hold the mind in ſuſpence, and keep it from giving an abſolute conſent to this truth. One is, that there is no likelihood, that bodies, which are in perpetual motion, and diſperſe themſelves every moment, can be animate. The other, that life, which ought to be common to all the parts, cannot be found in thoſe that are ſeparated from their whole; and that the Spirits are of that rank, as having not any union or continuity with the ſolid parts.

As to the former, it is not certain, that they alwaies diſperſe themſelves, ſo ſuddenly as is affirm'd. Thoſe Spirits, which conduct the blood through the veins, are conſerv'd a long time, and make the ſame circulation as the other doth; and it is frequently obſerv'd, that after they have apply'd themſelves to ſome part, and there acted, according to the orders of the Soul, they fall back, and return to their ſource. But be it granted that they ſhould ſo diſperſe themſelves, why may they not be nevertheleſs animate? The long continuance is not a diſpoſition neceſſary to life, and

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there are ſome parts, as the ſofteſt pieces of the Fleſh, which, in a ſhort time after they have been animated, may be reſolv'd and diſpers'd by a violent heat. As ſoon as the Spirits have acquir'd the diſpoſitions neceſſary for their being inſtruments of the Soul, ſhe inſinuates her ſelf among them, and animates them. When they are diſpers'd, or have loſt the continuity which they ought to have with their principle, ſhe leaves them, after the ſame manner, as ſhe does other parts that are ſeparated from the Body.

But what! Can the Soul animate ſuch a ſimple and homogenious body as the Spirits are? Why not, ſince ſhe animates the radical moiſture, the Fleſh, the Fibres, and all the other ſimilar parts? When it is ſaid, that the Soul requires an organical Body, it is meant of the whole Body, which ſhe is to animate, and not of its parts, which ought to be ſimple. Nay, indeed there was a neceſſity, that, as moſt of theſe parts are fixt and ſolid, ſo there ſhould be ſome apt to motion and ſubtile, to perform the ſeverall functions, for which it is deſign'd; and ſince the Soul is alwaies in action, it was requiſite ſhe had an Organ that ſhould continually move.

Art. 2.

The union between the Spirits and the Parts.

AS concerning the union there is between the Spirits and the other parts, there is no doubt to be made of it, ſince the leaſt interruption that happens therein cauſes an immediate ceſſation of the actions of life. For hence proceed faintings and ſwoun-

ſwoundings, and *Syncopes*, in the exceſs of joy and grief, the Spirits being forc'd with ſuch impetuoſity, that they loſe the continuity, which they ought to have with the Heart. Hence alſo proceed Apoplexies, by the interception of the veins, as *Hippocrates* ſpeaks, the matters which are therein contained obſtructing the fluxion of the Spirits, and interrupting the union which was between them and the others.

But with what can they be united ſo as to participate of the union which is common to the whole body? It is no doubt with the ſpirituous parts, which entet into the compoſition of the Heart: it is with the fixt Spirits, which are of the ſame nature with them. And 'tis poſſible this may be the end for which the beating of the Heart ſerves. For by the agitation it gives them, it makes them penetrate one into another, it binds, and ſoders, and cements them together, if we may uſe ſuch expreſsions of things ſo ſubtile.

Art. 3.

How the foreſaid union is conſiſtent with the intermixture of the Spirits, with the blood and humours.

ALl that is now left to give occaſion of doubt, is, that the Spirits are intermixt with the blood and humours, and that it is a hard matter to comprehend, how, in this intermixture, they can conſerve the union which ought to be between them. But to take away this, we are only to repreſent to our ſelves the light,

light which paſſes through the clouds, for it hath certain beams, which cannot paſs through them, and thoſe that make their way through, appear at certain diſtances one from another, yet ſo as that not any one of them loſes the continuity which it hath with the luminous body. Or, not to go out of the order of Bodies, the caſe is the ſame, as in thoſe exhalations, which are intermixt with the Air; they have ſeveral lines which are diffus'd of all ſides, but thoſe lines have commonly a continuity with the matter, from which the exhalation proceeds.

The ſame thing is to be imagin'd in the Spirits; for they iſſue out of the heart as a maſs of beams and ſpirituous lines, which ſcatter themſelves on all ſides, and penetrate into the humours, yet without any diviſion from their principle And this is the more eaſily imagin'd, in that, beſides the difficulty which things of the ſame nature find to be ſeparated one from the other, the Soul, who knows, that this interpretation of the Spirits muſt cauſe a ceſſation of all actions, does all that lies in her power to prevent it.

But whether the Spirits be animate or not, certain it is that they move, and that it is the Soul which gives them their motion. For though it may be ſaid that they derive their agitations in the Paſſions from the Heart, by reaſon it opens, ſhuts, dilates and contracts it ſelf, as they do, and that it is moſt likely, that it, being the principle both of life and the Spirits themſelves, ſhould alſo be the ſame principle of all their motions: yet we know by experience, that there are many Paſſions rais'd in the Soul, ſo as that there can be no change obſerv'd in the beating of the Heart and Arteries, though no doubt but the Spi-

rits are therein agitated. And indeed they are bodies ſo light, and ſuſceptible of motion, that the leaſt agitation of the Soul muſt needs ſtirr them. Which thing cannot be ſaid of the Heart, which is maſſy and heavy of it ſelf, and hath a function ſo neceſſary to life, that it ought not, without great neceſsity, or a great effort, to interrupt or diſturb it.

In light Paſsions therefore the Spirits only are agitated and ſtirr'd; but when they become ſtrong, not only the Spirits, but the Heart alſo follows the emotion and diſturbance of the Soul.

SECT. 2.

Why the Heart and Spirits move in the Paſſions.

But what end does the Soul propoſe to her ſelf in all theſe motions? What advantages can ſhe receive thereby? It is not to be doubted, but that as ſhe hath a deſign to be united to the good, and to ſhun or oppoſe the evil, ſo does ſhe imploy theſe Organs to attain thoſe ends, and believes, that the motions ſhe puts them upon are abſolutely neceſſary thereto. And it is true, there are ſome which produce the effect ſhe expects from them; but there are alſo ſome, that contribute nothing to the obtaining of her deſires. For example, when, in *Anger*, the Spirits ſeparate the venome and the choler, and convey them into the teeth and tusks of animals, it is cer-

certain, they are ſo many offenſive arms fit to aſſault and deſtroy the enemy. When, in *Love*, and *Joy*, the Spirits ſtirr the pureſt and gentleſt part of the blood, that is conformable to the condition the Soul is in, which then requires only agreeable objects, & would not be diſturbed by the agitation of choler and melancholy, which are troubleſome and malignant humours. And ſo it may be affirm'd, that, in all the other Paſſions, the Spirits are put upon ſuch motions as are conducible to the deſigns of the Soul, as we ſhall make it appear, when we come to diſcourſe of every one of them in particular.

But, for one of this nature, there are a thouſand others which are no way advantageous, and which rather ſerve to diſcover the precipitation and blindneſs the Soul is in, then to obtain what ſhe propoſes to her ſelf. For, that the Heart opens and dilates it ſelf in Love and Joy, that it ſhuts and contracts it ſelf in Fear and Sadneſs: That the Spirits ſhould diffuſe themſelves, and iſſue out in the former, and that they ſhould retreat and draw up together, in the latter; all this contributes nothing towards the attainment of her end. I know, her perſuaſion is, that opening the heart, ſhe makes a freer paſſage for the Good to enter in; that, ſhutting it, ſhe excludes the Evil; that, commanding the Spirits to march out, ſhe imagines, that ſhe comes neerer the objects, and ordering them to retreat to the Heart, ſhe is at ſo much the greater diſtance from them.

But the troth on 't is, that neither Good nor Evil enter into the Heart; and the motion of the Spirits cauſes not a greater or a leſſer diſtance between the Soul and them, then there was before. For, it being acknowledg'd, that ſhe is ſpread over the whole

Body, ſhe is already where the Spirits conduct her, and quits not thoſe places, from which they endeavour to remove her.

Yet are we not much to wonder at the errour ſhe falls into upon thoſe occaſions; for having not an exact knowledge of all things that concern her, ſhe is ſurpris'd, by the unexpected arrival of the Good and Evil, which preſent themſelves to her, and in the diſtraction they put her into, ſhe does all that lies in her power, ſhe beſtirs her ſelf, and ſets her organs in motion, according to the aim ſhe takes; and, among many things which contribute to her deſign, ſhe does an hundred others, that are of no advantage thereto, nay may be prejudicial. In the actions which are ordinary to her, and have been aſcrib'd her by Nature, ſhe is very ſeldom deceived; for ſhe regularly commands the Spirits into the parts, to inſpire them with vital heat, to ſupply them with the blood whereby they are to be nouriſh'd, to make the evacuations which are neceſſary; it being the inſtinct which guids her, and juſtly appoints her what ſhe ought to do. But when this aſsiſtance fails her, ſhe does as a man who punctually executes what he finds in his Inſtructions, but is extreamly at a loſs, when he is to do ſomething which he finds not in his papers. He then regulates himſelf, according to what he had done before upon the like occaſions, and being in haſt, he hazards the ſucceſs of the affair, which ſometimes comes to a good period, but moſt commonly happens otherwiſe then the man had imagin'd,

The caſe is the ſame with the Soul, when Good and Evil ſurpriſe her. For ſhe, not finding, in the inſtructions of the Inſtinct, what ſhe ought to do, upon ſuch occaſions, proceeds according to her ordi-

nary

nary manner of action; ſhe cauſes the Spirits to advance forwards or retreat, as ſhe is wont to do, in the neceſſary actions of life; and conſidering the precipitation ſhe is in, and the little knowledg ſhe hath, ſhe has neither the time nor diſcernment, to ſee whether they will be advantageous or diſadvantageous to her deſign.

SECT. 3.

What Faculty it is that moves the Spirits.

IT is therefore manifeſt, that the Soul cauſes the Spirits to move, to the end they ſhould communicate the vital heat to all the parts, that they ſhould ſupply them with the blood, whereby they are to be nouriſh'd, and that they ſhould tranſport the humours from one place to another, when ſhe thinks it neceſſary, as it happens in the Paſſions, in Criſes, and others. The queſtion now is, to know, what part of the Soul gives them their motions, whether the Vegetative or the Senſitive? As to the diſtribution of the vital heat, and aliment, as alſo, for the tranſportation of the humours in diſeaſes, it is moſt certain, that the Vegetative ſoul is the principle of all theſe actions. But the difficulty ſtill remains, concerning the motions of the Spirits in Paſſions. For, on the one ſide, it ſeems, that the ſenſitive Soul ought to move them, ſince ſhe it is that excites the Paſſions, that they move in effect, with a reſpect to the ſenſible

Good and Evil, and that they propoſe to themſelves the ſame end as ſhe does. On the other ſide, the motions of the ſenſitive Soul are voluntary, and may, or may not, be made, at the pleaſure of the animal, as may be ſeen in the motion of the Members. In the mean time, that which the Spirits ſuffer is neceſſarily made, and the Soul can neither excite nor hinder it, when ſhe pleaſes. So that it ſeems, that belongs to the juriſdiction of the Vegetative Soul, and that in the aſſociation there is between the faculties, and the mutual aſsiſtance they give each other, this latter is joyn'd with the Senſitive, to promote its poſſeſſion of the good, or receſſion from the evil, which preſents it ſelf to her.

Notwithſtanding theſe laſt reaſons, whereto it is no hard matter to anſwer, we muſt ſtick to the former, which prove, that it is the Senſitive Soul that cauſes the Spirits to move in the Paſſions. True it is, that the motions of the Vegetative are many times joyn'd with hers, as we find by experience, in extraordinary Griefs: but it is, when the Good and Evil are conſiderable, and make ſo deep an impreſsion, that they force their way quite to her: for when they are light, ſhe is not mov'd thereat, and leaves the Senſitive part to act alone, which yet fails not to ſtir the Spirits.

In effect, they are the general Organs of all the functions of the Soul, and all the faculties, what order ſoever they are of, equally employ them in their ſervice. They are ſerviceable as to life, ſentiment, motion, nay reaſon it ſelf, and in the higheſt meditations, they are ſtirr'd, as well as in natural actions. They are like an Inſtrument, whereof divers Artizans make uſe, in ſeveral works. For as the ſame pair of Com-

Compaſſes, wherewith a Maſon hath taken his meaſures, ſerves the Geometrician, to draw his figures; and the Aſtronomer, to meaſure the Heavens and the Stars. So the Spirits, which have ſerv'd the natural faculty, for the meaneſt actions of life, are employ'd, by the ſenſitive Soul, in the animal functions, and the Underſtanding it ſelf makes uſe of them, in operations of the higheſt conſequence.

But what! their motion is not free in the Paſsions, as it might ſeem it ought to be, if the ſenſitive Appetite were Director thereof, as it is of voluntary motions. It matters not, ſince even the Animal Spirits, which flow through the nerves, to make thoſe motions, and no doubt are mov'd by the ſenſitive Appetite, have not their motion more free, then that which is made in the Veins and Arteries. The neceſsity of motion is many times found in the ſenſitive faculty, as well as in the natural; and though the Muſcles be the Organs of free motion, yet we find, that reſpiration, which is wrought by their means, is neceſſary; that the motion of the Heart, which is as it were a compoſure of ſeveral Muſcles, and receives a Nerve from the Brain, to give it ſentiment and motion, is not to be ranked among thoſe that are voluntary. Nay the Will it ſelf, notwithſtanding that Soveraign liberty which it hath, is not free in its firſt ſallies, and what time ſoever it may take to conſider of the Good and Evil, yet is it not in its power, to hate the Good, and love the Evil.

Whence then proceeds this diverſity? Doubtleſs from the Inſtinct, which is a Law that forces the Soul to do what it commands for the welfare of the Animal. It is this Law that guids all the actions of the Natural faculty, that aſsigns the ſenſitive Soul the

motions which ſhe ought to make, not only thoſe that are not to be balked, as thoſe of the Heart and Lungs, and thoſe of the Animal Spirits; but alſo all thoſe that are done caſually, wherein the knowledge of the Senſes is of no advantage. For though the motion of the Spirits in the Paſsions be not made preciſely by it, yet does the Soul cauſe them to do it, according to the coppy which the Inſtinct gives her upon other occaſions, as we have ſhewn elſwhere.

Art. I.

Of what kind the motion of the Heart and Spirits is in the other Paſſions.

THus far as to what concerns the motion of the Heart and Spirits in the Paſsions of the ſenſitive Appetite; we now come to examine, whether it be performed after the manner, in thoſe of the Will and natural Appetite.

We may in the firſt place affirm, that there are many Paſsions rais'd in the Will, ſo as that neither the Heart, nor Spirits are thereby ſtirr'd, in regard it is a ſpiritual Faculty, which may act of it ſelf without the aſsiſtance of any Organ. But it is to be obſerv'd, that they muſt be very ſlight ones; for when they come to be of any force, they fail not both of them to be mov'd thereby, as well as in the Paſsions of the ſenſitive Appetite.

Not but that the Will, conſider'd in it ſelf, might be able, alone, to excite the moſt violent Paſsions, as we know it does in Angels. But in Man, in whom there is an union between the Corporeal and Spiri-

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tual faculties, it is impoſsible, but that one muſt aſsiſt and relieve the other, when any conſiderable Good or Evil preſents it ſelf to either of them. Which happens either hence, that there is a neceſſary communication of their motions one to the other, as we have declared; or that the Soul, upon ſuch occaſions, is diſtruſtful of her own ſtrength, and would rally together all the forces ſhe hath. Thence it comes, that ſhe thinks it not enough to move the ſenſitive Appetite, in extraordinary Griefs, to ſhun the Evil that preſſes hard upon her, but ſhe alſo excites ſadneſs, in the ſuperiour part, in order to the ſame deſign: and as if all that were not ſufficient, ſhe many times raiſes a Fever in the natural Faculty, to force away and deſtroy that enemy.

As to the Paſsions of that inferiour part of the Soul, there is not any one, wherein the Spirits are not ſtirr'd, but it is requiſite, they ſhould be violent ere they can move the Heart. For the caſe is not the ſame in them, as in thoſe of the other Appetites, which, though ever ſo much inclining to mediocrity, are nevertheleſs capable of altering her motion. Accordingly, we find, that, in wounds and ſwellings, the Spirits have their recourſe thither, with a certain impetuoſity, yet ſo as there happens not any change in the beating of the Heart and Arteries; and there are conſiderable evacuations made in Criſes, without any alteration in thoſe motions. But, in a Fever, which is the choler of the natural Appetite, in the Conſternation, which Nature is ſometimes ſubject to, in malignant diſeaſes, and in the agonies immediately preceding death, there may be obſerv'd a remarkable alteration in the Pulſe.

The reaſon of this difference proceeds from the nature

nature of the Vegetative Faculty, which is more material, and conſequently more heavy, then the Senſitive. For as a ſlothful perſon engages himſelf only in thoſe things, that are moſt eaſily done, and never undertakes the more difficult, but when he is thereto conſtrain'd by neceſsity: So that faculty, which is mov'd with ſome trouble, thinks it enough, in the lighter Paſsions to ſtirr the Spirits, becauſe they are eaſily mov'd; but it attempts not therein the moving of the Heart, by reaſon that is an Engine ſtirr'd with greater difficulty, unleſs it be when the Evil ſeems conſiderable, and that it thinks it requiſite to imploy all its organs, and all its force, towards the reſiſtance thereof.

SECT. 4.

How the Soul cauſes the Body to move.

BUt we are not yet come to the moſt difficult point of any, in this whole matter, to wit, how the Soul gives motion to the Heart and Spirits, and, to expreſs it in a word, how ſhe cauſes all the parts to move. For it is hard enough to conceive how a thing, which hath no body, is able to move a Body, and yet much more, to imagine, that, what is it ſelf immoveable, as it may be thought the Soul is, can cauſe the members of the Animal to move. It is indeed eaſily ſeen, that they move, by the means of the Muſcles, and that the Muſcles act by the contraction of the Fibres, which enter into their compoſition. But the queſtion is, how the Soul cauſes that contraction of the Fibres.

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Let not any one think to urge here, that the Appetite commands the motive vertue, which is in the members, and that the ſaid vertue executes what commands it hath received from the other. Theſe are but words, which, inſtead of clearing up the thing, render it more obſcure and hard to be comprehended: And he who ſhall narrowly conſider the nature of that command, and the manner how it may be made by the Appetite, as alſo, that, whereby it ought to be receiv'd by the motive vertue, will be no further inſtructed in what we enquire after, then he was before, and ſhall not find how the Fibres meet together and are contracted.

To expreſs our ſelves therefore clearly, and in few words, in order to the clearing up of theſe difficulties, we affirm, that all the parts are mov'd, in regard the Soul, between whom and them there is a ſtrict union, moves her ſelf, and that ſhe forces them to follow the ſame motion which ſhe hath given herſelf: So that the Fibres are contracted, becauſe the Soul, by whom they are animated, cloſes and reinforces her ſelf firſt, and afterwards cauſes them to contract.

The ſame thing is to be ſaid of the Spirits, for when they go from one place to another, when they dilate or contract themſelves in the Paſſions, it is the Soul that gives them theſe motions, conſequently to her giving of them to her ſelf.

This will not be hard to conceive, if we reflect on what was ſaid in the fourth Chapter of this work, where we have ſhewn, that the Soul was movable in all her ſubſtance, and, having a proper extenſion, ſhe had alſo ſome parts, which ſhe might move as ſhe pleas'd. For, this preſuppos'd, it is certain, that being united with the members, it is impoſſible ſhe ſhould

give

give her ſelf any motion, but ſhe muſt alſo give the like to them.

But it may be ſaid, that, if the caſe ſtands thus, there is no neceſſity, the Animal Spirits ſhould flow into the Muſcles, to cauſe them to move, in aſmuch as the Soul, being wholy in every part, hath no need that thoſe Spirits ſhould convey into it that vertue, which it is already poſſeſs'd of. We have already touch'd at this difficulty, which hath put all the Scholes into ſo much diſtraction. For ſome would have the Animal Spirits carry the motive faculty along with them; and others affirm, that what they do ſo carry with them, is only a certain quality, which is not animal, and ſerves only for a diſpoſition, to ſet the motive faculty, reſiding in the parts, upon action.

But the maintainers of both theſe opinions are, no doubt, miſtaken, though it were only in this, that they ſuppoſe, as they do, the Spirits not to be animate; the former, in that they aſſign animal vertues to Bodies, which they conceive have no life; the latter, in that they advance an imaginary quality, whereof they make no explication, and which leaves the thing as doubtful at is was before.

We muſt therefore affirm, that the Animal Spirits do not convey the motive vertue to the parts, but that the command of the Eſtimative faculty does it, without which there can no motion be made.

That this may be the better underſtood, we are to remember, what hath been delivered in the precedent diſcourſes; to wit, That the Appetite moves not but upon the command of the Eſtimative faculty, which orders what things are to be done; That the ſaid command conſiſts in the Image, or Idæa, which that faculty frames in it ſelf; And that after ſuch an Image

Image hath been therein produced, it is multiplicable and diffuſive, as a light, into all the parts of the Soul.

Now it is by the Spirits that this communication is wrought. For, as corporeal actions are done by means of the Organs that are proper thereto, ſo knowledge ought to be made in the Brain, in which are all the Organs neceſſary for that action. And whereas the parts, which ought to execute what the Eſtimative Faculty commands, are remote from it, there is a neceſſity, the Soul ſhould have certain miniſters, whoſe work it is, to carry about the reſolutions ſhe hath taken in her Privy-councel, without which, as in a well-govern'd Commonwealth, nothing either ought or can be done.

And this is the proper imployment of the Animal Spirits, which communicate the orders and decrees of the Eſtimative Faculty to the parts, which, upon receipt thereof, move, as we ſaid before.

CHAP. V.

Of the Vertues and Vices, whereof the Art how to know men may judge.

SInce *The Art how to know Men* pretends to the diſcovery of *Vertues* and *Vices*, how ſecret ſoever they may be, it may be alſo expected from it, that it would acquaint us, what Vertues and Vices are thereby meant; and withall, whether it hath that prerogative as to all in general, or only as to ſome

ſome of them. In order to the proſecution of that deſign, it ought to make an enumeration thereof, that it may afterwards give us a particular account of thoſe which are within its juriſdiction, and falls under its cognizance.

But before we come to that, this is to be premiſ'd, as of neceſſary knowledge, that the Vertues and Vices are certain Habits, fram'd in the Soul, by ſeveral Moral actions, which, often reiterated, leave in her an inclination and facility to do the like.

Art. 1.

What Moral actions are.

FOr the clearing up of this doctrine, we are to obſerve, that our Souls may do two kinds of actions, whereof ſome are *neceſſary*, the others *free*. The former are called in the Scholes the *Actions of Man*; and thoſe which are free, *Humane Actions*, in regard they are proper to man, as he is *Rational*, he only, of all Animals, having liberty.

There are ſome who confound the latter with the Moral Actions, which have a reference to good and evil manners, which deſerve praiſe or diſpraiſe, reward or puniſhment. But if among the free actions, there are ſuch as may be called indifferent, which are neither good nor bad, as many Philoſophers are of opinion, it is neceſſary there ſhould be ſome difference between Humane Actions and Moral Actions, and that the former ſhould be as it were the Genus of the latter; ſo as that all Moral Actions may be Humane, in regard they are free, and that all Humane Actions

Actions may not be Moral, in regard there be ſome, which are neither good nor bad.

Art. 2.

What Right Reaſon is.

BUt howere the caſe ſtand, as to the diſtinction of Actions, it is to be noted, that the Moral are good or bad, according to their conformity or contrariety to Right Reaſon. Now Right Reaſon is a juſt knowledge of the end and means, which Man ought to have, to arrive to his perfection. And his perfection conſiſts in two points; that of the Underſtanding, to know the Truth, and that of the Will, to attain the Soveraign Good, for which he is deſign'd. In a word, it is ſaid, that Art is a habit of the Underſtanding, cauſing a man to operate according to Right Reaſon; and that Vertue is a habit of the Will, which makes a man act according to Right Reaſon. So that there is one Right Reaſon for the Underſtanding, and another for the Will; one, leading to Truth; the other, tending to Good.

This Right Reaſon, or Knowledge, proceeds either from God, or from Nature, or from Ratiocination. For God makes Men to know what he deſires they ſhould do; and that knowledge is the Soveraign rule of our thoughts and actions. Nature alſo does inſpire men with a general knowledge, which is as it were the firſt guide ſhe gives us, to conduct our mind whither it ought to go. Under this knowledge do fall the common Notions, which contribute to the attainment of the Speculative Sciences; as alſo thoſe

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natural Laws, whereby our manners are regulated. In fine, Ratiocination, assisted by these first apprehensions and experience, hath found out Rules for Arts and Sciences, civil Laws, for the maintenance of society among men, and Maxims, for the conduct of every one in particular: And he, who acts according to any one of these lights, acts according to Right Reason. But to keep as close as may be to our subject, we are, from all we have said, to conclude, that Moral Actions are conformable to Right Reason, when they are regulated either by divine Law, or by natural and civil Laws, or by the Ratiocination of Moral Philosophy.

Art. 3.

Why the Vertues are in the mean.

NOw, among the many rules, which this part of Philosophy does furnish us withall, there is one that hath an influence almost over the whole matter whereof we treat. This is, that the actions of the Will and sensitive Appetite, and the Vertues themselves, which they produce, ought to consist in a mediocrity, not inclining to either excess or defect. Hence it is that Vertue alwaies keeps the mean between two Vices, which are opposite one to the other. And though there are some, which seem to be exempted out of this rule, as for example, Justice and Charity, and some others; yet is there a certain mediocrity which even those ought to observe, as we are taught by the Scholes.

The reason upon which this mediocrity is grounded

ded is hard enough to be found. For that which is commonly alledged, to wit, that the conformity of actions to Right Reason, consists in this, that there is neither more nor less in the actions, then ought to be, and that the disconformity observable therein proceeds from the addition of some thing or some circumstance, which is not suitable thereto, or the substraction of those that are; and that this Addition and Substraction makes the excess and defect of the actions: This reason, I say, presupposes what is in the Question; for it may be ask'd why these things and these circumstances are or are not suitable thereto; and a man may maintain which side he pleases.

I conceive it therefore much more pertinent, to affirm, that the mediocrity of actions is grounded on the Indifference, which is proper and natural to the Soul. For an action being nothing but a progression, and as it were an efflux or effusion of the Active power, ought accordingly to be conformable to that power; And consequently the humane Soul being indifferent and indeterminate, in regard that, in power, she is all things, it is requisite that her actions should be so too: and thence does proceed, not only the liberty she hath to do them, or not do them, but also the mediocrity, which she gives them, when they are done by her. For though she be then determin'd by the action, whereto she applies herself, yet does she therein preserve her indifference by the mediocrity, wherein she disposes it, in asmuch as what is in the midst is indifferent, as to the extremities, and what is in the extremity, is more determin'd then what is in the midst. Hence it comes, that the motions of the sensitive Appetite, which, in all other

Animals, are the more perfect, the more they are inclin'd to the exceſs and defect which is natural thereto, ought to be moderate in Man, in regard that he being ſubject to Reaſon, it is requiſite they ſhould be conformable thereto as we ſaid before.

Thoſe Moral Actions therefore, which are diſpos'd according to that mediocrity, which is preſcribed by Right Reaſon, are good and commendable, and thoſe that are chargable with any exceſs or defect, are evil, and deſtitute of moral honeſty, and cannot pretend to commendation. They are called Vertuous and Vicious, yet ſo as that they do not communicate that denomination to the perſons, by whom they are done. For a man is not called vertuous or vicious, upon his doing of a good or bad action; but, to gain that name, it is requiſite, he ſhould do many, and that he ſhould acquire the Habit thereof; in aſmuch as he he cannot be ſo called, but upon his having of Vertue or Vice, which, as we ſaid before, are Habits.

Art 4.

Of the Seat of Moral Habits.

BUt where ſhall we find theſe Habits, and in what part of the Soul are they framed? The difficulty lyes not, in reference to the Underſtanding, nor the Will, in regard it is neceſſary that the Habits ſhould have their riſe in thoſe Faculties, whereby the actions are done, ſince the actions produce the habits. And there is no doubt to be made, but that thoſe Moral Actions, which ought to be done with liberty and election, proceed from the Under-

Underſtanding and the Will, which are free powers, and conſequently, that Vertues and Vices are in thoſe Faculties, as in their true and proper ſubject. The Queſtion then is only in reference to the ſenſitive Appetite, to wit, whether it be capable of Vertues and Vices, ſince it is ſuch a faculty as is not free, nor can take cognizance of Right Reaſon, which is the rule of all Moral actions? And what breeds the difficulty as to this point, is, that the ſenſitive Appetite is ſubject to the Superiour faculties, and that its motions enter into Vertuous or Vicious actions, according as it moderates them, or permits them to be chargeable with exceſs or defect. So that if theſe motions, often reiterated, do leave therein an inclination and facility to do the like, it ſhall be a Habit, which, as it ſeems, can be no other then a Vertue or Vice. And thus the ſenſitive Appetite ſhall be ſuſceptible of either of them, as well as the Will.

Now it is certain, that there are habits fram'd in the ſenſitive Appetite, as may be deduced from the inſtruction given to beaſts, as alſo from the facility, wherewith our Appetite is inclin'd to certain actions after it hath done them ſeveral times. To this may be added, that, being a power, which is not determinated to one peculiar manner of acting, and hath its motions ſometimes ſtronger, ſometimes weaker, towards the ſame object, it is impoſſible, but that it ſhould be capable of ſome habits, and that the actions, it often reiterates, ſhould leave in it the ſame facility, which all the other faculties, acting after the ſame manner, are acknowledg'd to have.

To rid our hands of theſe doubts, we are to lay it down as a certain ground, that the habits, which

Beaſts acquire, cannot be ranked among Vertues and Vices, and conſequently, that the ſenſitive Appetite of man, which is of the ſame order with that of Beaſts, is not, of it ſelf, capable of having any other habits then they are.

But if it be further conſidered, that in Moral actions, the Will ever acts along with it, there is fram'd, at the ſame time, one habit in the Will, and another in the ſenſitive Appetite. The former is really vertuous or vicious; the latter, indifferent, as being neither good nor bad. And in regard they are not diſtinguiſh'd, there is attributed to the ſenſitive Appetite what belongs only to the Will. So that all may be ſaid of theſe laſt habits, amounts only to this, that they ſerve for matter and body to the vertues and vices, whereof the form and eſſence is in the Will; And that the vertues, which are in the Will, are living and animate vertues, and the productions of them are, merit, eſteem and praiſe, whereas thoſe of the ſenſitive Appetite are (if we may be permitted ſo to expreſs our ſelves) but rude draughts and pictures, without life and ſoul, having not the vigour to produce any of thoſe things, unleſs it be when they are accompany'd by the other.

For, when any perſon is naturally inclin'd to Temperance, he may acquire the habit thereof, but it ſhall not be a vertue, deſerving either praiſe or reward, if the Will do not contribute ſomewhat thereto. Nay it is further requiſite, that the Will be illuminated by Right Reaſon, otherwiſe the habit, which it ſhall have contracted, ſhall be of the ſame order with thoſe of the ſenſitive Appetite. Whereto this may be added, that the ſaid Habit ſhall be vicious, ſince it is conceiv'd, the Will hath not made the advantages it ought

ought of the illumination, whereby it ſhould have been guided. It is not ſufficient that it ſhould do *good* actions, but requiſite that it ſhould do them *well*. And thence comes it to be commonly ſaid, that Vertue conſiſts rather in *Adverbs*, then *Adjectives*, and that to deſerve the name of juſt, it is not only expected, that the things be *juſt*, but alſo that they be *juſtly* done.

Now in order to their being ſo done, there is a neceſſity of having knowledge, of making choice of the means & circumſtances; in a word, of following the directions of Right Reaſon, which are actions, whereto the ſenſitive faculty cannot attain, unleſs it be indirectly. For it is to be obſerv'd, that Right Reaſon being a knowledge, fram'd by intellectual Images, cannot have any connexion or reference to the ſenſitive Appetite, and cannot excite it to motion, in regard it is not ſuſceptible of thoſe kinds of Images, as the Will, upon the accompt of its ſpirituality, is. But when this latter hath been thereby illuminated, it moves, and afterwards imprints its motion on the ſenſitive Appetite, which implicitely ſuffers it ſelf to be carried away whitherſoever it is driven. So that if it happen, that its motions then prove conformable to Right Reaſon, the Appetite is not the cauſe thereof, but it is the Will which forces it: & its procedure may be compar'd to the motions of a Clock, which ow all their meaſures and regularity to the Art, which is in the mind of the Maker.

Art. 5.

That there are four powers which may be regulated by Right Reaſon.

BUt after what manner ſoever the ſenſitive Appetite be moved, certain it is, that it may be regulated by Right Reaſon, either directly or indirectly, and conſequently, it may be affirmed, that, ſince it is twofold, and hath its concupiſcible and iraſcible parts, there are, in Man, four Powers, which ought to be regulated by Right Reaſon, to wit, the Underſtanding, the Will, and theſe two Appetites. And as Vertue is the ſettled and conſtant rule of Right Reaſon, ſo is it requiſite, that every one of theſe powers ſhould have its particular Vertue, as well to guide, as prevent it from falling into evil, which is againſt Right Reaſon. Thus there ſhall be four general vertues; to wit, *Prudence*, for the conduct of the Underſtanding; *Juſtice*, to direct the Actions of the the Will; *Temperance*, to regulate the Paſſions of the Concupiſcible Appetite; and *Fortitude*, for the regulation of thoſe of the Iraſcible; whether theſe or any of them be rais'd in the ſenſitive Appetite, or in the Will. For the Will hath two ſorts of actions, whereof ſome are referrable to the Good and Evil of the perſon who acts, and theſe have appropriated to themſelves the name of *Paſſions*; and the others relate to the Good and Evil which may be done to others, and theſe are ſimply called *Actions* or *Operations*, that is, *juſt* and *unjuſt* actions.

To theſe four Vertues are referr'd not only all thoſe others, which are as it were ſpecies of them, but alſo the Vices, which are oppoſite thereto. We ſhall therefore divide the enſuing diſcourſe into four parts,

or

or Sections, in each whereof we ſhall treat of one of theſe Vertues, of all the ſeveral ſpecies of it, and laſtly of the Vices contrary thereto.

SECT. I.

Of PRUDENCE.

Prudence and *Syndereſis*, or Remorſe of Conſcience, are two habits of the Underſtanding, whereby Moral Actions are regulated. But they are different in this particular, that the Syndereſis preſcribes to all the vertues the end which they ought to have; and Prudence treats only of the means whereof they ought to make uſe, in order to their arrival thereto.

Now, all the employment which the latter hath in this buſineſs may be reduc'd to three general actions; the firſt whereof is to find out the means; the ſecond, to make choice of that which is beſt; and the third, to preſcribe: And this is properly to deliberate, or conſult; to judge, or conclude; to enjoyn, or preſcribe. And theſe things are ſo different one from the other, that, many times, there are ſome men fit for one of them, who are not for the others. Some will propoſe all the expedients imaginable in a buſineſs, and yet will not be able to judge, which is the beſt; and another will do his work well enough as to that, but will come ſhort of the ingenuity to put it in execution.

This difference proceeds from the defect of ſome one of the intellectual faculties, which hath not the diſpoſitions requiſite to produce thoſe actions. For,

to *deliberate* well, a man ſhould have a *vivacity of Spirit* to find out expedients; and *Docility*, to underſtand and follow good counſels. To *judge* well, a man muſt dive into the bottom, and unravel the intricacy of affairs, which requires a ſmartneſs of *Apprehenſion* and ſoundneſs of *Judgment*; and to ſee, at a diſtance, the ſucceſſes, which things may have, and that is *Perſpicacity*, or *Foreſight*. To *enjoyn* well, he muſt examine all the circumſtances of the actions, and that is *Circumſpection*; he muſt conſider the inconveniences and obſtructions, which may happen; and that is *Precaution*. In fine, all three make their advantages of *Ratiocination* and *Memory*; for nothing is to be ſaid without reaſon, and that, which is grounded on experience, is the moſt certain.

But in regard it is not ſufficient to have conſulted well, judged well, and enjoy'd well, if things be not ſpeedily put in execution, we muſt add, to all theſe qualities, *Diligence*, which is the final perfection and accompliſhment of *Prudence*.

Moreover, if theſe actions be apply'd to the conduct of a mans *Perſon*, *Family*, the *Countrey* wherein he lives, or that of *Warre*, they ſpread into thoſe particular Species of Prudence, which are called *Monaſtical*, *Oeconomical*, *Political* and *Military*. And theſe are the true Species of Prudence, the reſt may rather be called the integral parts thereof.

Now though it be commonly affirm'd, that Vertue lies between two vicious extremities yet is it not eaſie to ſet them down here. For there are ſome, whereto there cannot any thing be oppoſite, but the defect, as for example, *Memory*. Nay there are ſome, which have for their contraries the ſame vices that are oppoſite to others.

He

He therefore, who is endu'd with a vivacity of Spirit, hath for his extreams the Extravagant perſon and the Stupid. He who is Docile, the Credulous, and the Obſtinate. He who is Judicious hath the ſame extreams as the Ingenious. The Fore-ſeeing or perſpicacious perſon hath the Diſtruſtful and the Stupid. The Circumſpect hath the Inconſiderate and the Negligent. The Well-advis'd hath the Subtle and the Simple, he who hath a good memory hath, for oppoſite, only him that hath a bad one; as alſo he who hath the experience of things, only him who hath it not. The Diligent hath the Precipitate and the ſloathful.

Theſe are the Vertues and Vices which have ſome relation to Prudence, according to the diſtribution which Moral Philoſophy hath made thereof, and which the Art we treat of promiſes to diſcover. But it conſiders them not as they lie in that diviſion, nor under the ſame names. For it makes no difference between the Circumſpect, the Perſpicacious, and the well-Advis'd perſon. And whatever appertains to Ingenuity, Judgment, and Memory, it comprehends under the name of Fortunate birth, which ought to bring along with it vivacity of Spirit, ſoundneſs or ſtrength of Judgment, and goodneſs of Memory; it being requiſite that he who is called Εὐφυὴς, well, or fortunately born, ſhould have all theſe qualities together. True it is, that it particularly examines thoſe who have only one of theſe endowments, as we ſhall ſhew anon. Now the reaſon why this our Art does not alwaies follow the order of Moral Philoſophy, is, that all its knowledge is grounded upon ſigns, and that there are not ſuch for all theſe habits, ſo exactly diſtinguiſh'd. For there being ſome of them, which

which are diverſify'd only by certain external circumſtances, they give not any preciſe marks, whereby they may be diſtinguiſh'd one from the other, it being ſufficient, that the Principle, on which they depend, ſhould be known. And when it ſhall be known that a man is Judicious, it will be eaſie to conclude, that he is well Advis'd, Circumſpect, and Provident, which are the effects of Judgment, which conſiders both preſent and future circumſtances.

The order therefore, which our Art ſhall obſerve in this matter, ſtands thus:

A perſon well or fortunately born hath for his oppoſites { *The Extravagant.* / *The Stupid.* }

The Ingenious, and the Judicious, have { *The ſame oppoſites.* }

He who hath a good memory { *Him who hath none.* }

The Wiſe or Conſiderate perſon { *The Heedleſs.* / *The Sottiſh.* }

The Prudent or well-Advis'd { *The Crafty or Subtle.* / *The Simple.* }

The Docile. { *The Credulous.* / *The Obſtinate.* }

The Diligent. { *The over-Haſty.* / *The Sloathfull.* }

SECT.

SECT 2.

Of JUSTICE.

JUSTICE is a Vertue which renders every one what belongs to him. For, as we are not born of our ſelves, nor only for our ſelves, ſo muſt we be oblig'd to thoſe, from whom we derive our Being, and alſo to thoſe, for whoſe ſake we have receiv'd it. And therefore both theſe have a certain right over us, and we ought, in Juſtice, to render them that which belongs to them.

As therefore there are two Cauſes, to whom we are oblig'd for our Being, God and our Parents, ſo is it requiſite there ſhould be two kinds of Juſtice, whereby we ought to render what we ow them, and theſe are *Religion* and *Piety*.

Now, in regard we are born in order to Society, and that Society is conſider'd as a Whole, whereof every one makes a Part, it is accordingly requiſite, that every one ſhould have that reference to Society it ſelf, and all thoſe, who contribute to the compoſition thereof, which ought to be between the part and the whole, and all the parts taken together: otherwiſe the connexion and order, which ought to be therein, would be wanting, and there will be nothing but diſorder and confuſion. Whence it comes, that the common Concernment, and that of every one in particular, oblige us to render them, what we ow them, upon this relation and union. That Juſtice, which

which regards the publick concernment, is called *Policy*, whereby we render to the Community, what we ow it.

As to that which concerns particular persons, there being some who are design'd to govern and command, either upon the account of their dignity, or by reason of the Excellence they have, the Justice we ow them is, *Obedience* and *Respect*.

In all others we are to consider what we may ow them upon a rigorous account of Justice, or meerly upon a pure Moral obligation. The former consists in *Distributive* and *Commutative* Justice; of the other, there are six Species; to wit, *Friendship* and *Gratitude*; *Affability* and *Truth*; *Fidelity* and *Liberality*; whereof the two first are answerable to the *Heart*; the two subsequent, to the *Words*; and the two last, to *Actions*; whatsoever we ow being to be derived from the *Heart*, *Words*, and *Effects*.

Thus it is that our Art makes use of these Maxims. In the first place it considers the Honest, Just, or Upright person, under whom is particularly comprehended whatsoever appertains to Politicall, Commutative, and Distributive Justice. And to the Just person it opposes the Simple and Mischievous; but it examines not the Simple person upon the same account, as he makes one of the extreams of Prudence. In the next place comes Religion, which we call Piety, for now that word is reduc'd to the business of Religion: and the Justice we ow to our Parents is comprehended under Goodness. The opposites to Piety, are the Superstitious, and the Impious person. As to Obedience, it does not assign any markes of it, since those of Docility may serve instead thereof. Respect may also have a certain reference to Prudence

dence, or the other Species of Juſtice: for he who does not pay the Reſpect he ows, is either fooliſh or proud. So that it places the Friend in the third Claſſis, to whom it oppoſes the Flatterer and the Enemy. Next follows the Grateful perſon, who hath, for his oppoſite, onely the Ungrateful. The Affable comes in the firſt rank, who hath for oppoſites, the Cajoler and the Ruſtick. In the ſixt, comes the Tell-troth, or Sincere perſon, who hath for his oppoſite the Lyar. But in regard Lying may be referr'd to words, actions, a mans own affairs, and anothers; thence it comes that there are five kinds of Lyars, the Vain perſon, the Diſſembler, the Arrogant, the Hypocrite, and the Evil-ſpeaker. Then follows Fidelity, whereto there cannot any exceſs be oppoſed, but only the defect, which is Perfidiouſneſs. In fine, the laſt of all is the Liberal perſon, who hath for oppoſites the Prodigal and the Covetous. But in regard Compaſſion and Clemency come ſomewhat neer Liberality, the former relieving thoſe that are in want, and the other remitting the puniſhment which was due, our Art adds the Merciful and the Charitable, to the former whereof there is but one oppoſite, to wit, the Unmerciful; and of Clemency, the exceſſive Vice is Indulgency, or Fondneſs, and the defective, Cruelty. Magnificence hath alſo ſome relation to Liberality; for it ſeems to be a ſumptuous and excelling Liberality; and that hath for its oppoſites, ſuperfluous Expence, and Miſerſhip.

Theſe, reduc'd into the order obſerv'd in the precedent Section, will ſtand thus.

The Honeſt and Juſt perſon hath for Oppoſites { *The Simple.* / *The Unjuſt, or miſchievous perſon.* } *The*

The Pious, or devout		The Superstitious. / The Impious.
The Friend		The Flatterer. / The Enemy.
The Grateful person		The Ungrateful.
The Affable		The Cajoller. / The Rustick.
The Tell-troth	The Lyar — In Words	The Vain person. / The Dissembler. / The Evil-speaker.
	The Lyar — In Actions	The Arrogant. / The Hypocrite.
The Faithful person		The Perfidious.
The Liberal		The Prodigal. / The Covetous.
The Magnificent		The superfluously Expensive. / The Miser.
The Compassionate		The Unmerciful, or Uncompassionate.
The Clement		The Indulgent. / The Cruel.

SECT.

SECT. 3.

Of TEMPERANCE.

THe perfection of every power conſiſts in the force of its action, ſo that the Paſſions, how violent ſoever they may be, are ſo many perfections, reſpect being had to the Appetite, whereby they are produc'd. But in regard the Appetite was beſtow'd on the Animal, for its conſervation, and that, in Man, it ought to be ſubject to the ſuperiour Faculties, the actions of it ſhould not be defective, ſince perfection conſiſts in the force of the action; nor ſhould they on the other ſide be exceſſive, becauſe they would deſtroy health, and diſturb the nobleſt actions of the Soul. And therefore it is requiſite, they ſhould be moderate, that ſo they may be conformable to Reaſon; for, to be conformable to Reaſon, amounts to no more, then to be convenient for Man, that is, for his Nature. Nay, thoſe very Paſſions, which are excited in the Will, ought to admit the ſame temperament or moderation: for though they cannot alwaies cauſe an alteration in the Health, yet may they find the Soul work about objects, which ought not to move her, or keep her too long engag'd about ſuch as are not bad. Thence it comes, that over-earneſtneſs of ſtudy is vicious, in regard it employes the Spirit too much in Contemplation, and diverts it from that Activity, and thoſe lawful cares of Life, which juſtly

juſtly pretend to a ſhare in the actions of man. However it be, all the Paſſions are regulated by two Vertues, thoſe of the Concupiſcible Appetite by *Temperance*, and thoſe of the Iraſcible, by *Fortitude*.

As for Temperance, there are but two kinds of Paſſions about which it is employ'd, and which conſtitute the Species thereof, to wit, Pleaſure and Deſire. For though Love be the firſt, and moſt powerful of them all, yet is it impoſſible to make any conceit or apprehenſion thereof, otherwiſe then as it is inclin'd to ſome Good, which is either preſent or abſent. If it be preſent, it cauſes Pleaſure; if it be abſent, it frames Deſire: ſo that Love is, as it were, involv'd and confin'd within theſe two Paſſions, and that Vertue, whoſe buſineſs it is to moderate them, does alſo at the ſame time regulate the Paſsion of Love. Nay if things be narrowly examin'd, we ſhall find, that Pleaſure comprehends the two others, and that, in effect, Temperance hath no other deſign then to moderate the Pleaſures, derivable from the Goods of the Soul, the Body, or External things. But in regard, that, of theſe Goods, there are ſome, which are conſider'd rather as Abſent then Preſent, and others on the contrary: accordingly, Deſire is more manifeſt in ſome, and Pleaſure in others, and therefore we have though to ſeparate them.

For there are three things in generall, wherein our Deſire may be vicious, to wit, Knowledge, Wealth and Honours: and there are two others which contribute to immoderate Pleaſures, that is, the Senſes, and Divertiſements.

As to *Knowledge*, there being ſome things evil and unprofitable which may be learnt, and that too much or too little time may be ſpent about ſuch as are good

good and profitable, the Vertue which regulates our desires in the pursuit thereof may be called *Study*, or a commendable *Curiosity*.

For *Wealth*, if we regard the disposall, which is to be made thereof to others, the Vertue employ'd to that purpose is called *Liberality*, and belongs to Justice: But if it be desired for a mans private use, the Vertue which moderates the cares, which a man takes in the acquisition and use thereof, is called *Frugality*.

The Desire of *Honour* is regulated by *Humility*, *Modesty*, and *Magnanimity*. Humility keeps a man from falling too low in the pursuit thereof; Magnanimity, from attempting things too high; And Modesty moderates the desires a man may have for meaner honours.

Pleasure does principally regard the *Senses*, especially those of the Tasting and Touching, in asmuch as the irregularity of those two is most prejudicial to Health, and the Functions of the Understanding. The Pleasure of Eating and Drinking is moderated by *Sobriety*, and *Chastity* gives a check to the enjoyments of the flesh.

Now whereas there is a necessity of *Divertisement*, for the relaxation of Mind and Body, and for the recruiting of them with new forces, and that some abuse may be made of the Pleasure found therein; there is a particular Vertue design'd for the regulation of them, to wit, *Eutrapelii*, whereof there are several Species, according to the diversity of the objects, wherein diversion may be found; such as are *Conversation*, *Gaming*, *Musick*, *Hunting*, *Walking*, and others, whereto there have not yet any names been given, unless it be to that which

moderates the pleaſure taken in *Raillery*.

THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN is not, as to this particular, more exact then Moral Philoſophy, which hath not been able to make a diſcovery of all the Species of Temperance. For there are many Paſsions of the Concupiſcible Appetite, whereto it hath not aſsign'd particular Vertues, for their regulation, as for example, Hatred, Averſion, and Sadneſs. Nay it hath not expreſs'd all the differences of Deſires and Pleaſures, wherein there may be ſome failing, as well as in what concerns the uſe of the ſuperiour Senſes, ſince the ſame exceſſes which happen in the Taſting and Touching, do alſo occur in the Sight, Hearing, and Smelling. But as Moral Philoſophy hath, by the general tearm of Temperance, made proviſion for all the particular Vertues requiſite for that purpoſe: So our Art hath aſſum'd the freedom, to comprehend, under moderation, all that concerns the ordering and direction of theſe Paſsions.

We therefore place the Moderate perſon between the Voluptuous, and the Inſenſible. The Studious is comprehended under the Curious, the extreams whereof are, the Over-curious and the Negligent. The Frugal perſon lies between the ſame oppoſite Vices as the Liberal; thoſe two being diſtinguiſh'd only by the different ends which they have in the diſpoſal of Wealth. The Humble, the Modeſt & the Magnanimous, have in a manner the ſame extreams. There be only the Proud and the Ambitious which are different. That Modeſty, which conſiſts in the Geſture, is confounded with the character of the Wiſe, or Diſcreet perſon: That which relates to Cloaths is called Handſomneſs, which hath for oppoſites the Gawdy,

dy, and the Slovenly. But our Art conſiders not that Vertue, which is only in the external part, as being eaſily perceiv'd of it ſelf. The Sober perſon is attended by two Vices, both which are in the exceſs, and hath not any defect at all. The reſt may be ſeen by the enſuing Table.

The Moderate perſon hath for oppoſites	*The Voluptuous.* / *The Inſenſible.*
The Curious	*The over-Inquiſitive.* / *The Negligent.*
The Frugal	*The Prodigal.* / *The Covetous.*
The Humble	*The Proud.* / *The Abject.*
The Magnanimous	*The Preſumptuous.* / *The Puſillanimous.*
The Modeſt	*The Ambitious.* / *The Over-baſhful.*
The Sober or Temperate	*The Glutton.* / *The Drunkard.*
The Chaſt	*The Unchaſt.* / *The Impotent.*
The Cheerful	*The Ridiculous.* / *The Auſtere.*

To these may be added { *The excessive Gamster.* / *The excessive Huntsman.*

SECT. 4.

Of FORTITUDE.

FORTITUDE moderates the Passions of the Irascible Appetite; for this is the Vertue, which regulates the Soul, upon the occurrence of things troublesome and difficult. Now, though there be three kinds of Passion in this Appetite, to wit, Hope, Audacity, and Anger, yet are the two latter the more violent, and the least tractable; so that this Vertue is more apparent, in Anger and Audacity, then it is in Hope. And whereas Audacity relates to Dangers, and particularly that which is most to be fear'd of any, to wit, Death; thence it proceeds, that most of the Philosophers assign this Vertue to moderate that Passion alone. But following the Order we have propos'd to our selves, it is to be extended to all those Passions. Nevertheless, before we come to treat of the Species of it, this observation is to be premis'd, to wit, that there are three sorts of Fortitude, that of the *Body*, that of the *Mind*, and that of the *Appetite*. The first is purely natural; the last is acquir'd by Study and Reason; the other is partly natural, partly acquir'd. All these three have two principal functions, which are, to assault or set upon, and oppose.

Now

Now as Anger is the ſtrongeſt, and moſt ordinary Paſſion of this Appetite, Meekneſs is accordingly put in the firſt place, as being the Vertue, by which this Paſſion is moderated. There are ſeveral Species of Audacity, according to the ſeveral objects which oblige it to attack or oppoſe. For, in attacking the Evil, if it be done in Arms, it makes *Valour*; in all other caſes, it is *Audacity*, or *Confidence*. But if it ſlight and contemn great Dangers, it is tearmed *Magnanimity*, or Greatneſs of Courage. On the contrary, in oppoſing, it is *Conſtancy* and *Patience*.

As concerning Hope, it is regulated by Patience and Perſeverance. The latter hath a reſpect to the delay, the former conſiders all the other difficulties, which may occur in the expectation of Good.

According to this Order, our Art ought in the firſt place to examine the Strength and Weakneſs of the Body and Mind; then ſpeak of Meekneſs, which hath for its oppoſites, Anger and Inſenſibility, and ſo of the reſt, as may be ſeen in the enſuing Table.

A Perſon of a ſtrong Conſtitution of Body hath but one contrary, which is	*The Weak of Body*
A ſtrong Conſtitution of Mind hath alſo but one, which is	*Weakneſs of Mind*
The Meek or Courteous	*The Angry.* / *The Inſenſible.*
The Valiant	*The Raſh.* / *The Coward.*

The Bold	The Impudent. / The Timorous.
The Magnanimous	The Presumptuous / The Pusillanimous.
The Constant	The Unconstant. / The Obstinate.
The Patient	The Impatient. / The Stupid.
The Perseverant	The Self-will'd. / The Faint-hearted.

The End of the First Book.

THE ART How to know MEN.

The Second Book.

CHAP. I.

Of the Means whereby Men may be known.

HAving, in the precedent Book, explicated the Nature of the *Inclinations*, the *Motions* of the *Soul*, and the *Habits*, which *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* pretends it self able to discover; our design call upon us now, to an examination

of the *Means*, whereby this Knowledge is to be attain'd.

Now, whereas it is impoſsible to come to the knowledge of things obſcure, otherwiſe then by that of thoſe which are already known to us, there is a neceſsity, that if there be an Art, whereby may be taught what lies hid in men, it ought to make uſe of ſome manifeſt and known means, between which and the things it would know, there ſhould be ſuch a rapport and connexion, as that ſome certain conſequences might be drawn from the one to the other. And whereas there is not any rapport of this nature, other then what is between the cauſe and its effect, or the effect and its cauſe, or between one effect and another, upon this account that both of them proceed from the ſame ſource, it follows, that there are three means whereof this Art may make uſe, to arrive at the end, which it propoſes to it ſelf, and that it may diſcover a ſecret effect, by the cauſe which is known to it, or an obſcure cauſe by a manifeſt effect, and an unknown effect by another which is evident. And theſe means are called *Signs*, becauſe they denote, ſignifie, and deſign the things that are obſcure.

Thus, when we know a man to be of a Temperament ſubject to Melancholy, it may be ſaid, that he hath an inclination to Sadneſs, in aſmuch as that Temperament is the cauſe of ſuch an Inclination; and then the cauſe is the ſign of the effect. On the contrary, by the natural inclination which ſome man may have to Sadneſs, it is preſum'd, that he is of a Melancholick Temperament; and in that caſe, the effect is the ſign of the cauſe. In fine, by the Timorouſneſs, which may be obſerv'd in both theſe perſons, it may be judg'd that they are Diſſemblers, in regard

regard that both Timorouſneſs and Diſsimulation proceed from the weakneſs which attends the melancholick Temperament, and then it is, that the effect is ſign of an effect. Now, ſince cauſes and effects ſerve for Signs to the Art we treat of, the next thing to be known is, what theſe cauſes and effects are.

Art. 1.

What Cauſes they are which ſerve for Signs.

IT is not to be doubted but that the Cauſes, which contribute to the diſcovery of men, muſt be ſuch as have an influence over Man, and are in him; that is, ſuch as cauſe ſome alteration in the Body and Soul, and promote and change the actions of both. Of theſe there are two Orders; ſome are *Internal*, ſome *External*.

The *Internal* cauſes are the Faculties of the Soul, the Temperament, the Conformation of the parts, Age, Nobleneſs or meanneſs of Birth, the Habits, as well Intellectual, as Moral, and the Paſsions. The *External* are Parents, the Celeſtial Bodies, the Climate, the Seaſons, Aliment, proſperous or adverſe Fortune, Example, Advice, Puniſhments, and Rewards. For all theſe Cauſes make different impreſſions upon Man, and according to the ſtrength they have, they produce in him different effects; and diſpoſe him to ſuch and ſuch actions. So that every Faculty of the Soul, every Temperament, every Age, every ſeveral kind of Birth, hath its proper actions, its particular diſpoſitions, its inclinations, and averſions.

Parents

Parents do many times derive to their childre thoſe qualities of body and mind, which are natura to themſelves; the Climate, Health and Sickneſs, courſe of Life, Proſperity and Adverſity, Good and Bad Example; in fine, the different aſpects of the Celeſtial Bodies cauſe an alteration in the Body and Soul, imprinting in them divers qualities, and making them inclinable to certain Actions.

Art. 2.

What the Effects are which ſerve for Signs.

THe Effects which proceed from theſe Cauſes are alſo of two kinds; for ſome are *Corporeal*; others, *Spiritual*.

The *Spiritual* are the qualities of the mind; the Inclinations, the Habits, all the actions and motions of the Soul: for, that they have been numbred among the Cauſes, was in conſideration of the Effects which they produce; as here they are ranked among the Effects, by reaſon of the Cauſes from which they proceed. For inſtance, the Inclination which a man hath to Anger, is the cauſe of the Anger; but it is alſo the effect of the cholerick Temperament, which gives birth to that Inclination.

The *Corporeal* Effects conſiſt in the Bulk of the Figure of the parts, in the firſt and ſecond Qualities, in the Air of the Countenance, in the Carriage and motion of the Body, as we ſhall ſhew more particularly hereafter.

So that upon cognizance taken of theſe Cauſes, and a knowledge of the power they have, ſome judgment may

may be made of their preſent or future effects; And on the other ſide, upon an obſervation of the Effects, and a knowledge of that whereto they ought to be referred, the preſent or paſt cauſes may be gheſs'd at. Thus are they Signs one of the other; and *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN*, hath a priviledge to make its advantage of them, in order to the performance of what it promiſes.

But in regard all theſe *Signs* create not an equal knowledge of the things whereto they are referr'd, & that ſome of them denote the ſame with more certainty then others, it is requiſite there ſhould be a careful examination taken of their *Strength* and *Weakneſs*, ſince that is the chiefeſt and moſt ſolid ground of this Art.

CHAP. II.

Of the Strength and Weakneſs of Signs.

Art 1.

What Judgment is made by the Cauſes.

GEnerally ſpeaking, the judgment which is made by the Cauſes, is more uncertain then that which is made by the Effects, in regard that from the knowledge of the cauſe of ſome thing, it

it does not follow, that it ſhould produce the effect it is imagin'd to do, by reaſon of divers obſtructions, which may happen in the production thereof: But when an effect is ſeen, it muſt of neceſſity be, that the cauſe did precede. Thence it comes, that the knowledge which is had of the Temperaments, by the marks they leave upon the Body, is more certain then that which is had of the inclinations by the Temperament, in aſmuch as theſe marks are the effects of the Temperament, and that the Temperament is the cauſe of the Inclinations.

Art. 2.

Of the next Cauſes.

MOreover the cauſes are of two kinds; ſome are termed the *Next* Cauſes, others are *Remote*. From the former, a more certaine judgment may be deduced, in regard they have a ſtricter connexion with their effects. Accordingly, the knowledge which is had of the Temperament, better diſcovers the inclinations, then any thing that can be inferr'd from Birth, Age, or the Climate, &c. But there is not any Cauſe, from which there may be a more certaine judgment deduc'd of a mans actions, then the Habit: For he who ſhall know one to be a juſt perſon, will be the more apt to affirm, that upon ſuch or ſuch an occaſion, he will do an act of juſtice.

Into this rank may alſo be reduced the Paſsions themſelves, in reference to thoſe others which are wont to accompany them; for the Paſsions never march alone, and there is not any of them but produces

duces ſome others which either appear with it, or follow it very cloſely. Thus Arrogance, Impatience, Indiſcretion, accompany Anger; and therefore he who knows a man to be ſometimes tranſported with the latter, may affirm that he is apt to fall into the others. And this obſervation is ſo conſiderable, that it makes way for the Nobleſt rule of all *Phyſiognomy*, whereof Ariſtotle is the author, and which he calls *Syllogiſtick*; and of which we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter.

The Qualities or Endowments of the mind do alſo give a certain judgment of the good & bad productions, which ſhall proceed from them. And it may be affirmed, that when ſome man ſhall conceive himſelf oblig'd, out of the bent of his own inclination, to embrace ſome opinion, or to ſpeak to ſome buſineſs, he will judge and diſcourſe of it, anſwerable to the opinion the world hath of his capacity and endowments.

Art. 3.

Of the Remote Cauſes.

AS to the remote Cauſes, if there were ſo great certainty in Aſtrology as ſome imagine to themſelves, no queſtion but the judgments, which might be made upon conſideration of the Celeſtial Bodies, would be the moſt certain of any. But we do not acknowledge ſo great a power in thoſe Bodies, as is attributed to them, and we can grant them, at moſt, but ſome ſmall advantage over the Climate, which gives ſome ground to judge of the Inclinations, upon the accompt of the Temperament, whereof it is a Remote

more cauſe as well as they. Age and Sickneſs may be put in the ſame rank. But good and bad Fortune, Nobleneſs or meanneſs of Birth, Examples (under which I comprehend Counſels, Advice, Rewards, and Puniſhments) afford but very doubtful conjectures. Laſtly, the Seaſons and Aliment make the moſt uncertain judgments of any.

Art. 4.

What Judgment that is which is made by the Effects.

AS to what concerns the diſcovery which may be of the Cauſes by the Effects, we are to preſuppoſe the diſtinction we have already made thereof, that is, that of theſe latter, there are ſome Spiritual, ſome Corporeal. For, generally ſpeaking, the judgment which is made by the Corporeal, is more certain then that deduc'd from the Spiritual, in as much as the former immediately proceed from the Temperament, and the Conformation of the parts, which are the Next Cauſes of the Inclinations; or they (viz. the effects) proceed from the Paſſion it ſelf, which produces them on the Body, when the Soul is ſtirr'd thereby.

And as to the Spiritual, which are the Qualities or Endowments of the mind, the Inclinations, the Actions and Motions of the Soul, and the Habits; as there are many ſeveral Cauſes, whereby each of them may be produc'd, ſo the judgment made thereof is the more indeterminate and uncertain. For the Paſſion may be caus'd by divers objects, by the Weakneſs

neſs of the Mind, by the Inclination, &c. In like manner, the Inclination may be the product of the Inſtinct, to the Temperament, and of Cuſtome. The Habits alſo have diverſe Principles as well as the Qualities of the mind, ſo that it is no eaſie matter preciſely to aſſigne the Cauſe, from which each of theſe Effects proceeds.

Now, ſince there may be a more exact knowledge deduced from the Corporeal Effects, and that it is of them only that Phyſiognomy makes uſe, in order to the diſcovery of the Inclinations, it concerns us to engage upon a more careful examination of them, and to ſee what their number may be, what the cauſes thereof are, and what Strength and Weakneſs they have, that ſo we may judge, not only of the Inclinations, as Phyſiognomy does, but alſo of the Qualities of the mind, the Paſſions and Habits, which *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* pretends it ſelf able to diſcover by them.

CHAP. III.

Of the Natural Signs.

IN the firſt place, we are here to preſuppoſe, that there are two kinds of *Effects*, or *Signs*, which are imprinted on the Body. Of theſe, one is the *Natural*, which proceeds from the conſtitution of the Body, and the other Elementary Cauſes: the other, the *Aſtrological*, which proceeds from the Stars or Cele-

Celestial Bodies, whereof *Metoposcopy* and *Chiromancy* make use. We shall hereafter examine, whether there be any certainty in those Sciences, and whether the Signs, upon which they have fram'd their Rules, may contribute any knowledge of the Inclinations, the Passions, and the Habits, as they pretend to do.

As to the Natural Signs, *Aristotle* hath reduc'd them to nine Heads or Articles, which are these:

1. *The Motion of the Body, as the Gate, the Gesture, and Carriage of it.*
2. *Beauty, and Deformity.*
3. *Colour.*
4. *The Air of the Countenance.*
5. *The quality of the Skin.*
6. *The Voice.*
7. *The Fleshiness of the Body.*
8. *The Figure &* } *Of the Parts.*
9. *The Largness* }

All these Signs proceed from Internal or External Causes. And this distinction is so necessary, that it makes in a manner, the whole difference there is between those which are advantageous and those that are otherwise, as we shall make appear.

The Internal Causes are, the Conformation of the Parts, the Temperament and the Motive Vertue; the External are all those things, which come from without, and work some alteration in the Body. Thus a man may go slowly, either out of his natural Inclination, or out of Design, or through Weakness. Beauty and Deformity proceed from Nature, Artifice,

ce, or Accident. The Colour ought to be conſo-
nant to the Temperament; but the Air, and ſuch
other things may alter it. The Air of the Counte-
nance, and the Voice, the Skin, and the Fleſhineſs of
the parts, may receive alteration upon the ſame ac-
count. In fine, the Figure of the Parts s either Na-
tural or Accidental, for a man may become crooked,
and crump-ſhoulder'd, either by a Fluxion, or by a
Fall, or by Nature. True it is, that, of theſe Signs,
ſome are not ſo eaſily changed by the External Cau-
ſes, as the Figure, the Air of the Countenance, and
Motion; but the Colour, the Skin, and the Voice, do
eaſily receive the impreſsions thereof.

But it being ſuppos'd, as it is certain, that the In-
ternal cauſes are thoſe which produce the moſt cer-
tain Signs, we make this further obſervation, That
the Figure and Largneſs of the Parts proceed from
the Conformation; the Temperament gives the Co-
lour, the quality of the Skin, and the Fleſhineſs of the
Parts; The particular kind of Gate, and the other
Motions proceed from the Motive Vertue: But
Beauty, the Voice & the Air of the Countenance pro-
ceed from all theſe three Cauſes joyned together. For
Beauty conſiſting in a ſymmetry, and juſt propor-
tion of the Members, as to colour and grace, the
proportion proceeds from the Conformation; Co-
lour, from the Temperament; and the grace, from
Motion. The Voice is anſwerable to the Conforma-
tion of the Organs, their Temperament, and the mo-
tion of the Muſcles. In fine, the Air of the Counte-
nance, and the Carriage of the Body, have their prin-
cipal dependence on the Motion: for in the diſtur-
bance of the Paſſions, the Air, which accompanies
them, is nothing elſe then a certain propo.tion of

the parts, reſulting from the diverſe motions they make in purſuit of Good and Evil, which move the Appetite. But that diſturbance of the Paſſions being calm'd, and taken away, the Air, which remains fix'd on the Countenance, relates to the Conformation and the Temperament, as may be obſerv'd in thoſe who naturally have the ſame conſtitution and diſpoſition of the Parts, with thoſe, which the Paſſion is wont to cauſe.

Art. I.

Of the Difference of Signs.

OF the Signs before-mentioned ſome are *Common*, others *Proper*. The *Common* Signs are not determinated to any one quality, but may ſignifie many; on the contrary, the *Proper* are determinated only to one.

Moreover, there are ſome Signs, which, in a manner, never change, as the Conformation; all the reſt may be chang'd. And among theſe laſt, ſome are *Stable* and *Permanent*, others are *Tranſient*, and continue but a ſhort time. Thus thoſe which proceed from *Age* and the *Climate*, are Stable; but ſuch as proceed from Sickneſs and the Paſſions, are of ſmall continuance.

From theſe Diſtinctions, ſomething may be deduc'd, which may contribute to the diſcovery of the Strength and Weakneſs of the Signs; for thoſe which proceed from external cauſes do not denote any thing certain. And of thoſe which the Internal cauſes have produc'd, the Stable are ſignificators of Permanent

manent Inclinations; the others may poſsibly denote the preſent Paſsions, but not the natural Inclinations, unleſs it be by accident, as *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks.

Beſides, the ſigns which are the leaſt eaſily chang'd by the External cauſes, are the moſt certain; ſuch as are the Figure, the Air of the Countenance, and Motion; but the Colour, the Skin, the Fleſhineſs of the parts, and the Voice, are conſequently the leſs certain.

Whereto this may be added, that the Common Signs do not ſignifie any thing certain, unleſs there be ſome proper Sign, whereby they ſhould be determinated.

Art. 2.

Of the Means aſſign'd by Ariſtotle *to diſcover the efficacy of Signs.*

Ariſtotle propoſes another Maxim, to find out the efficacy and certitude of Signs. For he affirms, that, ſuch as are obſervable in the principal, and moſt excellent parts, are accordingly the moſt certain, and that, among thoſe, the Head is the moſt conſiderable; but, in that, the Eyes challenge the preheminence, the Forehead hath the next place, and then the Face, comprehending all that is below the Eyes. Next to the Head, are accounted the Breaſt and ſhoulders; in the third place come the Arms and Legs; The Belly is the laſt of all, and the leaſt conſiderable.

But this Rule ſeems ſomewhat diſconſonant to the Maxims of *Ariſtotle*, nay indeed to Reaſon it ſelf. For he, who aſsigns the Heart for the principle of all

Actions, as being that part, wherein he affirms the Paſsions to be framed, ſhould have beſtow'd the firſt and moſt excellent place on the Breaſt, and not on the Head, and have maintain'd, that the moſt certain ſigns of the Inclinations and Paſsions are derivable from that part, which encompaſſes the place, where they have their firſt birth. But it is to be obſerved, that *Ariſtotle* does not there paſs his judgment, of the excellency of the parts, as a Philoſopher or Phyſician would do; he conſiders them only upon this reflection, that the Paſsions are more diſcoverable in thoſe, then others And accordingly, he places the Arms and Leggs before the Belly, though they be much leſs excellent and leſs conſiderable, as to the eſſence and nature of the Animal. Now it is certain, that there is not any part, wherein the Paſsions are ſooner, and more apparently obſervable, then they are in the Head: as we ſhall ſhew more particularly in the next Article.

Art. 3.

That the Paſſions are moſt apparent in the Head.

THe firſt reaſon we ſhall give for the more remarkable manifeſtation of the Paſsions in the Head, is this, that they are not fram'd without the uſe of the Senſes, from which is derived the firſt knowledge of thoſe things, that move the Paſsions, and that all of them, Touching only excepted, are placed in the Head. Add to this, that the *Eſtimative Faculty*, whoſe work it is to conceive the things which

which are good and bad, and gives the firſt ſhock to the Appetite, is in the Brain; and that the ſtrength and weakneſs of mind, which have alſo a dependence on the ſame part, hath a great influence over the Inclinations and Paſsions. For it is certain, that Children, Sick perſons, and Women are ordinarily enclin'd to Anger, out of pure weakneſs of mind, as having not that heat of blood and heart, which is requiſite for a diſpoſition to that Paſsion.

But the principal reaſon hereof proceeds from the impreſsion, which the Paſsions make on that part. For as the Soul hath no other deſign in the motions of the Appetite, then to bring the Animal to the enjoyment of that Good, which ſhe conceives neceſſary thereto, and to remove the Evil, whereby it may be injur'd; ſo, to compaſs her deſires, ſhe employs all the parts, that are under her juriſdiction, and cauſes them to move anſwerably to the intention ſhe hath. Now, of theſe, ſome being more ſuſceptible of motion then others, they accordingly make a ſpeedier diſcovery of the agitation wherein ſhe is, and the progreſs ſhe makes therein: for there are ſeveral degrees in every Paſsion. In the firſt place, there is the emotion, or firſt ſtirring, of the Appetite, which does not iſſue out of the Soul, as being an immanent action: Then the Heart and Spirits are ſtirr'd, as being the chief Organs of the ſenſitive Appetite; and, if the Paſsion increaſe, the eyes, the forehead, and the other parts of the Head, are ſhaken: but if it ſtill advance, and come to execution, and that the Soul would really arrive at the enjoyment of the Good, and ſhun the Evil, ſhe moves the parts deſign'd for that purpoſe. till at laſt, ſhe puts the whole body into motion, if ſhe be not prevented.

So that it is to be hence obſerv'd, that the Heart and Spirits are thoſe parts of the body, which are firſt moved in the Paſſions. But the motion of the Heart is not ſenſible, as that of the Spirits, which is immediately to be ſeen in the Countenance, in regard they carry the blood along with them, the ſudden arrival or departure whereof alters, in a moment, the colour and figure of the face; which alteration happens not to the other parts, and that for two reaſons. One is, becauſe the Spirits make their recourſe to the face more abundantly then to any of the other parts, upon this account, that the Senſes are lodg'd therein, which ſtand in need of ſpacious channels, whereby the Spirits may flow thither in greater quantities, and with more eaſe. The other is, that the skin of the Face is of a particular conſtitution, which is not to be found in any of the other parts. For all elſwhere, unleſs it be in the palms of the hands, or the ſoals of the feet, the skin may be ſeparated from the fleſh: But in the Face, they are both ſo united together, that they cannot be ſeparated one from the other, without tearing and rending it. Whence it comes that the colour, which proceeds from the motion and quality of the blood, is more manifeſt there, then in all the reſt of the body; and this alſo ſo much the more, for that the skin there is very thin and delicate; which is not to be found in the hands and feet. So that, it being ſhewn, that the Paſsions do principally and more eaſily change the colour of the Face, then that of any of the other parts, it is to be maintain'd as certain, that, in ſuch a caſe, it muſt be the place where they appear ſooneſt and moſt evidently.

Moreover, whereas the Soul, being ſtirr'd, moves, not

not onely the Heart, the Spirits, and Humours, but alſo thoſe parts, which move voluntarily; it is not to be queſtion'd, but that thoſe which are moſt apt to motion are the firſt ſtirr'd by her, though their motion contribute but very little to the execution of her deſign. For, to what end ſerves the wrinkling of the forehead, the lifting up of the Eye-brows, and the widening of the noſtrils in the Paſſion of Anger; or, in Baſhfulneſs, the caſting down of the eyes, bluſhing, and being out of countenance? And yet it is not to be doubted, but that all theſe motions proceed from the diſturbance caus'd by the Paſsion in the Soul, and whereby ſhe is hurried, to make uſe of whatever ſtands in her way, though it be no advantage to her, as we ſaid before.

Since therefore that, of the parts, there are not any ſo ſuſceptible of motion, nor ſo ſuddenly betray their reſentment of the Paſsions, as thoſe which are in the Head, *Ariſtotle* had reaſon to aſsign it the firſt place, as to what concerns Phyſiognomical Signs; and to diſpoſe the eyes in the moſt excellent place therein, then to bring in the forehead, and ſo conſequently the others, for the reaſons we have alledged.

Art 4.

That the Inclinations are moſt apparent in the Head.

IT might be ſaid, that all this Diſcourſe does indeed demonſtrate the appearance of the Paſsions more remarkably in the Face, then any where elſe; but that the ſame thing is not to be concluded as to the Incli-

nations, and that all this alteration, and all theſe motions, which are conſequent to the agitation of the Soul, are only tranſient Signs, incapable of denoting permanent diſpoſitions, ſuch as are thoſe of the Inclinations and Habits. But we conceive it no inconſiderable advancement to have ſhewn, that the Characters of the Paſsions are principally apparent in that part of the Body, ſince that, according to the rule of conformity, whereof we ſhall ſpeak hereafter, thoſe who naturally have the ſame air, which the Paſſion cauſes, are inclinable to the ſame Paſsion.

However it may happen, if the Temperament, the Conformation of the parts, and the Motive vertue, be the cauſes of permanent Signs, it is conſequently certain, that there are not any parts, wherein the Formative vertue acts more efficaciouſly, then it does in the Head, by reaſon of the excellency of its Operations, and its Organs; no parts, wherein the Temperament can be more eaſily diſcover'd, by reaſon of the particular conſtitution, which the skin is of; in fine, no parts, wherein the motive vertue is ſtronger, and more free in its motions, ſince there it is in its proper ſeat and vigour.

To theſe reaſons, this may be added, that the great variety of the organs, which are in the Head, ſupplies us with a greater number of Signs, then any other part whatſoever, and that, Audacity and Fear taken away, as alſo ſome others which have dependance on them, there is not any Paſsion that leaves its marks on the parts, whereby the Heart is encompaſs'd. So that, without any further difficulty, we may allow the Head the preheminence, as to what concerns the Signs obſervable in phyſiognomy.

Art.

Art. 5.

That the Inclinations are diſcoverable by the Arms and Leggs.

IT may ſeem deducible from theſe laſt reaſons, that we are willing to allow the ſecond rank to the Arms and Leggs, and admit them to be the places, from which, next to the Head, there may be drawn ſuch Signs, as may pretend to moſt certainty, and whereof there are a greater number; and conſequently, that the Breaſt is not ſo conſiderable as they are. And indeed, if the Air of the Face, the Behaviour, and motion, be more certain Signs then the Figure, as *Ariſtotle*, in theſe words ſeems to affirm, ἰσχυρότεραι ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι, καὶ καθὰ τὰς κινήσεις καὶ τὰ σχήματα, placing the Figure after the Motions, it is certain, that they are much more apparent in the Geſture and Gate, then in the Breaſt, where it may be thought there is only the Figure to be conſider'd.

But we are here to call to mind, what we have ſaid elſewhere, to wit, that the Paſsions may be conſider'd in their firſt ſtirring, and in their execution, and that the execution is not alwaies conſequent to the ſtirring and emotion. Now the Arms and Legs are the principal organs in order to the execution of what the Appetite commands, and the Heart is the principle and ſource of the emotion. So that the marks which this latter gives are more univerſal, and more certain, then thoſe of the others, it being affirmed, that the Heart is alwaies mov'd in the Paſsions, and that every Paſsion comes not to execution.

I add further, that the Breaſt and Shoulders have alſo their particular carriage and motion, as well as the Arms; beſides, that the motion of the Arms, and the manner of Going, may be chang'd by cuſtom, whereas the ſame thing cannot be ſaid of the Figure of the Breaſt, which alwaies denotes the Temperament of the Heart, and, conſequently, the Inclinations. And as for *Ariſtotle*, we are to affirm, that he does not make any compariſon between the Air of the Countenance, and Motion, and Figure; but he compares theſe three together with the other Signs, as, for example, the Colour, the Voice, the quality of the Skin, and the Fleſhy parts, which no doubt are much leſs certain then the former, as we ſaid elſewhere. So that it is to be maintain'd, as manifeſt, that the moſt excellent place, from which the moſt remarkable Signs of Phyſiognomy are to be drawn, is the Head; the next to that, the parts which encloſe the Heart; the third, the Arms and Leggs; and the laſt, the Belly. For though this laſt hath ſome right to diſpute the precedence with the Arms, by reaſon of the many Signs found therein, eſpecially as to what concerns the Temperament; yet it is moſt certain, that modeſty does not eaſily permit that part to be conſider'd, whence it muſt needs follow, that the Signs are ſo much the leſs manifeſt; whereto may be added this alſo, that they do not principally denote the operations of the ſenſitive Soul, but only of the Vegetative, and that it is only by accident, that it makes any ſignification of the other.

Art.

Art. 6.

From what places the Signs are taken.

THe moſt conſiderable places, from which the Signs are to be taken, are, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, thoſe ἐφ' ὧν ἡ φρονήσεως πλείστης ἐμφάσια γίνεται, *In quibus ſapientiæ multæ apparentia fit*; which aſſertion may be explicated two ways. The former, that the parts where Wiſdom and Modeſty ought to be moſt apparent, are thoſe which diſcover the moſt certain marks of the Inclinations. So that the air of the countenance, and the carriage or deportment of the Body, making the principal diſcovery of Wiſdom in a man, it is accordingly from thoſe places, that we are to derive the moſt aſſured Signs of Phyſiognomy. For, as Prudence brings along with it a general diſpoſition to all the other Vertues; So, on the other ſide, Imprudence inveſts a man with a ſuſceptibility of all ſorts of Vices and Imperfections. So that the places, where thoſe two qualities are moſt remarkable, muſt of neceſſity furniſh us with the Signs of all the other Inclinations.

The ſecond Explication of that Aſſertion, and, in my judgment, the better, is, that the external parts, whereof the Soul ſeems to ſtand moſt in need, and wherein ſhe imploys the more art and conduct, whether as to the framing of them, or keeping them after they are fram'd, are thoſe from which we are to extract the moſt certain Signs of the Inclinations. The reaſon, this, that the Soul, making a fuller diſcovery of her ſelf, and, in ſome ſort, more manifeſtly producing her ſelf in thoſe parts, than in the others, may in them

them alſo make a greater diſcovery of her Inclinations. Now, it is generally acknowledg'd, that there are not any, wherein her cares, her conduct, and her induſtry are more apparent, than in the eyes, and in the other parts of the Head; in regard that all the Senſes, nay, Reaſon it ſelf, are lodg'd therein; and, next to them, in the Breaſt, upon this account, that it comprehends the ſource of life, and that the Appetite hath its reſidence there; And laſtly, in the Arms and Leggs, as being the inſtruments of voluntary motion, which, next to Sentiment, is the nobleſt quality of the Animal.

From the precedent Diſcourſe, it is eaſily ſeen, that there cannot be an aſſured judgment made of the Soul's Inclinations, otherwiſe than by the proper and permanent Signs, and that theſe are commonly drawn from the Figure, the Air of the countenance, the Motions, and the Fleſhy parts of the Body. So that among the Signs propos'd by *Ariſtotle*, the Figure, and Air of the countenance have the firſt place. Then follows the Motion, in as much as the Animal does not move, but anſwerably to the motion of the Appetite; and ſo it is eaſie to judge, of what quality the Appetite is, by Motion, which is one of its effects. The fleſhy parts of the body have the third place, in regard they denote the matter, whereof the body conſiſts: Now, every matter requires its particular form, and ſo, by the qualities of the matter, the qualities of the form may be known. The Skin and Hair come next, in as much as they are certain diſcoveries of the fleſhineſs. In fine, Colour and the Voice bring up the Rear, and have the laſt place, in regard they may be eaſily alter'd, eſpecially the Voice, which is chang'd in a moment, by the Paſſi-

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ons, by the leaſt fluxion, and by an hundred other ſuch accidents.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Rules, which Phyſiognomy hath fram'd upon the natural Signs, in order to the diſcovery of the Inclinations.

AS all the Signs, whereof we have treated, taken diſtinctly one from the other, afford us not a very certain judgment of what we would deduce from them; and that it is requiſite, there ſhould be a concurrence of ſeveral of them, to make a perfect denotation of what we would diſcover therby; ſo Phyſiognomy hath reduc'd them into divers Claſſes, wherein are comprehended all thoſe which have any relation to the ſame end and ſignification. And the number of theſe Claſſes is drawn from four rapports and reſemblances, which may be between Men & other things; it being conceivable, that one man may have ſome reſemblance to another, who ſhall be mov'd by ſome paſſion, or to Men of another Climate, or to Women, or to Brutes. Now, upon theſe four reſemblances, Phyſiognomy hath made four general Rules, which, beſides that they promote its particular deſign,

design, do further discover the initials of that Science and the improvements it hath made, in several Times and Ages.

Art. I.

Of the Progress of Physiognomy.

I Conceive then, it may be laid down as a thing not question'd, that Physiognomy had its beginnings and advancements, as the other Sciences had, which have not of a sudden, and, as it were, at the first start, nor yet in the same Age, attain'd the perfection and accomplishment, which Time and after-experiences have brought them to. And it is very probable, that the first observations made thereof, were taken from the effects, which the Passions produce in the countenance; and that it having been observ'd, that a Man transported with Anger, or cast down by sadness, had his countenance in such or such a posture, some observant Person inferr'd the likelihood there was, that those who naturally had their countenances so, were accordingly inclin'd to the same Passions. For this manner of judging of the Inclinations is more consonant to common sence, and the most easie to be observ'd. Afterwards there was taken into consideration the resemblance which may be between men, and other Animals, and a judgment was made of the conformity of their Inclinations, by the resemblance there was between them. Then was there notice taken of that which is between the Sexes; and, at last, that between men of different Climates. For it is certain, that the Sexes, in each Species, have the Figure of the Body and the Inclinations different,

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as well as men of different Climates; and that if there be a reſemblance, as to Figure, between any two of them, there ought to be alſo the ſame, as to their Inclinations.

Art. 2.

That the Syllogiſtical Rule was added by Ariſtotle.

THus far went the Antient Phyſiognomy. To theſe obſervations *Ariſtotle* hath ſince added the Rule which he calls *Syllogiſtical*. Now, though the rules which the antient Profeſſors of Phyſiognomy made uſe of were not bad, yet were they not certain enough, to eſtabliſh a Science upon them, in regard they did not employ them all in their judgments, nay, indeed us'd them not as they ſhould have done, and that they wanted the *Syllogiſtical Rule*, without which, the other are defective. And thence it came, that *Ariſtotle* found fault with them, and hath ſhewn, by ſolid reaſons, that there was no certainty in their Science.

Art. 3.

The defect of the firſt Rule of Phyſiognomy.

FOr, as to what concerns the firſt means, which they call apparent Conformity or Reſemblance, ὁμοιότητα, they minded not, that there are many contrary Inclinations, which cauſe the ſame conſtitution of countenance, as, for inſtance, Fortitude, and Impudence.

Beſides,

Beſides, the Air of countenance is chang'd in a moment, according as the Soul is mov'd; and ſo a man naturally ſad, may expreſs a certain cheerfulneſs in his countenance, upon the occurrence of ſome agreeable object. In fine, this Rule is very imperfect, and confin'd the ſtudy of Phyſiognomy to too narrow limits.

Art. 4.

The defectiveneſs of the ſecond Rule.

THe ſecond Rule, which they draw from the reſemblance there may be, between Man and other Animals, is yet more doubtfull, eſpecially conſidering the manner, how they made uſe of it. For there is not any man, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, who hath an abſolute reſemblance with any other Animal whatſoever, but onely in ſome particular part; and there is ground to doubt, whether any one part is capable of creating a judgment of an Inclination, proper to the whole Species. Secondly, it is to be conſidered, that there are few Signs proper and peculiar to any one Species, and that there be many common ones; and therefore the reſemblance which is made between a man and ſome other Animal, by the common Signs, will be defective, and ſignifie nothing, ſince it may be alſo made to another different Species. Nay, if the reſemblance be made by Signs proper to ſuch a Species, there will ſtill be reaſon to queſtion, whether thoſe Signs do determinately denote ſuch an Inclination, ſince it is to be conceiv'd, every Animal hath ſeveral others. Thus the Figure, proper to a Tygre, is,

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to have a very ſpacious mouth, ſhort ears, and the skin ſpotted; But this cannot deſign a particular Inclination, in regard that being a ſtrong, cruel, and indocible creature, it cannot be determined to which of theſe qualities that Figure may have any correſpondence. And therefore the antient Phyſiognomiſts, could not, by this Ruſe, make any judgment of the Inclinations, whether they made uſe of thoſe Signs, which are common, or thoſe which are proper to the Animals.

Art. 5.

How Ariſtotle *makes uſe of the ſecond Rule.*

IT will be ſaid, that, by this reaſon, *Ariſtotle* deſtroys as well his own doctrine, as that of the Antients, it being found, that, in other places, he makes uſe of this very Maxime, That ſuch, or ſuch a Figure denotes ſuch, or ſuch an Inclination, and that this is applicable to Lions, Eagles, Ravens, *&c.* It is true, that *Ariſtotle*, in appearance, makes uſe of the ſame Rule, but it is after another manner then the old Phyſiognomiſts had done. For theſe conſider'd not the marks and ſigns of Animals; and thereupon they concluded, that he who reſembled them in that, had the ſame Inclinations, as were found in the Souls of thoſe Animals.

On the contrary, *Ariſtotle* conſiders not the Signs as proper to the Animals, but as proper to the Inclinations; which having not been obſerv'd by *Baldus*, occaſion'd that great perſon to fall into a manifeſt contradiction. And accordingly, he afterwards teaches, how that obſervation is to be made, and affirms, that

we ought to conſider ſeveral perſons who have the ſame natural habit, ſuch as may be, for example, Fortitude, and mark, in what particular Sign they agree; and it ſhall be found, that their reſemblance will be in theſe particulars, in having the mouth large, and the extremities thick and ſtrong. Then you are to make your reflection on thoſe Creatures, which are known to be naturally ſtrong, as Lions, Bulls, Eagles, and Tigres, and finding that all theſe kinds of Animals have thoſe parts after the ſame manner, it will be very probably judg'd, that they are the marks of Strength or Fortitude.

But this is not yet ſufficient, it is further requiſite, that we examine, whether there may not be ſome other Creatures, which, though they be ſtrong, yet have not thoſe marks: for if there be not, the Sign is certain, otherwiſe, ſome doubt may be made of it. And the ſame courſe is to be taken, in order to the diſcovery of all the other Inclinations. But after what manner ſoever we may make uſe of this Rule, yet is it not of extent enough, to perform what may be made out by Phyſiognomy, in regard there are but very few Creatures, whereof we can have the knowledge of their particular inclinations, and the Figure of the parts correſpondent to thoſe Inclinations. So that it it is then only to be accounted certain, when it is confirmed by the others, and particularly by the Syllogiſtical Rule, which ſupplies the defect of theſe four.

Art.

Art. 6.

What the Syllogiſtical Rule is.

NOw, this Syllogiſtical Rule denotes the preſent inclinations and paſſions, in a way contrary to the others, in as much as it does not require proper Signs; but, from an inclination and a paſſion known by thoſe marks, it deduces the diſcovery of another, which hath not any. And this Rule is grounded on the connexion there is, between the Inclinations, the Habits, and the Paſſions. For one being the effect of the other, it may be judged, that a man hath an inclination to ſuch a paſſion or habit, though there be not any Sign proper thereto, and which may make any diſcovery of it, as being onely known, that the man hath that which is the cauſe of this. Thus having once known, that a man is timorous, it may be ſaid, that he hath a natural inclination to Avarice, and conſequently that he is a Miſer; that he is guilty of artifices and diſſimulation; that his fearfulneſs cauſes him to ſpeak with a certain mildneſs and ſubmiſſion; that it renders him diſtruſtfull, apt to ſuſpect, hard of belief, a bad friend, *&c.* Thus *Ariſtotle* gives an example of this kind of Judgment, affirming, that, if a man be ſubject to Anger, and of ſmall ſtature, he is Envious. But I conceive there is an errour in the Text, and that inſtead of μικρὸς, which ſignifies little, it ſhould be read πικρὸς, which is as much as froward, humourſome, and one who is not pleaſed at any thing, as we ſhall ſhew in its proper place.

As to the other four rules, thoſe which are taken from the Air of the countenance, and the reſemblance

there may be between the Sexes, are the moſt certain, and the moſt generally acknowledg'd. For there is hardly any Sign but may be referr'd to them, as *Ariſtotle* affirms; καλῶς ἔχει πάντα τὰ σημεῖα ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὸν ὑπερέχειαν, καὶ εἰς ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ. That of the Climates is more generall then the other, which is taken from the reſemblance of Animals: but it is not ſo certain in regard that all thoſe who are of the ſame Climate, are not of the ſame Temperament, and have not the ſame Conformation of parts; and therefore this is no neceſſary conſequence, that becauſe a man is born in *Greece*, he muſt be vain, unconſtant, and a lyar: and ſo of the reſt.

CHAP. V.

After what manner THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, makes uſe of the Rules of Phyſiognomy.

Art. 1.

How the ſaid Art makes uſe of the firſt Rule of that Science.

THus have we given an account of the Means which Phyſiognomy makes uſe of, in order to the diſcovery of the Inclinations, and which the

the Art we teach ought alſo to employ, in proſecution of the ſame deſign. But beſides that there are ſome others beſides thoſe, and that it hath many more things to diſcover than the other, it will not propoſe its Rules nakedly, as Phyſiognomy hath done, but eſtabliſh the grounds thereof, before they be reduced into practice.

When therefore the firſt Rule tells us, that thoſe, who naturally have the ſame Air, and the ſame Characters attending the motion of a Paſſion, are inclin'd to the ſame Paſſion; it is to be noted, that the ground on which this Rule is eſtabliſh'd, is the knowledge of the Characters of the paſſions. For, it were to no purpoſe, to affirm, that he, who naturally hath the Characters of Anger, is inclin'd to Anger, if it be not known, what the Characters of Anger are. This Art therefore pretends to draw a pourtraiture of every paſſion in particular, to deſign the Air and Figure it gives to all the parts of the Body, and all the motions it excites in the Soul. For, beſides what it will contribute to the deſign the Art hath to make known the paſſions, which cannot remain ſecret after ſo many *indicia* given thereof; It will alſo, by that means, declare thoſe which are conſequent one to another, and between which there is a connexion, the ground of the Syllogiſtical Rule; and by degrees, make that rule conduce to the diſcovery of the paſſions. It muſt therefore divide the Treatiſe of the Characters, into two and twenty Chapters, whereof the firſt eleven ſhall treat of the *Simple Paſſions*, comprehending among them Deſire, Laughter, and Weeping; and the other eleven ſhall treat of the *Mixt Paſſions*, according to the order we have ſet down before.

Art. 2.

How it makes uſe of the ſecond Rule.

AS to the ſecond rule, which teaches, that thoſe men, who have ſome parts reſembling thoſe of ſome other Creatures, have the ſame Inclinations with thoſe Creatures; it is to be examin'd, what Creatures thoſe are, which may give a ground for this rule. For all are not fit to be admitted into that predicament, either in regard that ſufficient obſervations have not been made of them, or that they are at too great a diſtance from the nature of man, as Inſects, Serpents, Fiſhes, *&c.* *Ariſtotle* therefore in his Phyſiognomy hath pitch'd upon twenty ſeven, to wit, fifteen four-footed Beaſts, and ſeaven Volatiles. The former are the Lion, the Panther, the Horſe, the Hart, the Ox, the Aſs, the Dog, the Wolf, the Swine, the Goat, the Sheep, the Ape, the Fox, the Cat, and the Frog. The other are, the Eagle, the Hawk, the Cock, the Raven, the Quail, Sea-Fowl, and ſmall Birds. Others have added to theſe, the Owl, and the Oſtrich. It is therefore requiſite, there ſhould be ſo many Chapters deſign'd, wherein muſt be treated, of the natures of theſe Animals, and eſpecially of thoſe parts of them, whereto thoſe of men may have any reſemblance, and of the Inclinations they denote.

Art. 3.

How the ſaid Art makes uſe of the third Rule.

AS to the third Rule, which ſhews, that he, who hath any ſemblance to Men of ſome other Climate, hath the ſame Inclinations as they have; this is grounded on the Figure of the Body, and ſuch Inclinations of the Soul, as that Climate cauſes. But in aſmuch as the Climate is to be conſider'd, not only by the poſition of the Heavens, but alſo by the nature of the Soil, by the Scituation, by the Winds reigning there, it is requiſite in the firſt place to treat of that Conſtitution of the Body, and the Inclinations, which a hot, dry, cold, or moiſt Climate may cauſe; and afterwards of thoſe, which may proceed from a moiſt, or dry, fruitful or barren ſoil. In the third place, of that which is conſequent to the ſcituation, as it is oriental or occidental; high, or low; maritime, or mediterranean. In fine, what contribution may be made thereto by the ſeveral Winds, Eaſt, Weſt, North and South.

Thence it muſt deſcend to the Figure and Manners of thoſe Nations, which depend partly on theſe cauſes, partly on the original of the people themſelves, whereof they ſtill retain ſome tincture, as alſo on the good or ill fortune which hath attended them, and cauſes them to change their former diſcipline, and their antient courſe of life. This Treatiſe muſt needs be long, and will require great pains to bring it to a period. For, beſides that there muſt be ſome

reaſon given of the particular Figure of every People, and its Inclinations, which is a thing very hard to do, it muſt alſo give an account of the Laws, which are proper thereto, in regard that the Law, as *Plato* ſayes, is the finding out of Truth; all ſorts of Laws being not convenient for all manner of Nations, but only ſuch as are conformable to their natural diſpoſitions; and he who hath lighted on that Conformity and Correſpondence, hath met with Truth. But howere it may be, this Diſcourſe is to be divided into ſo many Chapters, as there are Climates, and thoſe ſubdivided again into ſo many Sections, as there be Nations inhabiting each of them.

Art. 4.

How the ſaid Art makes uſe of the fourth Rule.

THe fourth Rule teaches us, That thoſe men who have any thing in their countenances approaching the Beauty of Women, have the ſame Inclinations as they have, and on the contrary. This is grounded on the Beauty, which is peculiarly anſwerable to either Sex, as alſo upon the Inclinations, which are natural to each of them. It is therefore requiſite, there ſhould be a diſcourſe concerning Beauty, and that it ſhould be divided into two Treatiſes; whereof the former ſhall ſhew how all the parts ought to be made which frame the Beauty of Man, and the Inclinations attending it. And the other is to give a particular account of the parts whereof the Beauty of the Woman conſiſts, and the Inclinations correſpondent

ſpondent to her Sex. All this ſhall be treated in fifty Chapters, there being no leſs then twenty five parts in each Sex, whereby they are repreſented as differing one from the other; the Colour and Proportion, which ought to be between them, being comprehended therein.

Art. 5.

Why The Art how to know Men *treats of the Temperaments.*

BUt in regard theſe two laſt Rules are principally grounded on the Temperament, before we come to the examination of them, it is requiſite there ſhould be a previous Treatiſe of the Temperaments, and a diſcovery made of the Inclinations, which each of them cauſes in the Soul, and the Figure it gives to the parts of the Body. And this is to be done in fifty two Chapters, wherof the firſt ſixteen ſhal treat of the Temperaments which are conformable to the whole Body; and the other thirtyſix, of thoſe of the Nobler parts. For there are ſome principal temperaments correſpondent to the four Humours, when they are only predominant, to wit, the Sanguine, the Cholerick, the Melancholick, and the Flegmatick; then each of theſe hath ſome one of the other humours predominant under it, as the Cholerick-Sanguine, the Melancholick-Sanguine, &c. and that makes up the number of ſixteen. In fine, every noble part is either temperate, or hot, cold, dry, or moiſt; or is hot and moiſt, hot and dry, cold and moiſt, cold and dry. So that there being four noble parts, and each of thoſe having

having nine differences of Temperaments, all put together, make up two and fifty kinds of Temperament which muſt be known, in order to a judgment of the Inclinations.

Art. 6.

That there are other Rules beſides thoſe of Phyſiognomy, whereby the Inclinations may be diſcover'd.

THus is it, that *The Art how to know Men* makes uſe of the Rules of Phyſiognomy, for the diſcovery of the Inclinations, and how, upon ſmall foundations, it deſigns the greateſt ſuperſtructure, whereof Science ever attempted the carrying on. But it does not think that ſufficient, as having added thereto ſome other means whereof Phyſiognomy makes no advantage. For, beſides that it makes the very effects of the Inclinations to contribute to the diſcovery of them, to wit, the deſire of doing the actions, and the pleaſure there is in doing them often; it being a thing out of all diſpute, that if a perſon be obſerv'd to be often deſirous to do the ſame thing, or that he does it many times with a certain pleaſure, it is a certain ſign of the Inclination he hath thereto. Beſides this, I ſay, it very advantageouſly makes uſe of the remote cauſes, whereof we have made mention before; for though the judgments, which may be deduced from them, be not abſolutely certain, yet do they either fortifie or weaken thoſe, which proceed from the next cauſes, which are, as we ſaid, the Inſtinct, the Temperament, and the Conformation of the parts. Accordingly, if a man be of ſuch a Temperament

perament and Conformation, as may be proper for courageous actions, and that he be withall a perſon well deſcended, that he be young, fortunate, and rich; that he have ſome military imployment, and that he be of a warlike nation, it is certain, that the judgement which may be made of his being inclin'd to courageous actions ſhall be more creditable, then if theſe circumſtances did not occur.

But if with that fortunate Conſtitution, he be of a mean extraction, if he be poor and unfortunate, and ſtricken in years, if he be of a Profeſſion that abates his courage, and keeps it down; if he be of a Climate over-hot, or over-moiſt, the Inclination which Nature hath beſtow'd on him to courageous actions ſhall be much weakned by theſe cauſes, how remote ſoever they may be, and the judgment to be made thereof ought to be the more reſerv'd.

It is therefore neceſſary that there ſhould be a previous knowledge of the Inclinations, which theſe cauſes produce, that they ſhould be compar'd together, and that it be examin'd how far they fortifie or weaken the others. Whence it comes, that, having treated of the Inclinations of the Inhabitants in general, it muſt diſcourſe of thoſe of Children, Young perſons, perfect Men, and Old men. Thence it muſt deſcend to the Moral Cauſes, which are in number ſeventeen; to wit, Nobleneſs and Meanneſs of Birth, Wealth and Poverty, Soveraignty and Subjection, Proſperity and Adverſity, and the courſe of Life, to wit, the Art Military, Medicine, Muſick, Hunting, Dancing, Philoſophy, Mathematicks, the ſtudy of the Laws, Oratory and Poetry, obſerving the Inclinations and Manners which accompany each of theſe Profeſſions: ſo that this will be the work of

one

one and twenty Chapters. And after all theſe diſquiſitions, it may well be confident, that it is able to diſcover, not only the preſent Inclinations, but alſo thoſe which are paſt, and thoſe which may yet be to come, through the change, which either hath been, or ſhall be made, in the Temperament and the Moral Cauſes.

CHAP. VI.

How the Actions and Motions of the Soul are known.

THE next work of our *Art how to know Men* muſt be', to ſhew how the actions and motions of the Soul are to be known, we mean not thoſe which are evident and manifeſt; for it were ridiculous to give Rules, to find out, whether a Man be in Anger, when he is ſeen tranſported with the fury, which that Paſſion inſpires; or whether he be ſad, when he complains, and laments, and ſeems to be over-whelm'd with affliction. But in regard there are ſome Paſsions, which are to be foreſeen before they are framed; and that of thoſe which are ſo, there are ſome that are not produc'd to any great height, as Hatred: that ſome of them are theatrical and feigned, as thoſe of Flatterers; Nay, that there are ſome cloak'd with contrary appearances, as when a man would have it thought he loves another perſon, though

though he hates him; when one makes ſhew of a certain joy, when he hath much ado to ſmother his grief; in fine, Deſigns cloſely carried on, ſecret Actions, the unknown Authors of known actions: All theſe things, I ſay, are the main ſubject of the Art we ſpeak of, and the Rules it gives for the knowledge of them. And no doubt but there are ſuch Rules, ſince there is not any thing conſiderable fram'd in the Mind, which may not be diſcover'd by the Countenance, by a mans Words, by the Effects, and ſome Circumſtances, from which there may certain, or, at leaſt, very probable conjectures be deduc'd.

Art 1.

That there are two kinds of Actions.

BE it obſerved then, that there are, generally ſpeaking, two kinds of actions; ſome ſimple and plain, and ſuch as they appear to be; others, deceitful, and cloak'd with diſſimulation. All the difficulty to be overcome in the former, is, to diſcover the end for which they are done. For, in every Action, there is alwaies the apparent and manifeſt motion, which is the matter, and as it were the body of the Action; and the Intention, which is the form; and, as it were, the Soul of the Action, and that is ever obſcure and hidden. Thus when there is a neceſsity of fighting againſt the Enemies of the State, the act of fighting is the matter of the Action, and is evident; but the End and Intention of it is a ſecret, in regard it is not known, whether it be for Honour, or Advantage, whether it be done out of force or by example, &c.

There

There will be therefore a particular Chapter for diſcovery of the Ends and Intentions of the Actions.

Art. 2.

Of Diſſimulation.

AS concerning the other Actions, which are cloak'd and cover'd with Diſsimulation, the diſcovery of them is much more difficult, for that difficulty occurs not only in the body of the Action, but alſo in the End of it, which is ſhrowded in divers pretences. And among Actions, the External may be diſguis'd under contrary appearances; and the Internal, which are the Thoughts and the Paſsions, may be eaſily diſſembled. Beſides, Diſsimulation inſinuates it ſelf into the Words, the Countenance, and the Effects, whether it makes its advantage of them diſtinctly, or altogether, as we ſhall ſhew more at large in the Treatiſe of Diſsimulation.

NOw the means, whereby the Art, we teach, pretends to the diſcovery of it, are twelve in number.

The firſt is, to examine the diſsimulation by it ſelf, and to ſee whether there be any likelihood or probability, the thing ſhould be as it is pretended; whether the countenance of the Diſſembler belyes his words, and whether the Effects are conſonant, or contrary one to another.

The ſecond, to oblige him who hath been caught in it, to diſcover it himſelf by fair words and perſuaſions.

3. To oblige him to it by puniſhments.

4. By

4. By Rewards.
5. By preſent puniſhments or rewards.
6. By a threatning of future puniſhments, and promiſes of future rewards.
7. By importunity.
8. By Wine and Good-fellowſhip.
9. By a conſideration of the perſon who acts, as whether he be of a timorous or confident diſpoſition, whether he have the reputation of being ſincere, or be a noted diſſembler, whether he be an inferiour perſon who ſpeaks, &c.
10. By a like conſideration of the perſon againſt whom the diſsimulation is acted, as whether he be one who is dreaded, whether a Prince, Maſter, &c.
11. There is yet a further way of diſcovering the Diſsimulation, by a ſudden motion of ſome Paſsion, which breaks forth, and betrayes what is in the Soul, ſuch as may be that of Anger.
12. The ſame diſcovery may be made by a ſudden ſally of Joy.

And upon all theſe ſeveral means, there are certain particular Rules, which ſhall be explicated in ſo many Chapters.

Art. 3.

How Actions may be foreſeen.

BUt we now come to examine, whether there be any Rules, whereby the Actions of the Mind, and the Paſſions of the Soul, may be foreſeen, before they are fram'd; and whether it may be affirm'd, that, upon ſuch or ſuch an occaſion, a man will have rational appre-

apprehenſions, if he ſhould chance to be tranſported with Anger, or fall into Fear, &c. As to the Actions of the Mind, as they muſt be neceſſarily conformable to the ſtrength or weakneſs of the Faculties, whereby they are produc'd; ſo is it certain, that a man, who ſhall have the organs, ſubſervient to thoſe Faculties, well or ill diſpos'd, ſhall have good or bad productions of the mind, and that it may be aſſur'd, that, when he ſhall be oblig'd to the reception of ſome ſentiment, or to ſpeak of ſome affair, he will judge and ſpeak of it, according to the capacity, which the world was perſuaded he had, as we have ſaid elſewhere. The Habit and Inclination do the like; for if it be known a man is Juſt, Magnificent, Valiant, &c. it will be undoubtedly ſaid, that, when any occaſion ſhall preſent it ſelf, his ſentiments will be conſonant to the Vertue and Inclination he hath.

Art 4.

How the Paſſions may be foreſeen.

But as to the Paſſions, there cannot ſo certain a judgment be made of them, and it may only probably be ſaid, that a man will be tranſported with Anger, and ſuffer himſelf to be carry'd away with vanity, or ſome other Paſſion, in regard that Reaſon and the Study of Philoſophy may keep him in, and correct the diſpoſitions which he might have to thoſe Paſſions.

Nay, there is this further conſideration to be made, in reference to theſe motions, that they are two-fold, primary, and ſecondary. The primary or firſt motions

tions hurry us away like torrents, and, as it is commonly said, come not within the jurisdiction of reason. The others are not so impetuous, and admit of some time to consider them; and therefore they may be the more easily check'd. But they are withall more hardly discoverable, in as much as they are more easily corrected; whereas the judgment, which may be made of the former, is more certain, it being very hard, that the Habit should be so perfect, as that it might divert Nature from those first assaults, and break that strong connexion, which is between the Inclination and the Action.

We are to make this further observation, that, of the Passions, there are some may be called the Principal and Predominant, & others, which are only the Companions & Attendants of the former. When a man is angry, his Predominant Passion is Anger, as being that which hath possess'd it self of all his Soul, and whereto are referred all the other Passions, which are framed afterwards, as Arrogance, Insolence, Obstinacy, &c. In like manner, Sadness, or Grief is the predominant Passion in him who is afflicted; but Fear, Languor, Sloath, Superstition, are its Attendant Passions In fine, there is not any one of them, which, when it is fram'd in the Soul, does not call some others to its assistance and relief; so that, the Predominant Passion once known, there's no doubt but the others are wayting on it. But in regard the connexion there is between them, may be stronger or weaker, and that there are some, whereof the consequence is as it were necessary, and others, wherein it is only contingent, (For Languor, or Dejection of Spirit, and Sloath, are in a manner necessarily attendant on Sadness; but Superstition does not alwaies

follow it.) Whence it may be thence inferr'd, that the knowledge had of the former is more certain, and that of the contingent, doubtful.

Let us therefore conclude, that there are two waies, principally, whereby future Paſsions may be foreſeen, to wit, the Inclination, and the Connexion there is between the Paſsions. Whereto may be added, the Strength or Weakneſs of his Mind, who is to reſent it, and the greatneſs of the Good or Evil, which is to happen to him. For if it be known, that a man is to receive a great injury, and that he be a perſon of a weak Spirit, ſome will not ſtick to affirm, that he will be overcome by the Paſsion of Anger.

Art. 5.

Whether contingent Actions may be foreſeen.

IT will peradventure be objected againſt us, that there is not any certain knowledge of things to come, which are Contingent, in regard they may equally either happen or not happen: otherwiſe, if a certain judgment could be made thereof, they would not be Contingent. The Anſwer to this Objection, which is made againſt all the Sciences of Divination, is this. That there are two ſorts of Contingents, ſome, which have a natural and regulated cauſe, whereby, according to the common order of things, they ought to be produced. Others have no regular cauſe, but a fortuitous or free, as thoſe things that happen by hazzard, or the election of the Will. Thoſe laſt are purely contingent, and cannot be determinately known any way whatſoever. But the former

former are not purely contingent, and the knowledge had of them may be certain in the ſequel of things, as not differing from that of things neceſſary, ſave only in this, that their cauſes may be prevented from producing their effects. The actions and paſsions of the Soul are of that kind, in as much as there is a connexion between them and the Faculties, the Inclinations and the Habits: for they are effects, which, by ordinary conſequence, depend on thoſe cauſes; and though ſome of theſe effects be free, yet are they not abſolutely ſuch, when they proceed from the ſaid cauſes, and that theſe concurr with the freer cauſe, ſuch as is the Will.

CHAP. VII.

How the Habits may be known.

Art. 1.

Of the diſcovery of the Moral Habits.

IN order to our ſatisfaction, whether the *Habits* are diſcoverable or not, we are to remember, that there are two kinds of them, the *Intellectual*, and the *Moral*, and that theſe latter are more eaſily known then the Intellectual. For it is more eaſie to

judge whether a man be Juſt or Temperate, then whether he be a Phyſician or Mathematician. The reaſon, given of this difference, is, that the Intellectual Habits make not any impreſſion on the body, and conſequently leave no ſenſible mark, whereby they might be known.

But I do not conceive this reaſon ſolid enough, in regard the Moral Habits do not alſo make any manifeſt impreſſion on the body, no more then the Intellectual. It is therefore more to our purpoſe to affirm, that the Moral habits are more certainly known, becauſe the Moral inclinations are determinated to certain Paſſions, which, often reiterated, produce Habits. And whereas there are few who reſiſt their inclinations, by reaſon of the difficulty and trouble it is to change them, and that every one commonly does what is moſt eaſie and delightfull to him: it thence proceeds, that the knowledge had of the inclinations, which is well grounded, and certain, enables us to make a more probable judgment of the habits, whereby they are attended.

Art. 2.

How the Intellectual Habits may be known.

But the caſe is otherwiſe in the Intellectual Habits, in regard the Underſtanding is not determinated to any one Art or Science, rather than another. And though that, of theſe, ſome have a greater conformity to the Imagination, then they have to the Judgment or Memory, yet the great number there is of them leaves the Mind, which cannot be naturally determinated

terminated to one more then another, in a certain indifference. For it may be ſaid, that a man is fit for Poetry, Painting, or Muſick, by reaſon of his having a ſtrong Imagination, and not the like for Medicine, Policy, and the other Sciences, which require a greater portion of judgment. Yet can it not be affirm'd, that he is effectually a Poet, a Painter, or a Muſician, in regard the inclination he hath to the functions of the Imagination renders him equally fit for either of them. Whereas on the contrary, the Moral inclinations are determinated to certain paſsions, and thoſe paſſions to particular Habits. Whence it may be affirm'd, from the knowledge had of the inclinations, that a man is endu'd with ſuch a Vertue, or ſubject to ſuch a Vice; and it ſeldom happens that one is miſtaken in thoſe judgments, for the reaſons alledged.

There is therefore a diſcovery made of Vertues and Vices, by the means of the inclinations which are known; and it is the onely expedient that Phyſiognomy makes uſe of. But our Art hath ſome other, from which a greater certainty may be derived.

Of theſe, the firſt is, to know the end of the Actions, which conſiſts in a free, perfect, and abſolute election; for he who acts by the direction of that, muſt neceſſarily act by vertue of ſome habit.

Secondly, the exceſs and defect of the paſſions, in reference to the objects; for he who is often angry, and that in a higher degree then he ought, muſt infallibly be adjudg'd to have the habit of Anger.

Thirdly, the perſeverance which any perſon is found guilty of, in any paſſion.

Laſtly, the effects, which the Vertues and Vices produce in the Soul and Body. And theſe frame the

Characters of the Vertues and Vices, which are to be deſcribed, according to the order we have ſet down before.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Aſtrological Signs.

BEſides the Natural Signs, whereof we have already treated, there are yet others, which are called Aſtrological Signs, in regard it is pretended, that the body receives the impreſſions of them from the Starrs and Celeſtial Configurations. Theſe conſiſt, for the moſt part, in certain Lines, which are principally to be obſerv'd in the Fore-head, and the Hands, and are imagin'd, to be the effects of the Planets predominant over thoſe parts.

From ſome obſervations which have been made thereof, there are two Arts fram'd, *Metopoſcopy*, and *Chiromancy*, or *Palmiſtry*; the former whereof conſiders the Signs which the Starrs have imprinted in the Forehead, and the other, thoſe imprinted in the Hands.

It is our work to examine, whether there be any truth in either of them: For if any knowledge of the inclinations and the motions of the Soul may be deduced from them, as they boaſt there may, the Art we teach ought not to ſlight them; nay, 'tis requiſite it ſhould accept of their aſſiſtance, ſince they are engag'd in the ſame deſign, and that nothing is to be omitted,

omitted, which many contribute to the diſcovery of a thing, ſo intricate as the heart of Man is

But if they have not any thing of certainty, and that they are onely the recreations, or, poſsibly, dreams and reveries, which the ſpirit of Man imagines to it ſelf, either by way of delight, or through miſtake, our Art ought to diſcard them as vain, ſuperfluous, and ſuperſtitious Sciences, not worthy to be admitted into the ſociety of thoſe of Nature, or to buſie the thoughts of any man that pretends ever ſo little to Ratiocination.

Let us therefore begin with *Chiromancy*, for it is better known then *Metopoſcopy*, and ſeems to have more evident principles, which may be more eaſily eſtabliſhed, nay, ſuch as, if they prove true, will ſerve for a ground-work to the other. Yet ſhall I not put my ſelf to the trouble of any other Diſcourſe thereof, then what ſhall be contain'd in two Letters, which I have already communicated to the publick, ſince they are pieces, which make up part of the deſign of this Work, and which the impatience of a Friend prevail'd with me to take off from the reſt, to ſatisfy his curioſity. I ſhall not now abate ſo much as the civilities I thought my ſelf oblig'd to render him, nor yet the precautions wherwith I would have ſecur'd my ſelf againſt my Readers. For, though that contributes nothing to my Deſign, yet will it afford thoſe ſome diverſion who ſhall take the pains to read it, and give them the ſame pleaſure, which is ſometimes deriv'd from the ſight of a ſtrange ornament, or ſome antique Mode, unexpectedly brought upon the Stage.

THE FIRST LETTER TO *MONSIEUR* B. D. M. UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF *CHIROMANCY*.

SIR,

WHen you preſs me to put into writing the Diſcourſe we had together concerning *Chiromancy*, and endeavour to perſwade me, that it were an injury to the publick, to deprive it of the Arguments you heard me make upon that ſubject, I reflect on the intreaty which *Socrates*'s friends ſometime made to him, that he would ſuffer his Picture to be taken, and the confuſion he conceiv'd hereat, after he had ſatisfy'd their deſires. For before that was done, there was no great notice taken of the defects which Nature

ture had imprinted in his face, and people began not to heed them, and withall, to reproach him therewith, till after they were repreſented upon the Cloath. The ſame thing, no doubt, will happen to me, when I ſhall put into writing the Diſcourſes, whereof you aſſure me, that you were not diſpleas'd at the recital. They will come to you with this diſadvantage now, that they are not attended with that grace of Novelty which they had then; They will not be accompany'd with the pleaſure of walking, and the converſation which then rendred them agreeable; and appearing before the Eyes, whoſe judgment is much more ſevere then that of the Ears, the defects there may be in them will ſoon be obſerv'd, and give me the ſhame and regret of having obey'd you. Nay, what muſt be my doom, when I ſhall have other Judges then your ſelf, from whoſe friendſhip I derive a confidence of ſome favour, and whoſe curioſity for theſe kinds of Sciences may abate ſomewhat of your ſeverity? And what reception can I expect, when I ſhall find the more ingenious part of the World prepoſſeſs'd with this opinion, that they are vain ſtudies, and all their principles, all their promiſes, deluſive and imaginary?

But, maugre all theſe hazzards, wherein you engage me, I am reſolv'd to endeavor the ſatisfaction of your deſires, and reduce, to a more ſerious examination, the things which I entertain'd you with only by way of divertiſement. For if upon this ſecond trial you ſhall make of them, you ſhall find them of good alloy, I ſhall not queſtion, but they both may, and ought to go for current, in the commerce of Learning. And certainly, if there be any thing rational in the conjectures I have made, nay, if they do but raiſe the diſtruſt

diſtruſt of a Truth not yet fully known, it is juſt the publick ſhould participate thereof, for the excitation of thoſe who make it their buſineſs to ſearch after the miracles which God hath been pleas'd to ſhut up in Man, to make a greater diſcovery of this in particular, and to add thereto their obſervations, which may poſſibly compleat what I have only begun. For how poor & low an eſteem ſoever we may have for Chiromancy, yet may Philoſophy find in it ſome things not unworthy her higheſt and nobleſt Contemplations. She thinks it no diſparagement to her, to deſcend to the moſt obſcure Arts, to clear up their principles; And as the light of the Sun faſtens it ſelf on the moſt impure things, yet is not corrupted thereby, and from them draws thoſe vapours, which it raiſes up into the higheſt regions of the air: So Philoſophy, without any derogation from her dignity, condeſcends even to the loweſt effects of Art & Nature, and thence derives ſuch diſcoveries as ſhe does not think unworthy a place among her moſt ſublime ſpeculations. And no doubt, though I do not pretend my ſelf one of thoſe, by whom ſhe ſhould execute ſo great deſigns; I may however think, that I have met with ſomething, which may not be unworthy of her cares, and ſuch as ſhould not only ſatisfie their curioſity who are lovers of Chiromancy, but alſo be advantageous to Phyſick. For if I can make good this Principle, *THAT EVERY NOBLE PART OF THE BODY HATH A CERTAIN PLACE IN THE HAND WHICH IS APPROPRIATED TO IT, AND WITH WHICH IT HATH A PARTICULAR CONNEXION AND SYMPATHY*, beſides that, it will make very much for that diſpoſition of the

the Planets, which the ſaid Science hath appropriated to the ſame places, and upon which it lays the main foundation of all its Rules, there may be ſtrong preſumptions deduc'd thence, to conclude, that the good or bad diſpoſition of the principles of life may be diſcover'd in the Hand; and that between the other parts of the body, there are as well as in this, certain reſemblances and ſympathies, which depend not on either the diſtribution of the Veſſels, or their ſtructure, but on a ſecret influence, which contributes to their union and aſſociation. And this will be no inconſiderable ſecret, in order to the opening of the veins, and the application of remedies, in certain places, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.

My work therefore, in this place, ſhall be to make good the ſaid great principle. For to deſcend to the particular rules of that Science, and to give the reaſons thereof, as you have heard me do of ſome of them; beſides, that it were a diſreſpect to the Severity of Philoſophy, for a man to amuſe himſelf about things, which, for the moſt part, are either falſe or uncertain, as being not confirm'd by juſt obſervations, would be too great a flattery of their ſimplicity, who give them more credit then they deſerve, and a miſ-expence of that precious Time, which other employments challenge.

But to prevent your complaint of this abatement, I ſhall add to the Diſcourſe, wherewith I formerly entertain'd you, the reaſons which rais'd in me the firſt ſuſpicion, that there might be ſome truth in Chiromancy, and that the grounds of it might be more certain, then many do imagine. And I doubt not but theſe reaſons of mine will, in like manner, prevail with all thoſe who ſhall conſider them without prejudice,

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in as much as the very ſame thing, which ſhould have brought it into ſuſpicion, and deterr'd thoſe who were inclin'd to the ſtudy of it, plead for it, and invite to the knowledge thereof.

To make this out, it is to be obſerv'd, that the firſt and principal ground of *Chiromancy*, is the diſpoſition of the Planets, which it hath diverſly placed in the Hand: For it hath put *Jupiter* in the fore-finger, called alſo *Index*; *Saturn*, on the middle-finger; the *Sun*, on the Ring-finger; *Mercury*, on the little-finger; *Venus*, on the Thumb; *Mars*, on the palm of the Hand; and the *Moon*, on the lower part of it. This foundation, I ſay, which inverts the natural order of the Planets, and conſequently, ſeems rather to be the effect of the extravagance of the firſt inventors of this Science, then of any reaſon they might have to rank them after that manner, is ſo far from bringing it into any miſtruſt of falſity, that, in my judgment, it is one of thoſe things which have brought into queſtion the truth there may be in it. For there is a kind of neceſſity, that the mind of Man, which is ſo much in love with proportion, and which, where-ever it can bring it in, never fails of adorning and enriching its imaginations therewith, ſhould not without cauſe have omitted it here, and that it hath been conſtrained, by the certainty of the experiences it hath made, to change the order of the Planets, which it hath ſo exactly obſerv'd in *Metopoſcoty*, and in a thouſand other occurrences, wherein it hath had the freedom, to make application thereof. And no doubt, had it been a pure imagination, it had been more eaſie and more rational to have plac'd *Saturn* on the fore-finger, *Jupiter* on the middle, *Mars* on the next, the *Sun* on the little finger, and ſo to have follow'd the order,

order, which thoſe Planets obſerve among themſelves, then to tranſpoſe them, as they now are. Or, if there had been a neceſsity of this tranſpoſition, me-thinks it would have been more pertinent, to have the greateſt finger govern'd by the greateſt of thoſe Celeſtial Bodies, or to have aſsign'd it that which is more apt to motion, then the Ring finger is, which is both leſs, and leſs active. So that there is a great probability, that ſo extraordinary a diſpoſal of the Planets is not the production of their pure fancies, who firſt ſpent their endeavours in that Science, but rather of the neceſsity, which oblig'd them to follow the reaſons and experiences, whereby they diſcover'd that truth.

But the obſervation which *Ariſtotle* hath given us, in his Hiſtory of Animals, adds much to this ſuſpicion. For, in that incomparable Work, wherein it may be ſaid, that Nature hath diſcover'd and explicated her ſelf, he affirms, that there are, in the Hand, certain Lines, which, according as they are long or ſhort, denote the length or ſhortneſs of Man's life. And this being one of the firſt rules of *Chiromancy*, it is to be preſum'd, that that Science was not unknown to him, and that ſo great a perſon would not have ſhuffled into a Hiſtory, which was to be one of the nobleſt draughts of Nature, a doubtfull thing, and ſuch as he was not confident of the truth of. And that, if it be certain, as experience hath ſince confirm'd, there is no rational perſon, but will conclude, that the Hand ought to have a ſtricter connexion with the principles of life, then any of the other external parts, wherein there are no ſuch marks to be found; That thoſe marks are certain effects which ſhould make a diſcovery of the good or bad diſpoſition of the principles, from which they proceed; And, in a word, that there

there are in that part ſuch miracles, as are not yet fully known, and that if the knowledge thereof could be attain'd, there would haply be acquir'd that which *Chiromancy* does ſo much pretend to.

Add to this, that he who ſhall take notice, that the Lines, which are in the Hands, are different in all men, that in the ſelf-ſame perſon, they are chang'd at certain periods of time, and that all this diverſity cannot proceed from any internal cauſe, to us yet known, will, in all likelihood, be forc'd to acknowledge, that all thoſe Characters are the effects of ſome ſecret influence by which they are imprinted in that particular part; And that, nothing being ſuperfluouſly done in Nature, they have their particular uſe, and do denote, if not any thing elſe, at leaſt this, to wit, the alteration, which happens in the principles, whereby they are produc'd. For to make theſe impreſſions relate to the Articulations, and the motions of the hand, as ſome have done, is a thing which cannot be maintain'd; ſince the Articulations are equal in all men, who nevertheleſs have all their Lines unequal; that there are many Hands, wherein there is not any Articulation at all, as in the ſpace which lies between the joints of the fingers: That children newly born, who have their hands ſhut all after the ſame manner, without making in a manner any motion, have nevertheleſs many lines, which are different in every one of them: that thoſe who exerciſe the ſame Art, and conſequently ought, as neer as may be, to uſe the ſame motions, have them nevertheleſs as different, as if they were of contrary profeſsions: That, in the ſelf-ſame perſon, they are chang'd, though there be not any change in his courſe of life: And laſtly, that in the forehead, where there is not any Articulation, and which

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part all men move after the ſame manner, there are alſo ſuch lines, wherein may be obſerv'd the ſame diverſity, as in thoſe of the Hand.

We may further add to theſe conſiderations the great Antiquity of the Science of *Chiromancy*, which muſt needs have been ſtudied before *Ariſtotle's* time, in as much as what he ſayes, of the Lines of the Hand, is one of its obſervations and rules; the work it hath found ſo many learned men, who ſearch'd into the ſecrets of it, and have honour'd it by their Writings: And laſtly, the admirable judgments which have been made according to its Maximes. For it is a thing comes not much ſhort of aſtoniſhment, that, of forty and five perſons whom *Cocles* had foreſeen, by his Art, to be ſubject to dye violent deaths, *Cardan* obſerv's, that there were but two of them living in his time, to whom that misfortune had not hapned.

But to come to a free acknowledgement of the truth, all theſe, as we have already obſerv'd, are but ſo many ſlight ſuſpicions, which conclude not for the certainty of this Science. For as to the order of the Planets, which it hath chang'd, it gives a great preſumption, that it hath not been done without ſome reaſon: but the queſtion remains ſtill undecided, to wit, Whether it be true, that thoſe celeſtial Bodies have any kind of power or influence over the Hand, and whether any one of them have ſome particular place aſsign'd it therein? The Authority of *Ariſtotle* may alſo be queſtion'd, and all this diverſity of Lines may proceed from other cauſes, and have other uſes, different from thoſe appropriated thereto by *Chiromancy*.

Moreover, how ancient ſoever that Science may be, it makes not much for its certainty, ſince there

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are ancient errours, whereby all the precedent Ages have been abuſed: And though many great Wits have thought it not unworthy their ſtudy, yet have there been, in all times, ſome, who have employ'd their endeavors about curioſities, as vain, as poſſibly this may be. In fine, all the teſtimonies and examples, which are commonly produc'd, in defence of it, can pretend to no more weight and validity, then thoſe brought for *Geomancy*, *Onomancy*, and other Arts of *Divination*, all which are imaginary and ſuperſtitious, and yet neither want Patrons to protect them, nor fail of ſucceſs in the judgments, which are made by them.

On the other ſide, neither do all theſe reaſons abſolutely condemn it, and make not any otherwiſe againſt it, then in that they render it doubtful, leaving the inquiſitive perſon in an uncertainty, what he ought to believe, and continuing him in the deſire of being ſatisfi'd therein. Now the only means to attain that ſatisfaction, is to examine the Principles of it, and to ſee whether there be any reaſons, whereby they may be maintain'd. For if any of them be certain, and well grounded, there is not, in my judgment, any rational perſon, who joyning the precedent ſuſpitions with the truth of theſe Principles, but will acknowledge, that if the Science, which hath been built thereupon, is not arriv'd to the higheſt degree of certainty, it may come to it in time, by the diligent and exact obſervations, which are yet to be added thereto: And that if it cannot promiſe as much as *Aſtrology* pretends it ſhould diſcover by the Stars, which it hath plac'd in the Hand, it may at leaſt judge of the good or bad diſpoſition of the interiour parts, between which and it there is an undeniable

ſympathy

ſympathy, and, by that means, conduce very much to the conſervation and continuance of Health, and the curing of diſeaſes. For when it ſhall be confin'd within theſe limits, and quit all other pretences, it will ſtill be a very conſiderable Science, and ſuch as, for the excellency of its diſcoveries, and the advantage may be made thereof, might be worthy the curioſity of the ſevereſt Philoſophers, and all thoſe who make it their buſineſs to enquire into the wonderful things of Nature.

Theſe are the conſiderations which I had, before I fell to examin the Principle before-mentioned, which is the main foundation, on which the diſpoſal of the Planets, into ſeveral parts of the Hand, is built, and in a manner, the only ſource, from which, all the judgments which *Chiromancy* can promiſe, are deduced.

The method I have obſerv'd therein, is, according to the ſubſequent Articles, to ſhew,

1. *That, of ſituations, ſome are more noble then others.*
2. *That the nobler ſituations are deſign'd for the more excellent parts, and that the excellency of the parts is deduc'd from the advantage they bring along with them.*
3. *What advantages may be deduced from the Hands.*
4. *That the Right Hand is more noble then the Left.*
5. *That motion begins on the Right ſide.*

6. *That the Hands have the greateſt portion of the natural Heat.*
7. *That the Hands have a greater communication with the nobler parts.*
8. *That ſome ſecret Vertues are convey'd from the nobler parts into the Hands.*
9. *That Nature does not confound the Vertues,* and conſequently,
10. *That the Vertues of the nobler parts are not receiv'd into the ſame places of the Hand.*
11. *That there is a Sympathy between the Liver and the Fore-finger.*
12. *That there is a Sympathy between the Heart and the Ring-finger.*
13. *That there is a like Sympathy between the Spleen and the Middle-finger.*
14. *That there is a Sympathy between all the interiour parts and the other parts of the Hand.*
15. *That the Face is an Epitome of all the exteriour parts.*
16. *That there is a mutual Sympathy between all the parts;* and,
17. *That the diſtribution of the Veins made by* Hippocrates, *for the diſcovery of that Sympathy, was not underſtood either by* Ariſtotle *or* Galen.
18. *Whence proceeds the regularity which Nature*

Nature obſerves in her evacuations.

19. *That the Planets have a certain predo-dominancy over the ſeveral parts of the Hand.*

20. *That the Planets have alſo a predominacy over the interiour parts.*

21. *That the Moon hath ſuch a predominancy over the Brain.*

22. *That the Sun hath the like predominancy over the Heart.*

23. *That the other Planets have the government of the other interiour parts.*

24. *That the principles eſtabliſh'd regulate many doubtful things in Chiromancy.*

Art. 1.

That, of Situations, ſome are more noble then others.

THat we may therefore give a ſolid beginning to this Diſquiſition, it is to be obſerv'd, that there are three orders of SITUATION, wherein all the parts of Animals, the Heart only excepted, are placed; to wit, *Above* and *Beneath*, *Right* and *Left*, *Before* and *Behind*. But theſe are not all equal as to their origine and dignity, and there is a diverſity of perfection, not only among them, but alſo between the tearms and differences, whereof they conſiſt. For

Before and *Behind* are more noble then *Right* and *Left*, and theſe laſt, more noble then *Above* and *Beneath*; But further, *Before* is more noble then *Behind*; *Right*, then *Left*; and *Above*, then *Beneath*.

The reaſon of this diverſity proceeds, in the firſt place, hence, that theſe three orders of ſituation, are anſwerable to the three dimenſions, obſervable in every natural body, to wit, *Length*, *Bredth*, and *Depth*, as theſe laſt are anſwerable to the three kinds of Quantity, which are admitted in every Mathematical body, to wit, *Line*, *Superficies*, and *Solid*. For the *Line* makes the *Length*, and the *Length* produces *Above* and *Beneath*: From the *Superficies* comes *Bredth*, and from this laſt *Right* and *Left*; And the *Solid* body produces *Depth*, as *Depth* does *Before* and *Behind*.

Now as the *Line* is more ſimple, and, by nature, precedent to the *Superficies*, and this laſt to the *Solid* Body; in like manner *Length* naturally precedes *Bredth*, and this laſt, *Profundity*. Accordingly the order of ſituation of *Above* and *Beneath* is more ſimple, and previous to that of *Right* and *Left*, as this laſt is, in reſpect of *Before* and *Behind*. So that Nature alwaies making her progreſs from thoſe things, which are in a lower, to ſuch as are in a higher degree of perfection, it follows, not only that the *Line* and *Length*, are leſs perfect then *Solidity* and *Profundity*; but alſo, that the ſame diverſity is found in the orders of ſituation, which are anſwerable to every one of them: And that conſequently, that of *Before* and *Behind* is the moſt noble; that of *Right* and *Left*, next; and that of *Above* and *Beneath* leaſt of all, as being the firſt, and ſimpleſt of all.

In effect, we ſee that all theſe things have been diſtributed

ſtributed to Bodies, according to the excellence they ſeverally ought to have. For thoſe which have life do in the firſt place grow in *Length*, and as they advance towards perfection, they acquire *Bredth* and *Profundity*. Plants have indeed the ſituation of *Above* and *Beneath*, but are deſtitute of *Right* and *Left*, *Before* and *Behind*: only living Creatures are endued with theſe laſt differences; nay, there are ſome of theſe, which have them not all, that being a priviledge reſerv'd for thoſe, which have the parts better diſtinguiſh'd, and whoſe motions are more regular.

Yet is it to be affirm'd from what hath been ſaid, that all theſe kinds of ſituation may not be found in purely-natural bodies, but they are uncertain and accidental; as not having any principle, whereby they are limited and determined, and it is only by way of reference to things animate, that they are admitted to be in them. For what is the *Above* and the *Before* of a Pillar, may as well be the *Beneath* and the *Behind* of it, and he who is on the *Right* hand of it, may be placed on the *Left*, yet without any change of place. But the caſe is not the ſame in things living and animate, wherein all the differences of ſituation, which the parts have, are unchangeable, as being fix'd and determinated, by the vertues and operations of the ſoul. And thus far of the kinds of ſituation, compar'd among themſelves.

But he who ſhall think fit to conſider the tearms and differences, whereof each of them conſiſts, will further find, that there is ſtill ſome one of them more noble then another, in as much as one is the principle of another, and that the principle is more excellent then that which depends on it. For the *Above* is the

principle of the *Beneath*, the *Right* of the *Left*, and the *Before* of the *Behind*.

And indeed the Beginning is a kind of Principle, and the beginning of the three principal operations of the Soul is wrought in these three differences of situation. For Nutrition begins by the *Above*, Motion by the *Right*, and Sentiment by the *Before*. And accordingly the Mouth, which is the first receptacle of the Aliment, from whence it is afterwards distributed all over the Body, makes the *Above* in all Animals, as the root makes it in all Plants. Whence it comes, that the Latin Tongue calls those roots which are *deepest* in the Earth, *high*. And it is commonly said, that Man is a Tree inverted, not upon this accompt, that his hair, which hath some resemblance to the roots, is above, and those below; but because he hath his mouth directly opposite to that of trees: for it is not to be doubted, but that the Root is the mouth of Plants, since it is by that they receive their nourishment, and that it is thence convey'd to all the other parts. The Sentiment also begins by the *Before*; for, the Sense of Touching only excepted, which it was requisite should be spread over all the parts of the Animal, all the other Senses are placed before, in regard it must have been the imployment of the Senses, to conduct and regulate Motion, which is alwaies made forward, and begins on the *Right* side, as we shall shew hereafter. Whence it follows, that the *Above*, the *Right*, and the *Before* are the Principles of the others, and that they are consequently more noble then they.

Art.

Art 2.

That the nobler Situations are deſign'd for the more excellent parts; and that the excellency of the Parts is deduc'd, from the advantage they bring along with them.

NOw Nature alwaies keeps to this Maxime, that ſhe diſpoſes the moſt excellent things, into thoſe places, which are moſt noble, as it may be obſerv'd in the order, wherein ſhe hath put all the principal parts of the Univerſe; And conſequently, it is requiſite, that, in Man, who is the Epitome, and abbreviation, of the World, the parts ſhould be ranked conformably to their dignity; And that it may be affirmed, not only that the moſt excellent are in the nobleſt ſituation, but alſo, that thoſe, which are in the nobleſt ſituation, are therefore the moſt excellent. For, it follows thence, that the Hands, being plac'd in the upper part are more excellent then the Feet, which are in the lower; and the Hand which is on the right ſide is more excellent, then that on the left. But whereas the excellency of the parts is deduc'd from the advantages they bring to the Animal, we are to examine, in order to the proſecution of our deſign, what uſe the Hands may ſerve for, wherein they are more ſerviceable then the Feet, and what advantage the *Right* hath over the *Left*.

Art. 3.

What advantages may be deduced from the Hands.

IN the first place, it is certain, that all Animals, which consist of Blood, and, for that reason, have the denomination of perfect creatures, have been furnish'd with four organs, to facilitate their motion, from one place to another; which organs are answerable to the four first differences of situation beforementioned, to wit, *Above*, *Beneath*, *Right* and *Left*. For there have not been any instruments, which might be conceiv'd answerable to the two last, to wit, *Before* and *Behind*, there being not any perfect Animal, which naturally moves backward, and the other organs being sufficient to carry on the motion, which is made forwards, as experience hath made apparent. This truth is evident, in all kinds of perfect creatures, since that most of the terrestrial have four feet; volatiles have two feet and two wings; the Fishes have four finns, and Serpents make four different folds or twinings. And all these parts are so absolutely necessary, in order to the progressive motion, which is natural to them that if they wanted any one of them, it could not be performed without some trouble. For the Volatiles are not able to fly when their legs are broken; nor can the Fish swim when they have lost any of their finns; norcan the Serpents crawl, if those parts of their bodies be cut off, which make the last twinings of their motion.

From what hath been said, it may be concluded, that

that the Hands, being of the ſame rank with inſtruments, which are deſign'd for progreſſive motion, do ſerve to promote that of Man, and that if he were depriv'd thereof, he would not perform that motion with ſo much eaſe. For we find, that a man cannot run without much trouble, when his hands are bound; as alſo that he ſhuts his fiſt when he goes to jump, and in his ordinary gate, the arm ſtill falls back, when the legg on the ſame ſide is put forward. To this may be added, that, in infancy, they do the office of feet; that when one is fallen, he cannot well get up without them; and that if one be to climb up, or come down ſome ſteepy places, they are no leſs ſerviceable then the legs. All which are evident ſigns, that theſe parts contribute much to the progreſſive motion of Man.

But whereas Nature diſcovers a great frugality in all ſhe does, and makes all the advantages ſhe can of them, ſhe does not content her ſelf with this firſt imployment ſhe hath impos'd upon the hands; but ſhe hath deſign'd them for ſo many other uſes, as it is impoſſible to give a particular account of them all. So that thence came the neceſſity of making a compariſon between them and the Underſtanding, and affirming, that, as this latter is the form of forms, as having them all in its power; in like manner, the Hand is the Inſtrument of Inſtruments as comprehending alone the vertue of all the reſt. For it is by the Hands that a Man receives and retains thoſe things which are neceſſary and delightful to him: By them it is, That he defends himſelf, and overcomes thoſe things, that are hurtful and prejudicial to him. In a word, they are the principal Agents, in the compaſſing of all Arts, and the general Utenſils, employ'd by

by the Mind, to bring to light the nobleſt, and moſt advantageous Inventions. And no doubt, Man derives ſo great an advantage from them, over all other Animals, that if it cannot be affirm'd, as it was by that antient Philoſopher; That *he is wiſe, becauſe he hath Hands*, this at leaſt may be infer'd, that he ſeems Wiſe, becauſe he hath Hands.

This premis'd, it is not to be admir'd the Hands ſhould be diſpoſed into the upper part of Man, as the more honourable place, and that Nature ſhould deſign their ſituation as neer as ſhe could to the Seat of Reaſon and the Senſes, between them and which, there is ſo great a correſpondence and connexion.

Art. 4.

That the Right Hand is more noble than the Left.

BUt though Nature hath plac'd the Hands in the ſame rank, as to ſituation, yet are they not equal in point of eſteem with her, in as much as ſhe treats the *RIGHT* hand as the elder, and the firſt in dignity. For, if thoſe things, which are moſt active, are conſequently moſt excellent, and moſt conſiderable, it follows, that the *Right* Hand, being ſtronger, and more nimble then the *Left*, ſhould alſo be more excellent then it. Now, that it hath more ſtrength and agility, is the conſequence of its having more heat, which is the ſource of thoſe qualities. And its having more heat, is again the conſequence, not only of its being ſited on the ſame ſide as the right ventricle of the Heart, where the bloud is more hot and fuming; not

not onely of *its* being neer the Liver, which is the ſpring of bloud; not onely becauſe the Veins of all the parts on the right ſide are larger, as *Hippocrates* affirms; but alſo, by reaſon of its being plac'd on the *Right* ſide, where motion hath its firſt beginning.

For, as the Spirits are the principal organs of all the actions of the body, and are by Nature moſt abundantly ſent, to thoſe places, where they ought to be ſtrongeſt and have moſt employment; ſo is it not to be doubted (ſince it is requiſite, Motion ſhould begin on the Right ſide, and that all the preparations neceſſary thereto, and the principal effort it requires, ſhould be made in that part) but that a greater quantity of Spirits make their recourſe thither, chafe, and fortifie it, by the heat they carry along with them, and by the ſecret influences of the vital principles, which they communicate thereto. Thence it comes, that even thoſe parts, which do not contribute any thing to Motion, and are on that ſide, have a reſentment of that force and vigour, which was deſign'd for that ſole action onely. For the right Eye is ſtronger and ſurer then the left; and the certitude of the ſight, which is made by both together, abſolutely depends on the former. All the organs ſubſervient to generation, which are on that ſide, are apt to frame Males, and thoſe which are on the left, Females. And, generally ſpeaking, diſeaſes commonly aſſault the parts on the left ſide, as ſuch as, having leaſt heat, are conſequently the weakeſt.

Art.

Art. 5.

That Motion begins on the Right ſide.

NOw, that Motion naturally begins on the Right ſide, is a truth which cannot admit of any diſpute, if we but take into our conſideration, what paſſes in all Animals For thoſe which have four feet do always begin to go by ſetting the right fore-foot foremoſt; and others, which have but two, ever raiſe up the right foot firſt. Burthens are better carried on the left ſhoulder then on the right, in regard it is requiſite the principle of Motion ſhould be free and diſ-engag'd: And Painters never forget, in their Pictures, when drawn to the full length, to diſpoſe them into ſuch a poſture, as that the left Legg ſtands foremoſt, as it is commonly ſeen in thoſe that are ſtanding, whereby the right is put into an aptitude to move, when they would go from the place where they are. Nay, there are ſome creatures, which, having not been able, by reaſon of their Figure, to receive the two differences of *Right* and *Left*, as the Purple-fiſh, and all the others which have their ſhells after the form of a Snail, have not nevertheleſs been depriv'd of that of *Right*; in regard that, it being neceſſary they ſhould move, it was accordingly neceſſary, that they ſhould have the principle of motion.

All theſe truths therefore being thus eſtabliſh'd, to wit, that there are ſome places and parts in the body, more or leſs noble; That the more noble are deſign'd for the reception of the more excellent parts;

That

That the excellency of the parts is deriv'd from the advantage they bring along with them; And conſequently, that the Hands, which, for the many ſeveral ſervices they do, are plac'd in the upper part, as being the nobleſt Place, ought to have the precedence, in point of excellency, of the Feet.

In the next place, it will be our buſineſs to ſhew, that the Hands receive a more conſiderable aſsiſtance and relief, from the principles of Life, and that all the nobler parts do communicate a greater vertue to them, then to any other whatſoever.

Art. 6.

That the Hands have the greateſt portion of natural heat.

TO make good this aſſertion, we are, in the firſt place, to obſerve, that Nature hath a greater care and tenderneſs for thoſe parts, which are the more excellent; That, ordinarily, ſhe frames them firſt; and that ſhe uſes more Art in the making of them, and more providence in the conſervation of them, then ſhe does in others. This is apparent, in the order ſhe obſerves in their firſt conformation: for, next the Heart and Brain, whereof She firſt makes a draught; the Eyes, which, without diſpute, are the moſt delicate and nobleſt organs, appear before all the other parts, nay, indeed before there is any deſignation of the Liver, the Spleen, and the Reins. The Mouth, in all Animals, is alſo one of the firſt parts that are framed next to the Eyes: Then may be ſeen the organs of progreſsive motion, and, after them, may be obſerv'd the Liver, the Spleen, and the other internal

internal parts; as the laſt and moſt exact obſervations of Anatomy have diſcover'd. Moreover, we find, that the upper parts are ſooneſt finiſh'd, and that, in Children, they are bigger and ſtronger then the lower; whence it comes, that they have all the ſame proportion, as is in the ſtature of Dwarfs; and that it is with ſome difficulty they are brought to go, in regard their Leggs are too ſhort, and too weak.

Now, it is certain, that all the care, which Nature takes, whether in the framing of them firſt, or in promoting their perfection, depends on the natural heat, whereof ſhe communicates a greater abundance to them. For that is the general inſtrument of all her actions, and the real ſubjunct, wherein all her faculties reſide. So that, if there be any parts which are framed before others, it proceeds hence, that they muſt firſt have had their portions of that heat, which is always moſt pure, and efficacious in its ſource; And if they are brought to perfection before the others, it muſt be attributed to this, that it is done by a particular application of that quality, acting there more powerfully then in any other part, and being, for that reaſon, continually ſupply'd by the influence of the Spirits, which augment and fortifie it. Whence it muſt follow, that the Hands, which are framed before ſo many other parts, and are ſooner advanced to perfection and accompliſhment, then the Feet, have accordingly had a more advantageous diſtribution of the natural heat, and a larger proportion of the Spirits, then the other.

Art.

Art. 7.

That there is a greater communication between the Hands and the nobler parts.

But if we would conſider theſe parts, when they are arriv'd to a more perfect ſtate, and in a time, when they are able to execute the principal functions, whereto they are deſign'd, we ſhall certainly find, that the Heart, the Liver, and the Brain, do communicate to them a greater portion of Vertue, then they do to any of the other parts. For, not to mention the actions of the natural and ſenſitive life, which are common to them, with the parts afore-mentioned, progreſſive Motion is particularly reſerv'd for them. So that, to perform that action, wherein there is more difficulty, and more ſtrength requir'd, it is but juſt there ſhould come to them a greater relief, and a ſtronger influence, from thoſe principal members, then may be neceſſary for the other actions of life. It is accordingly requiſite, that they ſhould have more bloud, more heat, and more ſpirits; more bloud, to render their conſiſtence the more firm; more vital heat, that they may be inſpir'd with greater force, and a greater abundance of the animal Spirits, to convey into them not onely ſentiment, but alſo the motive faculty. For, without theſe conditions, thoſe organs are of no advantage, and no motion can be made. In a word, ſince inſtruments are not inſtruments, but correſpondently to the vertue they derive from the cauſe, whereby they are employ'd, it is neceſſary that thoſe parts, which are the inſtruments of Motion,

Motion, ſhould accordingly receive, from the principles of Motion, that vertue, whereby they are put in action. And thence it alſo follows, that they ſhould have that vertue in a higher degree then others; they ſhould have more Spirits, whereby it might be convey'd into them; and conſequently, there is a greater correſpondence between them, and the nobler parts, which are the ſources of thoſe ſpirits, and that vertue.

This reaſon indeed is common to the Hands and Feet, that is, comparatively to the other parts; but if we conſider the great advantage, with the ſituation of the upper part hath over that of the lower, as alſo the excellency of the parts, which are placed in the former, and the particular care which Nature takes, of them, as we have ſhewn already; It will be apparent, that, in the ſaid diſtribution of Spirits and Vertues, the Hands have had the beſt ſhare, and conſequently, that there is a greater correſpondence between them and the nobler parts, then there is between theſe laſt and the Feet, or any other member whatſoever.

Art. 8.

That ſome ſecret Vertues are convey'd from the nobler parts into the Hands.

BUt beſides this communication and correſpondence, which there is betweeen the Hands and the nobler parts, by means of the Veins, Arteries, and Nerves, there are yet others more ſecret, ſuch as have more obſcure ways and paſſages, and yet much more clearly

clearly diſcover the truth we ſearch after. For, if it be certain, that the Lines of the Hand denote the length and ſhortneſs of Life, according as they are long or ſhort of themſelves, as *Ariſtotle* and Experience have taught us; it is neceſſary, not onely that there ſhould be a greater rapport, and a ſtronger connexion between it and the principles of life, then there is between them and all the other parts, where thoſe marks are not to be found: But it is further neceſſary, that the nobler parts, which are the ſources, wherein thoſe principles are comprehended, ſhould communicate to it ſome ſecret influence which muſt have no reference to the ordinary and manifeſt vertues it receives from them; in as much as neither the bloud, nor the ſpirits, nor the heat, nor the motion, which they diſtribute and diſperſe into it, do not contribute ought to the making of the Lines therein longer or ſhorter, or denoting the length or ſhortneſs of Man's life.

Art. 9.

That Nature does not confound the Vertues.

THis ſecret Sympathy, which is between the Hand and the nobler parts, being preſuppoſed, at leaſt, till ſuch time as we ſhall have prov'd it more at large, by more full and particular obſervations, we ſhall lay it down, as a moſt certain principle, that Nature does not confound the vertues, eſpecially the formal and ſpecifick, ſo there be ever ſo little oppoſition between them, and that ſhe always diſtinguiſhes them, as much as lies in her power. For, not to bring on

the Stage the maximes of Aſtrologie, which hath divided the Heavens into ſo many Planets and Starrs, into ſo many Signs and Houſes, differing one from another in point of vertue; there is not any order of things in the Univerſe wherein this truth is not obſervable. For example, in perfect Animals, the qualities neceſſary to generation have been divided between the two Sexes; in each of thoſe, the faculties conducing to the government of life, have every one of them its particular Seat; And all the Senſes have their proper organs and diſtinct functions. Nay, let us examine Plants, Minerals, and Stones, and we ſhall find the ſame diſtinction; and, not to deſcend to the particulars which might be inſtanced, we need only direct our obſervation to the Load-ſtone, where it is ſo obvious to the Senſe, that, without blindneſs, or ſtupidity, it cannot be doubted of. For, in an Homogenial body, the compoſition whereof is equal every where, and wherein it ſeems that all the parts ſhould have one and the ſame power; yet is it obſerv'd, that, of thoſe parts, there are ſome, whereto the Magnetick qualities have been particularly diſtributed, and that there are two Poles, wherein they have been diſtinctly placed. And if what ſome perſons of late pretend that they have made it their diſcovery, be true, to wit, that there is a fixt Meridian in the ſaid Stone, it is requiſite, that all the others ſhould alſo be fixt, and conſequently, they have each of them a different inclination. So true is it, that Nature loves to diſtinguiſh the Vertues, and ſo averſe is ſhe to the intermixture and confuſion of them. And indeed, if ſhe did not exactly proceed, according to this order, things would be done many times contrary to her deſign, one quality would deſtroy another,

ther, and the effects would not be anſwerable to their cauſes, nor to the end, whereto they are deſign'd.

Art. 10.

That the Vertues of the nobler parts are not receiv'd into the ſame places of the Hand.

IF the caſe ſtand thus, and it be granted, that there are ſome particular Vertues communicated from the nobler parts to the Hand, it is requiſite that they ſhould not be confounded together, nor receiv'd into the ſame part of it; And conſequently, it is neceſſary, that there ſhould be one place aſſign'd for that of the Liver, another for that of the Heart, and ſo of all the reſt.

But the main difficulty is, to find out, which thoſe particular places and parts are, whereinto thoſe influences are receiv'd. For though *Chiromancy* aſſures us, that there is a ſympathy between the Fore-finger and the Liver, between the Middle-finger and the Spleen, between the Ring-finger and the Heart, *&c.* yet does it not produce any convincing proof of this truth; and as for the Experiences it advances, for the confirmation thereof, they ſtill leave thoſe unſatisfy'd, who allow nothing to be granted, but what is back'd with ſound reaſons, and are look'd upon by them as ſo many reveries and extravagances of man's curioſity. But certainly, he who could make good this Sympathy, by other obſervations, then thoſe which may be deduc'd from *Chiromancy*, and ſuch as ſhould be built upon Medicine, or ſome other part of natural Philoſophy, might juſtly make it his boaſt, that he

had diſcover'd the myſterie of this Science, and that he had found out the onely ground, upon which the truth of all Celeſtial configurations is ſupported. For my part, I do not pretend that I can produce all thoſe, which might be neceſſary, to make an abſolute proof thereof; yet dare I affirm, that I have ſome, which may, as it were, lay the foundations of ſuch an evicti, on, and are ſuch, as, having demonſtrated ſome part of it, will leave an invincible preſumption for the reſt, and a hope, that it may be accompliſh'd, after there hath been a carefull obſervation made of what happens to this admirable organ.

Art. II.

That there is a Sympathy between the Liver and the Fore-finger.

THe firſt Obſervation then, which we have to propoſe, is, to ſhew the communication and ſympathy which is between the Liver, and the Finger, commonly called by the Latines, *Index*. It is deduc'd from Medicine, which teaches us, that the Leprozie hath its ſource and principal ſeat in the Liver, and that one of the firſt Signs it gives, whereby it may be diſcover'd, appears in that finger. For when all the Muſcles of the Hand, and indeed, of all the Body, are full and ſucculent, thoſe which are ſubſervient to the motion of that finger wither and dry up, eſpecially that which is in the Thenar, that is, in the ſpace between the ſaid Finger and the Thumb, where all that is fleſhy is conſum'd, and there remains onely the skin and the fibres, which lye flat to the bone. Now this could

could not happen thus, if there were not ſome analogie, and ſecret correſpondence, between the Liver and that part, ſince it is one of the firſt that is ſenſible of the alteration which is wrought in its ſubſtance: it being a thing may be confidently affirm'd, that there is not any diſeaſe, which ſo much corrupts the nature of the Liver, and deſtroys, not only its vertue, but alſo its ſubſtance, as this does; which, upon that accompt, is called the Univerſal Cancer of the Liver, and the whole maſs of bloud. *Galen*, no doubt, was ignorant of this ſympathy, as being a thing which pure Ratiocination could never have diſcover'd, when, to be inform'd thereof, it was requiſite it ſhould be reveal'd to him in a dream. For he relates, that, being troubled with a violent pain, which put him into a fright of being troubled with an Impoſthume in the Liver, he had an advice in his ſleep, to open the Artery which runs along that finger, and that the ſaid remedy immediately appeas'd the pain, whereto he had been ſubject a long time before. Which is a manifeſt ſign, that there is a particular communication between thoſe two parts, and a certain ſecret friendſhip and combination, whereby they are united together.

Art. 12.

That there is a Sympathy between the Heart and the Ring-finger.

THe ſecond Obſervation ſhall be, to ſhew, that there is ſympathy between the Heart and the fourth finger, which, in regard Rings are worn on it,

is commonly called the Ring-finger. For it is a thing cannot be reflected on without ſomething of wonder, that, when the Gout falls into the Hands, that finger is the laſt which it faſtens upon: And *Levinus* relates, that, in all thoſe whom he met with troubled with that Diſeaſe, the fourth finger of the left Hand, that is, the Ring-finger, was ever free from it, while all the others were extremly ſubject to pains and inflammations.

Now, whereas the parts make a ſtronger or weaker reſiſtance againſt Diſeaſes, according to the greater or leſſer force they have, and that their force depends on the greater or leſſer degree of natural heat, which is in them, it muſt needs be inferr'd, that that finger muſt have more of it then any of the others, ſince it makes a greater reſiſtance againſt the evil, then they do. And whereas the diſtribution of the natural heat proceeds either from the firſt Conformation of the parts, or from the influence communicated to them by the principle of heat; and that there is no probability, the ſaid finger, having the ſame ſtructure and compoſition with the reſt, ſhould have a greater portion then they of that fixt and original heat, whereof there is a diſtribution made at the birth; it muſt needs follow, that the divident it hath thereof ſhould proceed from the influence, which the principle of heat ſends it in greater abundance then to any of the reſt; and conſequently, that there is a greater communication, a greater dependence and connexion, between it and the Heart, which, without all diſpute, is the principle of that heat, then there can be between the Heart and all the other fingers put together.

Nor was Antiquity wholly ignorant of this ſympathy, in as much as Hiſtory informs us, that the Antient

tient Phyſicians were of Opinion, that this finger had a certain cordial vertue, as making uſe of it excluſively to all the reſt, in the mixture of thoſe medicaments, whereof they made their Antidotes. And thence it came, that they gave it the denomination of the medical finger, which it ſtill keeps in the Latine Tongue, that this is one of the reaſons why Rings have been ever ſince worn on it; and that many apply thereto remedies for the weakneſſes of the Heart, as *Levinus* affirms, that he had often made experience, as alſo for the curing of intermittent Fevers, as ſome do ſtill, with good ſucceſs.

Nor is it of late onely, that ſome have made it their buſineſs, to find out the cauſe of this intelligence and relation between theſe two parts. For ſome, as *Appion*, in *Aulus Gellius*, have affirmed, that there was a nerve, which, proceeding from the Heart, ended at the ſaid finger; others, that that connexion was wrought by an Artery, and that it is manifeſtly perceiv'd to beat in Women during the time of their Travel, as alſo in thoſe, who are wearied with overworking, and in all the Diſeaſes, which aſſault the Heart. But, though this laſt Opinion be the more probable, yet doth it not abſolutely take away the difficulty, in as much as the other fingers have each of them an Artery at well as this, which Artery proceeds from the ſame branch, and the ſame ſource as that of the other does. Whereto it may be added, that it is not neceſſary there ſhould be manifeſt conduits for the conveyance of theſe vertues, Nature her ſelf, as *Hippocrates* affirms, making ſecret paths and ways, for the paſſage, not onely of her own faculties, but alſo for that of the humours themſelves, which ſhe would rid her ſelf of.

Art. 13.

That there is a like Sympathy between the Spleen and the Middle-finger.

I might add for a third obſervation, to diſcover the Sympathy there is between the Spleen and the Long or Middle-finger, the miraculous effects, which the opening of the *Salvatella* produces in diſeaſes of the Spleen. For that Vein paſſing commonly between the Middle-finger, and the Ring-finger, as *Hippocrates* affirms, or between the latter and the Little-finger, but ſending ſome branch to the Middle-finger, it may, with much probability, be imagin'd, that the vertue of the Spleen is convey'd by the ſaid Vein to that Finger, and that the Ring-finger being wholly taken up with the influence of the Heart, cannot entertain that of the Spleen, if it be true, that the vertues are not confounded, as we have ſhewn elſewhere. And indeed, what ever ſome late Practicers of Phyſick may ſay, experience, back'd by the authority of the firſt Maſters of that Science, is of more force then all the reaſons can be alledged by them.

For, beſides that it is a thing of dangerous conſequence, for any one to think to make all the rules of Medicine ſubject to ratiocination, which is many times weak and deceitful, and to diſcard the ſentiments of the Ancient Profeſſors of that Art, who were more exact obſervers of things, then thoſe who have come after them; this, I ſay, not urg'd, I can truly and ſafely affirm, that, having caus'd this vein to

be

be opened in Quartan Agues, above ſixty times, it never fail'd, after the preparations neceſſary thereto, either quite to take away the Fever, or abate much of the violence of it, and made the fits more eaſily ſupportable. Let them not therefore argue any thing from the diſtribution, nor yet from the largneſs of the Veſſels; For as one and the ſame boal of a tree hath ſeveral branches, which have not the ſame vertue, and that, of theſe, ſome bear flowers, or fruits, others nothing at all; In like manner, though all the veins of the Arm and Hand proceed from the ſame trunk, yet have they not the ſame employments, and they are only ſo many channels, through which the ſeveral faculties may flow. So that the faculty which proceeds from the Spleen, may paſs wholy in the *Salvatella*, without diſperſing it ſelf into the other veins; which may be imagin'd done, after the ſame manner, as it is, that the parts disburthen themſelves only on thoſe, which are particularly attributed and affected to them, though they have a connexion with ſome others, by their veſſels and ſituation; And hence it is that the ſeveral tranſportations of the humours, and the changes which diſeaſes make from one place to another, do proceed, as we ſhall ſhew more at large hereafter.

As to the largeneſs of the Veins, which makes the evacuations of them more advantageous then are thoſe of ſuch as are leſs, it is a thing out of all diſpute, when the queſtion is of diminiſhing ſomewhat of the univerſal fulneſs of the body: But for what concerns the diſcharging of ſome part, it is obſerv'd, that, many times, the leſſer veins, provided they be neer it, and that there be ſome ſecret communication between them, do it more ſafely and more effectually then

then the greater. In fine, ſince it is an opinion, without preſcription of time, that the opening of the vein hath prov'd ſucceſsful in diſeaſes of the Spleen, as may be ſeen in the writings of *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, and all the *Arabians*, it is not likely it ſhould be approv'd by ſuch eminent perſons, and that it ſhould continue in repute for ſo many ages, through which it hath deſcended to us, had it not been ſupported and confirm'd by experience, in as much as there is not any Reaſon, which might have given ground to that perſuaſion. And if it be by this way, that this remedy came to be known, there is no neceſſity we ſhould reduce it to the examination of reaſons, no more then we do the purgative faculties, and all the other ſpecifick vertues, whereof Medicine is full.

To return therefore to the proof, which this diſcourſe interrupted; we ſaid, that ſome advantage might be made of this obſervation, to confirm the ſympathy there is between the Spleen and the middle finger. But if particular inſtances might ſerve for proofs to general Maxims, I dare affirm, that I have one, which wonderfully makes good this ſympathy. For I know a perſon, who, being ſubject to the diſeaſes of the Spleen, is never troubled therewith, but the middle finger of the left Hand becomes cold, benumm'd, and of a wan colour, as if it were depriv'd of life.

To this we may add the Story related by *Hippocrates*, in the fourth Book of *Popular diſeaſes*, of the Woman, whoſe *Hypochondria* were ſo extended, and the reſpiration ſo obſtructed, to whom there happen'd the eleventh day a fluxion and inflammation in that very finger, which gave her ſome eaſe for a certain

rtain time, though afterwards, the violence of the ever, and the Impoſthume, which bred in her en-ails, occaſion'd her death. For it may be con-ctur'd thence, that ſome part of the humour, which as in the Spleen, was disburthen'd into that finger, being a part, between it and which there was a mmunication and correſpondence, and that the id disburthening procur'd it ſome eaſe; but with is further obſervation, that, it being not poſsible, hat the whole cauſe of the indiſpoſition ſhould be ontain'd in ſo narrow a place, the remainder occa-ion'd the impoſthume, whereof ſhe died. However, o deal ingenuouſly, we muſt confeſs, that theſe are nly conjectures, not fit to enter into competition ith the precedent obſervations, which ſeem to have demonſtrated the truth we are enquiring after.

Art. 14.

That there is a Sympathy between all the interiour parts, and the other parts of the Hand.

WHat hath been ſaid in the precedent Articles is ſo evictive, that it were to be wiſh'd, we had as good proofs, to make a diſtinct diſcovery of the reſt of the Sympathies, which are between the other interiour parts, and ſome other places in the Hand. But, to excuſe the negligence of not looking after them, it may with much probability be affirmed, that, ſince thoſe of the Heart and Liver are certain and unqueſtionable, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the

the others ſhould be ſo too, though they are not apparent to us: And that not only the Brain, and the other parts, which have publick and principal functions, as well as the Heart and Liver; but alſo that the Spleen, the Stomach, the Lungs, the Kidneys, and poſsibly ſome other parts, ſhould have each of them, in the Hand, their proper and affected place, between which and them there is a certain correſpondence and complyance.

Art. 15.

That the Face is the Epitome of all the exteriour parts.

IT may therefore be brought in as a proof of that ſecret intelligence, which is between ſome parts and others, and for the honour of that we now treat of, that the Hand and Face are as it were an abſtract of all the parts of the Body. For the latter is an Epitome of all the exteriour members, there being not any part of it, but hath its particular and manifeſt reſemblance to ſome one of them; as the former, in like manner is, of all the interiour parts, as having not any place, between which and ſome one of them there is not a ſecret connexion and ſympathy. And no doubt, this is one of the principal reaſons, that theſe two parts have had ſo peculiar a conſtitution of the skin, which, though all elſewhere, it be ſeparated from the Muſcles, is, in theſe, ſo joyn'd, that it is impoſsible to ſeparate the one from the other: it being Nature's pleaſure, who hath deſign'd theſe parts for Mirrours, wherein all the others were

to

to be repreſented, that the fleſh ſhould be joyn'd to the skin, that the impreſsion it receives from the Nerves, Veins, and Arteries, which are ſpread through it, ſhould be more eaſily communicated, and be more ſuddenly apparent without. Which thing may alſo be obſerv'd in the ſoles of the Feet, which, in ſome ſort, participate of the ſame advantages with the Hands, and upon the ſaid advantages there is another Science eſtabliſh'd, called *Podomancy*, which promiſes the ſame things as *Chiromancy*, but not with ſo good ſucceſs, for the reaſons we ſhall give elſewhere.

Art. 16.

That there is a mutual Sympathy between all the parts.

NOr is it only between the exteriour and manifeſt parts, that this aſſociation and mutual correſpondence is found, there is yet another more general ſympathy, which was known by *Hippocrates*, and ſuch, as he made it his ground of that ingenious diviſion of the Veins, which he hath made in his book *Of the Bones*. For that tranſcendent Wit, having conſider'd the ſeveral tranſportations of the humours, and the changes of diſeaſes, ſo often made from ſome certain parts to others, hath deſign'd the Veins whereby they might be made, and which accordingly were to be opened, in order to the preventing thereof. And, that ſuch an order might be obſerv'd in that procedure as ſhould take away the confuſion thereof, he hath laid down ſeveral heads, or as it were articles, at which he would begin the diſtribution of thoſe

thoſe Veſſels; for he hath plac'd the firſt in the Hea- the ſecond, in the Reins; the third, in the Liver; t fourth, in the Eyes; and the Fift in the Head; fro whence he draws four pair of Veins, which are after wards ſpread into divers places.

Art. 17.

That the diſtribution of the Veins made by Hippocrates, *for the diſcovery of the ſaid Sympathy, was not underſtood either by* Ariſtotle, *or* Galen.

FRom what is aboveſaid, it is not to be inferr'd, that *Hippocrates* was of opinion, that thoſe were the firſt Sources, from which the Veins derive their origine, as *Ariſtotle*, *Galen*, and in a manner all their followers have impos'd upon him, ſince he could not be ignorant, that all of them have their root in the Liver, whence they are diſtributed into all the parts of the Body, in order to the conveyance of their nouriſhment into them; as he afterwards makes it appear in the diſtribution he hath made of the Liver-vein, and whereof he hath given a further account in the ſecond Book of *Popular diſeaſes*: But it was only to denote the correſpondence there is between thoſe five parts and the reſt, & the diſeaſes and ſymptomes which they mutually communicate.

Accordingly, when he ſaies, that the left Eye receives a Vein from the Right, and the latter another from the Left, it is not to be taken literally, as if thoſe Veins did really derive their origine from thoſe places

places; but it is to ſhew, that the indiſpoſitions of one eye are communicated to the other, as if they had veins, whereby they might be directly convey'd. True indeed it is, that this communication is wrought by the interpoſition of the veins, and that theſe veins do alſo proceed from ſome common branch; but that is at ſuch a diſtance from the Eyes, that it cannot be preciſely affirm'd, there is any intercourſe of veins between them, upon any other account then that of the ſympathy there is between them. And this is ſo certain, that, many times, *Hippocrates* conſiders not the continuity of the veins, in the diſtribution he makes thereof, ſince he ſhews, that the Head and Lungs hold a correſpondence with the Spleen, though the veins of the Spleen are not united, nor continuous with thoſe of the aforeſaid parts; in as much as it is ſufficient, in order to the correſpondence, whereof he ſpeaks, that there ſhould be ſome kind of communication between thoſe veins, by ſome means or other, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.

But to make a more particular diſcovery of the ſecret and advantage of this admirable diſtribution, it is requiſite we ſhould examin ſome articles of it. For when he tells us, that, from theſe four pair of veins, which iſſue from the Head, there is one which hath two branches, which falling from the Temples deſcend into the Lungs, whereof one paſſes from the right ſide to the left, and ſpreads into the Spleen and left Kidney; and the other paſſes from the left ſide, and goes into the Liver and right Kidney; and afterwards both thoſe branches end at the Hemorrhoidal veins: Does he not thereby teach us not only why the opening of the Hemorrhoidal veins is good for thoſe, who are troubled with pains in the Reins, Pluriſies,

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and Inflammations of the Lungs; but alſo why the ſuppreſſion of them cauſes the Dropſie and the Phthiſick? For, though there be other places, where it ſhould ſeem, that the reflux of the blood, which they contain, might be made; yet the correſpondence there is between them, and the Liver and Lungs, is the only reaſon why it is not made elſewhere.

And queſtionleſs, thoſe branches, which, deſcending from them, paſs from the right ſide to the left, and from the left to the right, acquaint us with the cauſe, which hath been ſought after to ſo little purpoſe; to wit, why the impoſthumes and ſwellings, which happen from the upper part to the lower, are not alwayes on the ſame ſide, where the ſource of the diſeaſe is obſerv'd, but ſometimes on the right, ſometimes on the left; whereas thoſe which happen from the lower part to the upper, are alwayes conſonant to the regularity of the part, where the ſeat of the indiſpoſition is: For, without this diſtribution of the Veins, it is impoſſible to give a reaſon for all theſe accidents.

Nay further, without the ſaid diſtribution, it would not be known why there is ſo great a correſpondence between the Breaſt and the Genitals, that the Cough ceaſes, when thoſe are ſwell'd; that the ſwelling is aſſwag'd, when the Cough follows; nay, that the ſwellings of the Veins which happens to them, correct the defects, that make the voice ſmall or hoarſe.

In a word, this is the only ſecret, to diſcover the wayes, which Nature obſerves in her tranſportation of the humours, from one part to another, and for the diſcerning of the veins, which are to be opened in every particular indiſpoſition. For, though they have all the ſame root; though divers of them have com-

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mon branches, which ſhould equally diſtribute unto them the blood and humours, which they contain; yet the correſpondence and friendſhip there is between the parts, prevails with Nature, to force them rather by one vein then another, and ſhe, making choice of that which is moſt convenient for her purpoſe, meddles not with the others, which are near it, and proceed from the ſelf-ſame origine.

And this is evidently remarkable in the ſympathy, whereof we have heretofore given ſuch preſſing examples. For, in all probability, it is by the Veins and Arteries, that the ſecret vertue, which is communicated from the Heart and Liver to certain fingers, is convey'd into them; and yet all thoſe, which are in the Hand, are not employ'd in that conveyance, and though they proceed from the ſame branch, yet is there not any more then one, whereby the vertue of the Heart, and another, whereby that of the Liver, is convey'd. Otherwiſe, there would be no determinate place for the reception of their influence, and all the fingers of the Hand, which have veins and arteries, would receive it equally; the contrary whereof we find by experience.

Accordingly, to ſay the truth, all theſe veſſels are only channels and conduit-pipes, which cannot, no more then thoſe of ſprings or fountains, give any motion to the humours: But they are the Spirits only, which convey and force them, to thoſe places, where they are ordered to go. And as the correſpondence, there is between the members, is carry'd on and improv'd by means of theſe Spirits; ſo is it not to be doubted, but that the blood, wherewith they are intermix'd, marches along with them, from one part to another, and, conſequently, occaſions that mi-

raculous harmony of the veins, obſerv'd by *Hippocrates*.

For no doubt that Harmony was the ground, upon which he and the ancient Maſters of Medicine have, in the ſame member, obſerv'd veins that held a certain correſpondence with ſeveral parts, as, in the Arm, the Head-vein, the Liver-vein, and the Spleen-vein, which they alwayes punctually opened in the particular indiſpoſitions of thoſe parts, ſlighting, or at leaſt not minding, the weak reaſons which the inſpection of Bodies, and the affectation of novelty have ſince brought into vogue.

Art. 18.

Whence proceeds the regularity which Nature obſerves in her evacuations.

AND certainly, if a recourſe be not had to this direction of the Spirits, it would be impoſſible to give an account of the regularity, which Nature obſerves in her motions, when they are abſolutely at her diſpoſal, and which Medicine imitates in the evacuations preſcrib'd by it. For when, in inflammations of the Liver, the right Ear becomes red; when ulcers riſe in the right Hand and right Foot; when blood iſſues out at the noſtrill of the ſame ſide; or when there happen impoſthumes and ſwellings in the right Ear; And, on the contrary, when all the ſame accidents are obſervable on the left ſide, in inflammations of the Spleen; When, I ſay, Medicine preſcribes Phlebotomy on the ſame ſide that the diſeaſe is; and teaches us withall, that all the evacuations made on the

the oppoſite ſide, are dangerous, in caſe they are made of themſelves, or naturally, or to no purpoſe, if done by Art. What other reaſon can be aſſign'd for this regularity, at leaſt ſuch as may be ſatisfactory to the mind, then that alledged by us? For what is ſaid of the ſtreight Fibres which enter into the compoſition of the veſſels, whereby ſome are of opinion, that the humours are attracted, is, to give it no worſe tearm, impertinent: ſince they are incapable of making any ſuch attraction, as we have ſhewn elſewhere; ſince they are found equally on all ſides of the veſſel, and conſequently cannot determine, or direct the motion of the humours to one rather then another: ſince there are not alwayes Fibres to promote that regularity, in as much as from the Spleen to the left Noſtril, there cannot be any at all, the veins of the Noſe proceeding from the hollow Vein, between which and the Spleen there is no connexion; And, in fine, ſince the humours which are without the veſſels, nay the very vapours, and the moſt ſimple qualities are communicated from one part to another, after the ſame manner, ſo as that the Fibres act not at all upon thoſe occurrences, they, in caſe there were any, not contributing any thing to the tranſportation of the vapours and qualities.

Moreover, if any ſhall affirm, that this may be done by thoſe ſecret conduits that are in ſome parts of the fleſh, and aſcend from the lower parts to the upper, yet ſo, as that thoſe which are of one ſide have no communication with thoſe of the other, we anſwer, that it is a pure imagination without any likelihood of truth, in as much as, moſt commonly, theſe evacuations are wrought by the veins; and that it is requiſite, the humours, which flow through thoſe ſecret

conduit-pipes, ſhould enter into the veins, where it muſt be aſſerted there are not any paſſages; nay further, that there ſhould be ſome conduits croſs the body, ſince the humours ſometimes paſs from the Right ſide to the Left, ſometimes from Before to Behind, and moſt commonly from the Centre to the Circumference. But, all conſider'd, reflecting on either of theſe opinions, we cannot find, why there ſhould be ſo much danger, when the regularity is not obſerv'd in the evacuations of the humours.

But it being ſuppoſed, that the ſaid evacuations are wrought by the direction of the Spirits, it is eaſily concluded to be neceſſary, that Nature muſt needs be extremely oppreſs'd, when ſhe follows not the order which had been preſcrib'd her, and when ſhe gets out of her ordinary road, to ſhun the enemy that preſſes upon her. For it is to be attributed to this very reaſon, that the motions ſhe makes in ſharp Fevers upon even days are always dangerous; in as much as it is an argument of the violence ſhe ſuffers, and the diſorder into which the violence of the Diſeaſe forces her, when it makes her forget the odd days on which ſhe ought to engage againſt the choler, which is the cauſe of thoſe Diſeaſes.

But however the caſe ſtands, we may confidently affirm, that the regularity we ſpeak of, without all doubt, proceeds from the Spirits, which conduct the humours all over one half of the body, and diſpoſe them not at all into the other, unleſs there be ſome great obſtruction. For, Nature hath ſo great a tenderneſs for the conſervation of things living and animate, that ſhe hath, in a manner, divided them all into two parts, out of this deſign, that if it happened one ſuffered any alteration, the other might ſecure it

ſelf from it, and ſo, in it ſelf, preſerve the nature of the whole. Now, this diviſion is real and manifeſt in ſome ſubjects, as in the ſeeds and kernels of ſome Plants, all which conſiſt of two portions, which may be ſeparated one from the other; as alſo in all thoſe members of the Animal that are double. In others it is obſcure, and not obſervable in an actual ſeparation of the parts, but onely in thoſe operations which ſhew, that they have each of them their diſtinct juriſdiction and different concernments; ſuch as is that whereof we ſpeak, which diſtinguiſhes the whole body into two halfs, whereof one is on the right, the other, on the left. Of the ſame kind is alſo that which may be obſerved in the members that are ſingle, as the Brain, Tongue, Noſe, *&c.* where we many times ſee one half, which is aſſaulted by ſome Diſeaſe, the other free from it, though there be not any ſeparation between them.

If then it be true, that Nature, to preſerve one half of the body, charges the other with all the diſorder that happens thereto, and permits not the humours, wherewith it is troubled, to exceed her limits, and, by that means, to faſten on the other, it is not to be doubted, but that the Spirits, which are her firſt and principal organs, do ſerve her in that enterprize, and that the tranſportation of the humours, from one place to another, is their charge, but onely ſo farr as ſhe hath given them order to do. And if, to compaſs this tranſportation, there be any neceſſity of making uſe of the Veins that are on the other ſide, yet does not that make them forget Nature's deſign, and the commands they had received from her; and ſo they onely paſs along, if I may ſo expreſs it, the borders of their neighbours, to get to the place whereto

they are directed. Thus, for example, when, to diſburthen the Spleen of the humours whereby it is incommodated, there happens a bleeding of the Noſe by the left Noſtril, it is abſolutely neceſſary, that they ſhould go out of the Spleen-veins into the Hollow-vein, which is on the right ſide. But the Spirits can conduct them in ſuch manner, as, at laſt, to make them return all along the ſame line, and within that half of the body, wherein the Spleen is. But this is to enter too farr into the ſecrets of Medicine; it ſhall therefore ſuffice, at the preſent, to affirm, that the communication there is between the Veins, according to the diſtribution made thereof by *Hippocrates*, proceeds from the Spirits, which convey the humors from one to another, conſonantly to the relation and correſpondence which there is between the parts, or according to the regularity they obſerve among themſelves.

Art. 19.

That the Starrs, or Planets, have a certain predominancy over the ſeveral parts of the Hand.

TO return to the Sympathy there is between the interiour members, and the ſeveral parts of the Hand, I am of opinion, that the reaſons alledg'd by us for the maintaining thereof, if they do not abſolutely convince the moſt obſtinate, will, at leaſt, leave in their mind ſome doubt of the truth thereof. And I make no queſtion, but that *Chiromancy* ought to be ſatisfy'd therewith, ſince that having been hitherto unknown

unknown to it, they make good the chiefeſt of its foundations; as alſo that it will be eaſie for the ſaid Science, to eſtabliſh thereupon the maximes of Aſtrologie, which ought to furniſh it with moſt of its rules, and ſecure its greateſt promiſes.

For, if it be once granted, that the interiour parts are govern'd by the Planets, and that they receive, from thoſe Celeſtial Bodies, ſome particular influence, as Aſtrologie teaches; it muſt of neceſſity follow, that the vertue which is deriv'd from thoſe parts to the Hand ſhould be accompanied by that which the Planets communicate to them; And that, for example, if the Heart communicates its influence to ſome finger, the Planet, under whoſe government the Heart is, ſhould alſo derive his to the ſame place: it being not probable, that the influence of the Planet ſhould make a halt at the Heart, while this laſt communicates to the Hand that which is proper and natural to it; in as much as, the truth of the Celeſtial influences being granted, it muſt be affirm'd, that thoſe two vertues are combin'd into one, which is the onely eſſential diſpoſition, and the ſpecifick property of each part. Now, it is a concluſion of Aſtrologie, confirm'd by its principles and obſervations, That the Liver is govern'd by *Jupiter*, the Spleen by *Saturn*, the Heart by the *Sun*, and ſo of the reſt: whereof the conſequence is, that the fore-finger ſhould be accordingly govern'd by *Jupiter*; the middle-finger, by *Saturn*; the Ring-finger, by the *Sun*, &c. in regard there is a correſpondence and ſympathy between thoſe principal parts and the ſaid fingers, and that the former communicates to the latter the vertue they have in themſelves. All which conſider'd, we are not any longer to think it much, that Chiromancy hath

chang'd the order of the Planets in the Hand; nor yet ask, why it ſhould place *Jupiter* on the fore-finger, and the *Sun* on the Ring-finger, rather then on any other part, in as much as the nature of the Heart, and Liver, and the ſympathy there is between them and thoſe fingers, hath aſſign'd it thoſe places to be, as it were, particular houſes, which the ſaid Planets have in the Hand, as they have in the Heavens ſuch as are peculiar to them.

Theſe things thus laid down, the whole difficulty is reduced to this point, *viz.* to know, whether thoſe Starrs do really govern the principal parts of the body, and communicate unto them ſome ſecret vertue, which might be cauſe of the good or bad diſpoſition they have?

But, for any man to think to drive on this Queſtion as farr as it might go, and to examine al the conſequences and circumſtances thereof, with the ſeverity, which Philoſophy requires in theſe matters; beſides that it would bring into doubt thoſe truths which Aſtrologie places in the rank of things already judg'd, and ſuch as its moſt irreconcileable enemies are, for the moſt part, forc'd to acknowledge; it would require a Diſcourſe which ſhould exceed the limits of our deſign, nay, indeed contradict the method wherewith all Sciences would be treated. For this admits not, that all thoſe things which occurr therein ſhould be brought into diſpute; it particularly declares againſt the cenſuring of thoſe principles upon which they are eſtabliſh'd, and would have all thoſe, which are deduced from the concluſions of the ſuperiour Sciences, how doubtfull ſoever they may be, to be receiv'd with the ſame priviledge, as the maximes and common notions of the Mathematicks may challenge. It is

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therefore ſufficient for Chiromancy, that Natural Philoſophy maintains its firſt foundations; and ſo whatſoever it afterwards receives from Aſtrologie, ought to be allow'd, or at leaſt the diſquiſition thereof left in ſuſpence, till the ground of Aſtrologie it ſelf ſhall have been examined.

Art. 20.

That the Planets have a predominancy over the interiour parts.

TO remove therefore, in ſome meaſure, the diſtruſt which ſome may have, that the Concluſions which Chiromancy derives from Aſtrologie for principles, are wholly imaginary, and contrary to truth, we are now to make it appear, by ſome obſervations not admittable into diſpute, That ſome parts of the body, are under the particular direction and government of certain Planets.

Nor will this be any hard matter to do, as to ſome of them. And though we ſhould reject the experiences, which Aſtrologie might furniſh us with upon this occaſion, and that, upon ſuch a rejection, we ſhould not have others convincing enough to make an abſolute proof of this truth; yet would the former lay down a great preſumption for the aſcertainment of the reſt, and leave a very wel-grounded conjecture for us to imagine, that every member is governed by one of thoſe Starrs, and that the Principle which Aſtrologie had made thereof, in order to the furtherance of Chiromancy, is not ill eſtabliſh'd.

Art.

Art. 21.

That the Moon hath ſuch a predominancy over the Brain.

LEt us then begin with the Brain, and affirm, that it is a thing out of all controverſie, that the Moon hath a ſecret ſuperintendency over that part, and that it is more apparently ſenſible of its power, then any of the other parts. For it ſwells and abates; it increaſes and diminiſhes, proportionably to the increaſe or decreaſe of that Planet. Thence it comes, that the Science of Medicine, upon a certain knowledge of theſe changes, takes a care, that, when Trepanning is preſcrib'd, it ſhould be perform'd with the greater precaution in the full of the Moon; in regard the Phyſicians know, that, then, the Brain is alſo in its full, and that cauſing the Membranes, which encompaſs it, to come neerer the bone, it expoſes them to the danger of being the more eaſily touched by the inſtrument.

But there cannot be a greater demonſtration of the connexion and ſympathy, which there is between the Moon and the Brain, then that the Diſeaſes of that part have their intenſions and remiſſions, according to the courſe of that Planet. For, of theſe Indiſpoſitions, there are ſome do ſo regularly follow her motions, that they may be the Ephemerides, or Prognoſtications thereof: Nay, though ſhe be under the Horizon, and that the perſon ſubject to thoſe indiſpoſitions endeavour, by all ways imaginable, to ſecure them-

themſelves againſt her influences; yet does not all this hinder, but that the breaking out of a fluxion, which comes preciſely at the time appointed, in the change of her Quarters, will cauſe them to be felt, though they be not ſeen either in the Heavens or the Almanacks.

Moreover, do not the fits of the Epilepſie or Falling-ſickneſs ordinarily follow the motions of that Planet? Are there not ſome kinds of diſtractions, and extravagances which are called *Lunacies*? Nay, to deſcend even to Horſes, are they not ſubject to diſeaſes in the Head, known by a name not much differing from the forementioned, purely upon this account, that both of them follow the motion of the Moon? In a word, is it not a thing generally acknowledg'd, that the beams of that Planet cauſe ſtubborn diſtempers, and diſcolour the countenance if one be a long time expos'd thereto, eſpecially if the party be aſleep? Now all theſe things cannot be referr'd to any other cauſe then the influences thereof, in as much as moſt of them are many times obſervable, when ſhe is under the Earth, and that, granted to be there, neither her light, nor the Magnetick vertue attributed to her, can have any action upon us.

Nor is there any doubt made of the truth of theſe ſecret qualities, eſpecially after the obſervations, which have been made of an infinite number of effects they produce; and, among others, of the Ebbing and flowing of the Sea, which, without all diſpute, follows the motion of the Moon, beginning alwaies when ſhe appears either above our Horizon, or that of the Antipodes, and being in her greateſt force, when ſhe is come to their Meridian or ours. For if it can be ſhewn, as it would be eaſie for us to do, would

would this place admit of a diſcourſe ſo long as ſhould be requiſite thereto; if, I ſay, it can be demonſtrated, that the Flowing of the Sea cannot proceed from the motion of the Earth, nor from the light of the Stars, nor from any Magnetick vertue, nor by the impulſion of the Moon, nor by the Rarefaction caus'd in the Water by Heat, there remain only the Influences of this Planet, to be the cauſe of that miraculous motion, and no doubt to be alſo the like cauſe of all the accidents before-mentioned.

Art. 22.

That the Sun hath the like predominancy over the Heart.

NOw, if it be acknowledg'd, that the ſaid celeſtial Body (the Moon) hath the influences we have mentioned, and that it is by them it hath the direction and government of one of the principal parts of the body, there is no queſtion to be made, but that the Sun, which hath the ſupremacy, and is, as it were, the Father of all the other Planets, ſhould have ſuch as are more powerful; and that he, whoſe concurrence is requiſite for the generation of all things, hath reſerv'd to himſelf the firſt and nobleſt part of Animals, that he might have the conduct thereof, and communicate his vertues thereto. No doubt but it muſt be ſo, and therefore it may be affirm'd, that he hath made choice of the Heart for his Throne, and the place of his exaltation: and that, as he is in the Heavens, in the midſt of all the Stars, ſo is he plac'd in the midſt of all the members of the Body, which are govern'd by the Planets. Thence

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is it, that he dilates his vertue into all the parts of the little world; and if, in his courſe he comes to ſuffer ſome malignant Aſpect, that member is ſenſible of it, and ſympathizes with the diſorders of its Soveraign. Upon this diſcovery hath it been obſerv'd, that thoſe, who are ſick, ſuffer an extraordinary weakneſs in Eclipſes of the Sun, nay, that thoſe, who are of a more delicate Complexion, do ſenſibly reſent in themſelvs the effect of that Conſtellation. To this may be added that the vital faculty becomes languiſhing, and weak, during the time of the Solſtices and the Æquinoxes, and, when ever any malignant Stars riſe with him, that *Hippocrates* hath forbidden the making uſe of any remedy, till ten daies are paſt. But we muſt not omit to bring, in this place, an obſervation, which that incomparable perſon hath left behind him in his Book *of Dreams*, whereby may be diſcover'd, not only the ſympathy there is between the Heart and the Sun, but alſo that which is between the Moon and the Stars, and the other parts of the Body. For having ſuppos'd, that the Sun hath a relation to the middle of the Body, the Moon to the cavities that are in it, and the Stars to the external parts, he affirms, that if thoſe Celeſtial bodies appear in the dream with the purity, and according to that regularity of motion, which is natural to them, it is a ſignification of perfect health, and that there is not any thing in the body, but is conſonant to the rule and order, which Nature requires. But if the party dreaming ſeems to ſee any of the Planets dimm'd, or diſappearing, or obſtructed in its courſe, it is a ſign of ſome indiſpoſition to happen in thoſe parts, between which and thoſe bodies there is a ſympathy and correſpondence. For if thoſe diſorders happen in the Stars, the indiſpoſition

ſition will be in the conſtitution and habit of the Body; if in the Moon, it will be in the Cavities; but if it be in the Sun, it will be ſo much the more violent, and more hard to be cured, as ſuch as engages againſt the principles of life: it being not to be imagin'd, that the middle, he ſpeaks of, can be underſtood of any thing, but the vital parts, which comprehend the Heart, and the parts about it.

Now, if this be true, as Reaſon and Experience hath ſince frequently confirm'd it, we are to conclude thence, that ſince, in dreams, the Imagination frames all thoſe Images of the Sun, to repreſent to its ſelf the good or ill diſpoſition of the Heart, it is neceſſary, that it ſhould have ſome ground to joyn together two things, which are ſo different among themſelves, and that it ſhould find, in the ſaid part of the body, certain Solar qualities, which may ſerve for a model for the figures and repreſentations it makes of that Star. And, in a word, it is requiſite, that the particular Influences, which the Heart receives from the Sun, ſhould be the originals, according to which, the Soul, in ſleep, draws all thoſe admirable copies. If the caſe were otherwiſe, why ſhould ſhe not as well make them for ſome other member? And why, in the inflammation of the Liver, for example, where the heat is at that time greater, then in any other part of the Body, ſhould ſhe not make to herſelf a repreſentation of that Star, which is the ſource of all the heat in the world, as well as ſhe does in the leaſt alterations of the Heart? Certainly, there are, in this part, ſome vertues, ſo ſtrange and ſo conceal'd, that it is impoſſible to make any reference thereof to the Elements. For that it ſhould many times defie the flames, ſo as not to be conſum'd thereby; That it

ſhould

ſhould not grow ſofter by boyling, if the Auricles be not taken away; That ſome kinds of fiſhes cannot be boyl'd, if the heart be left within them; theſe, I ſay, are effects ſo particular thereto, and whereof it is ſo hard to give any reaſon, by the manifeſt qualities, that there is ſome ground to preſume, that thoſe which it hath are of a higher order, and referrible, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, to the Element of the Starrs.

Now, if the influence which the Heart receives from the Sun is the cauſe, that the Dreams do, by the images of that Planet, repreſent the diverſe diſpoſitions, wherein the heart is; it is requiſite, the caſe ſhould be the ſame, as to the Moon and Stars, in reference to the Cavities of the Body, and the exteriour parts. And thence, no doubt, it proceeds, that Aſtrology hath diſpos'd, under the direction of the Moon, the Brain, the Breaſt, the Inteſtines, the Bladder, and the Matrix, which are the moſt conſiderable cavities of the Body; as alſo that it hath divided all the exteriour parts among the Signs of the Zodiack, grounding it ſelf, at firſt, on this Doctrine of *Hippocrates*, whereto it hath ſince added its own Experiences.

Art. 23.

That the other Planets have the Government of the other interiour parts.

THeſe reaſons thus laid down, there is no difficulty to be made, but that the other Planets have alſo their particular influences, and, as well as the two already

already mentioned, have the government of certain parts of the Body. But Philoſophy hath been ſo negligent in preſerving the obſervations thereof, that, thoſe, which Aſtrology furniſhes us withall, being excepted, we have not any from which may be deduced the direction of *Jupiter* over the Liver, that of *Saturn* over the Spleen, &c. unleſs we may be admitted to bring into that rank, the marks and moles which are found naturally imprinted on thoſe parts. For it is an obſervation grounded on experience, that he, at whoſe birth *Saturn* hath the predominancy, hath commonly one of thoſe marks upon the region of the Spleen; if it be *Jupiter*, he hath it upon that of the *Liver*; if *Venus*, the mark is to be ſeen on the privy parts, and the party hath another between the Ey-brows. Upon which obſervation, *Dares Phrygius*, in the Pourtraiture he made of the beautiful *Helene*, affirms, that ſhe had one between the Ey-brows, which *Cornelius Nepos* hath neatly expreſs'd, in theſe two excellent verſes:

Parva ſuperciliis nubes interflua raris
Audaci maculâ tennes diſcriminat artus.

But I do not account theſe obſervations full enough, nor ſo ſufficiently confirm'd by experience, as that a certain proof, of what we pretend to, may be deduced from them. In the mean time, till there be a more exact diſquiſition made thereof, we ſhall not ſtick to affirm, that the Sun and Moon, which, without all diſpute, have a predominancy over the Heart and Brain, may well ſecure the preſumption we have, to imagine, that the other Planets have a certain Empire over the members, which Aſtrology hath made ſub-

ject

ject thereto. And conſequently, we may conclude, that the Principle which Chiromancy derives from it, is not without ſome ground, and that it may make good a great part of the promiſes it makes.

Art. 24.

That the Principles eſtabliſh'd regulate many doubtful things in Chiromancy.

THeſe are then the reaſons, upon which, I conceiv'd, that ſome eſtabliſhment might be made. This further advantage may be made of them, that they may ſerve to regulate many things, whereof there is ſome controverſie in the practick part of Chiromancy, and to diſcover the cauſes of many effects obſerv'd therein. For there are ſome, who affirm, that it is not only requiſite to make an inſpection into the Hands, but that it is alſo neceſſary to look upon the Feet; that the left Hand ought to be the more conſider'd in Women, and thoſe whoſe Nativities happen in the night; and the Right, in men, and thoſe who are born in the day. But the advantage which the Hands have over the Feet, clearly ſhews, that the inſpection of the latter is to little purpoſe, and that the Artiſt may find out in the Hands, whatever can be expected from this kind of knowledge. Moreover, the Right Hand being more noble then the Left, in all ſexes, at what time ſoever the Querent be born, ought to be more exactly conſider'd, then the latter, eſpecially as to what concerns the Heart, Liver, and Brain, between which and it there is a greater communication. But, on the other

ſide, the Left hath the preheminence, as to what concerns the Spleen, and the other parts, which are on the ſame ſide, by reaſon of the power which Regularity hath upon thoſe occaſions. In fine, what we have ſaid before concerning Length, Bredth and Profundity, furniſhes us with the cauſes of the diverſity which is obſerv'd in the Lines: for thoſe which are ſimple ſhew that the vertue is weak, length being the firſt eſſay it makes; thoſe which are croſs'd diſcover a greater ſtrength in it, as having extended it ſelf into bredth, and that it does its utmoſt in thoſe which are deep.

But I forget my ſelf, and conſider not, that I inſenſibly enter into a particular diſquiſition of thoſe things, which it was my deſign to have balk'd. Nay, I am to fear, I have expreſs'd my ſelf too freely in the general, and that I betray a certain acknowledgment, by the certainty I find therein, that I have the ſame perſuaſion for the particular. But I am far from entertaining any ſuch thought. True it is, I lay the foundations of a Science, which ſeem to me ſolid enough, but I find not materials to compleat the Edifice. For moſt of thoſe rules and precepts, wherewith ſome would have carried on the Superſtructure, are not ſufficiently eſtabliſh'd; the experiences, by which they are maintain'd, are not fully verified and confirm'd; And there is requiſite a new ſupply of obſervations, made with all the caution and exactneſs neceſſary, to give it the form and ſolidity, which Art and Science require. But *from whom* are theſe to be expected, ſince thoſe, who might be thought able to make them, will not buſie themſelves about it? And *when* may they be expected, ſince there are ſo many to be made; and that there is ſo much dif-

difficulty in the making of them wel

But if it ſhall happen, that any will venture their endeavours herein, and ſhall attempt it with a confidence of being able to overcome the charge and difficulties of ſo great a deſign, I am to tell them, that, in my judgment, they will be extreamly oblig'd to you, SIR, for having engag'd me, to promote their work, and aſſigning them the foundations, on which they are to build; and you are to acknowledge withall my complyance with your deſires. For if you conſider my ordinary imployments and ſtudies, you will find, that I have done them ſome violence, to humour your inclinations, and that I could not give you a greater demonſtration of the friendſhip and reſpects I have for you, then by expoſing my ſelf to cenſure, to ſatisfie your curioſity. I am not to fear yours becauſe I am confident it will be favourable to me; but I dread that of the Publick, from whom no favour is to be expected, and whoſe judgments are very ſevere, and, many times, unjuſt. It is your buſineſs therefore to prevent my appearance before that ſevere Tribunal, if you are not ſufficiently confident, that I ſhall eſcape the puniſhment of temerarious Writers; and conſequently, hazzard not, at leaſt without great precaution, the little eſteem good fortune hath been pleaſed to favour me with in the world, and for the ſecurity and preſervation whereof, I conceive you oblig'd to concern yourſelf, ſince you know how much I am,

SIR,

Your, &c.

THE SECOND LETTER TO *MONSIEUR* B.D.M. UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF *METOPOSCOPY*.

SIR,

I Know not whether I ought to complain of your Curiosity, which requires of me things that are so difficult, or lay the fault on the complyance I have for you, which will not suffer me to deny you any thing, within the reach of my performance. When you would have me to establish the principles of *Metoposcopy*, upon Physical observations, as I have done those of *Chiromancy*, you consider not, that you engage me in an attempt, which *Cardan*, *Achillinus*, and the *Conciliator* durst not undertake; and when I comply with your commands, I also reflect not, that I expose my self to the censure of all those, who shall see

ſee this diſcourſe, and, no doubt, will blame me for beſtowing my time in the examination of things ſo vain, and ſo much cry'd down, and, by my conjectures, confirming thoſe in their errour, who give too much credit thereto. But ſince I have not ſo much command of my ſelf as to balk the ſatisfaction of your deſires, let me beg your care of my reputation, and entreat you, to acquaint thoſe, to whom you ſhall communicate this Piece, with the judgment, which, you know, I make of theſe kinds of Sciences. For though I find ſome grounds, whereby their Principles may be maintain'd, nay am of a perſuaſion, that if ſuch perfect obſervations might be made, as were neceſſary to give them rules, there might be framed an Art thereof, which would be very advantageous and delightful: yet does not this hinder my being of opinion, that all thoſe, which we find in Books, are not only falſe, but alſo temerarious, and that thoſe who make uſe of them, juſtly deſerve the contempt, which Wiſdom hath for things of that nature, and are no leſs juſtly ſubject to thoſe puniſhments, whereto Religion hath alwaies condemn'd them. With this precaution, I ſhall dilate my diſcourſe upon this ſubject, according to the enſuing Heads or Articles, and ſhew;

1. *That Metopoſcopy hath the ſame Principles with Chiromancy.*
2. *What part of the Face are governed by the Planets.*
3. *That not only the Forehead, but alſo the other parts of the Face are to be conſidered in Metopoſcopy.*

4. *That the Sun and Moon have the govern-ment of the Eyes.*
5. *That* Venus *hath the government of the Noſe.*
6. *That there is a correſpondence between all the marks of the Face, and others, in other parts of the body.*
7. *Whence the Lines of the Forehead proceed.*
8. *What particular Planet hath the government of the Forehead.*
9. *That* Jupiter *hath the government of the Cheeks.*
10. *That* Mercury *hath the like government of the Ears.*
11. *And laſtly, that* Mars *hath the government of the Lips.*

Art. 1.

That Metopoſcopy hath the ſame Principles with Chiromancy.

WE are therefore, in the firſt place, to affirm, that the ſame Principle, upon which *Chiromancy* is eſtabliſh'd, ſerves alſo for a ground to *Metopoſcopy*, in as much as all the promiſes of this latter Science are grounded on the government and direction, which the Planets have over certain parts of the

the Face, as they have over thoſe of the Hand. So that if the ſaid Principle be found well eſtabliſh'd, in order to *Chiromancy*, there is no queſtion to be made, but it makes as well for *Metopoſcopy*. Nay, it may be affirm'd, that the general reaſons, whereof the former hath made uſe, are more preſſing and deciſive in the latter; And if they give preſumptions and apparences of ſome truth in the one, in the other they ſeem to give aſſurance and certainty.

For, if it be once granted, that the Planets have a certain direction and government over the nobler parts, and that they inſpire their good or bad qualities into them; That there is alſo a certain ſecret correſpondence between the ſaid Parts, and ſome Members, whereto they communicate the good and bad diſpoſitions, which they may have; And that for the ſame reaſon, the ſame Star, which hath the government of ſome noble Part, governs alſo that, between which and the other there is a correſpondence and ſympathy, as we have already ſhewn in the precedent diſcourſe: If, I ſay, this be true in *Chiromancy*, it ſhould be much more certain in *Metopoſcopy*; ſince it may be inferr'd, that, ſo far as the Face hath the preheminence before the Hands, ſo the direction of the Planets, and the ſympathy of the nobler parts ſhould be proportionably ſtronger and more efficacious in that part, then they are in any of the reſt.

For certainly, there is not any likelihood, that the Heart, the Brain, the Liver, and the other principal parts, ſhould have any particular vertue, to be communicated to certain parts of the Hand, as the experiences we have produc'd do make evident, and not make ſome participation thereof, to that, which is

the moſt excellent of all, and as it were the Epitome of the whole Man, and the Mirrour, wherein all the diſpoſitions of Body and Soul are repreſented and obſerv'd.

We need not bring any reaſons, or proofs, to demonſtrate the truth of theſe advantages; they are too evident, and too well known, to leave any place for doubt; there needs no Eyes, to make a greater apprehenſion thereof then words can expreſs: nay, there needs no more then common ſence, to conclude, that; if there be any influences communicated by the nobler parts and the Stars to the exteriour parts, the Face ought to have a better and greater ſhare of them then any other part whatſoever.

Art 2.

What parts of the Face are govern'd by the Planets.

ALl thoſe grounds and conſequences being preſuppos'd, we now come to examine, *what parts of the Face thoſe are, between which and the Noble Parts and the Stars, there is a certain Sympathy.* For, as this Sympathy is grounded upon the Formal and Specifick vertues, and that Nature confounds not thoſe vertues, as we have ſhewn elſewhere; ſo it is requiſite, that there ſhould be ſome place in the Face, anſwerable to the Heart and the Sun; another, to the Liver, and *Jupiter*; ſome other, to the Spleen, and *Saturn*, and ſo of the reſt; and that every one of them ſhould receive the vertues and influences, which are proper both to the noble part, between which

and

and it there is a Sympathy, and the Planet, under whoſe direction it is.

The Vulgar *Metopoſcopy* takes notice of no other places, where theſe impreſſions ſhould be made, then the Forehead, which the Profeſſors of it have divided into ſeven parts, in order to the placing of the ſeven Planets therein. So that they have aſſign'd the firſt and higheſt place to *Saturn*; the ſecond, to *Jupiter*; the third to *Mars*; the fourth, to the *Sun*; the fifth, which is above the left Eye-brow, to *Venus*; that which is above the right, to *Mercury*; and they lodge the *Moon* between thoſe two. And when theſe places are mark'd with any lines, they denote the power of that Starr, which is appropriated thereto.

But I fear me, this orderly, and regular diſpoſal of the Planets is a product of Man's wit and invention, which affects a kind of proportion and Symmetry in all things, and imagin'd, that thoſe Celeſtial Bodies ought to be placed in the Face, with a reſpect to the ſame order which they obſerve in the Heavens. Chiromancy hath done much better, when ſlighting that proportion, it chang'd the order of the Planets, and plac'd them in the Hand, after a quite different ſituation. For, from thence it hath been with ſome reaſon concluded, that there were ſome experiences, which had oblig'd it to rank them as it hath done, and to recede from that method, which the imagination ſo induſtriouſly obſerves, in all its operations, wherein it never wants references and reſemblances, to eſtabliſh its Dreams and Viſions.

Now, what makes me to imagine the falling of *Metopoſcopy* into the ſaid errour, is this, that there are many, who have not approv'd the Situation, which ſome others have aſſign'd to thoſe Planets, as having

diſpos'd

diſpos'd *Venus* into the place of the *Sun*, and tranſ-ferr'd the *Sun* and *Moon* over the two Eye-brows, and ſet *Mercury* betwixt them. And all this was done, upon an imagination they had, that it was more pertinent, to place the two great Luminaries over the Ey-brows, in order to their having a ſuperintendency over the Eyes, which are the cleareſt and moſt luminous parts of the whole Face. But this obſervance of proportion, though it ſeems ſufficiently well imagin'd, is not a rule for the conduct and guidance of Nature. She propoſes to her ſelf ſuch ends and means as are more ſolid, then any of theſe vain Chimera's; and thoſe, who are deſirous to enter into the knowledge of her Secrets, do not make a ſtand at theſe appearances, but ſearch after reaſons, grounded upon certain, and well-eſtabliſh'd, experiences.

Moreover, the acquaintance I had with a perſon admirable in the ſtudy of this Art, gives me a rational encouragement, to doubt of all theſe kinds of orderings and rankings of the Planets. For he put *Saturn* in the place, where the *Sun* was plac'd by ſome, and *Venus* by others. And whereas that is the moſt remarkable part of any in the Forehead, and how ſcarce ſoever the lines may be in that part, yet there never fails to be one there; he conceiv'd, that the Line of *Saturn* was proper and natural to the Forehead, and that all the others were accidental, and, as it were, ſcatter'd up and down there, onely to denote the Aſpects, which that Planet hath to the others. So that, upon a bare inſpection of the Face, he exactly diſcover'd the diſpoſition of the Planets, as it was at the minute of the Nativity. In the mean time, he made ſuch certain judgments upon theſe grounds, and I my ſelf have made ſuch ſtrange ones, upon the

rules

rules I receiv'd from him, that they have created in me a perſuaſion, not onely that there is a true Science of *Metopoſcopy*, which is not ſo vain and deceitfull as ſome might be apt to imagine; but alſo that that which is commonly found in Books, and whereof ſuch as are addicted to that ſtudy ordinarily make uſe, is grounded on ſuch falſe Principles and Rules, as cannot attain the knowledge, which may juſtly be expected, from an Art ſo miraculous, and of ſo great advantage.

But when all is done, what place ſoever be aſſign'd to thoſe Starrs, the Queſtion ſtill remains, to know, whether there are any Phyſical experiences and obſervations whereby it may be maintain'd? For, if we muſt referr our ſelves to thoſe of the Science it ſelf, it might produce an infinite number, and I conceive my ſelf able to eſtabliſh the Syſteme I ſpoke of before, by thoſe I have ſeen made by others, and thoſe I have often made my ſelf. But, in as much as the teſtimony a man gives of himſelf is not legal, and may be ſuſpected; accordingly, it is not juſt to believe that which *Metopoſcopy* might give on its own behalf, and there is not any Art, how vain or ſuperſtitious ſoever, but may be eſtabliſh'd by its own obſervations. Let us thefore try, whether we can elſewhere find out ſuch reaſons and proofs, as may ſettle the grounds of this Art, and give, at leaſt, ſome preſumption of the truth there may be in it.

Art.

Art. 3.

That not only the Forehead, but alſo the other parts of the Face are to be conſidered in Metopoſcopy.

But, before we come to the examination of the aforeſaid point, it is requiſite, we ſhould undeceive thoſe, who are of opinion, that the Forehead is the onely part of the Face, from which *Metopoſcopy* deduces the ſigns and marks, which it makes uſe of; for it is certain, that all the others do contribute ſomewhat thereto, as well as it. And indeed, it is not to be imagin'd, that, it being granted, there is a certain ſecret intelligence between the Starrs and noble parts of the body, and the exteriour parts thereof, in the Face, the ſaid correſpondence and ſympathy ſhould be between them and the Forehead onely; And that the Eyes, the Noſe, and the Mouth, which are ſuch conſiderable parts, and which Nature frames and conſerves with ſo much care and tenderneſs, ſhould not have any communication with them.

And thence it comes, that thoſe Aſtrologers, who have apply'd themſelves to this Science, have made every part of the Face ſubject to ſome particular Planet. For, not to mention the Forehead, wherein, as we ſaid before, they have plac'd them all, they have conſign'd the Right Eye to the *Sun*; the Left to the *Moon*; the Noſe to *Venus*; the Ears to *Mercury*; the Cheeks to *Jupiter*; and the Lips to *Mars*; and according to the conſtitution of thoſe parts, they have laid down Rules whereby to judge of the good or bad

bad diſpoſition of thoſe Starrs, and of the effects they might work upon the perſons. So that thoſe Rules and Judgments being under the juriſdiction of *Metopoſcopy*, there's no doubt to be made, but that it makes its uſe and advantage of all the parts of the Face, and that it is a groſs errour, to imagine, that it hath nothing to conſider, but the Forehead.

This preſuppos'd we now come to examine the reaſons, whereby the ſituation, which every Planet hath of each of thoſe parts, may be eſtabliſh'd and confirm'd.

Art. 4.

That the Sun and Moon have the government of the Eyes.

IN the firſt place then, if it be obſerv'd that all the Paſſions are to be diſcern'd in the Eyes, and that the Heart and Brain are the ſources out of which they proceed, it will be eaſily judg'd, according to the Principle laid down by us, to wit, That thoſe Noble parts of the Body, which receive ſome influence from the Starrs, communicate it to the Members, between which and them there is any correſpondence and ſympathy; It will be concluded, I ſay, that, ſince the Heart and Brain are govern'd by the *Sun* and *Moon*, as we have ſhewn elſewhere, it muſt of neceſſity follow, that they ſhould derive to the Eyes, the Vertues which they have received from thoſe Planets.

Moreover, it is an Obſervation confirm'd by abundance of Experiences, that thoſe, who are born, during the time of Eclipſes, are commonly weak-ſighted,

ſighted, as if thoſe two great Luminaries, which may be called the Eyes of the Heavens, communicated their defect to the Eyes of the Body, between which and them, there is a certain connexion and correſpondence.

Nor is there any reaſon it ſhould be here laid to our charge, that, contrary to the proteſtation we have made, we borrow this proof from Aſtrologie; for it is altogether natural, as all thoſe which Medicine and Agriculture deduce from Lunations, and the riſing of the greater Starrs: It is not maintain'd by the doubtfull calculations of Aſtrologers, and do not affirm, as they do, that the *Sun* and *Moon*, being in unfortunate places, produce that effect; in as much as that ſuppoſes the diſtinction of the Celeſtial Houſes, and the Aſpects, which belong purely to the Judicial part of that Science.

And I make no doubt, but that, upon theſe Rules, was made that admirable Prognoſtication, which *Hippocrates* gives an account of in his *Prorrheticks*, where he ſays, that a Phyſician being ſent for in a mortal diſeaſe, affirm'd the ſick party would not dye of it, but that he ſhould loſe both his eyes. For ſince that incomparable perſon, who knew more of the Prognoſtick part of Phyſick, then all thoſe who have come after him, ingenuouſly acknowledges, that he knew not the ſecret of making ſuch predictions; It is very probable, that this was made by the Rules of *Metoposcopy*, according to the principle laid down by us.

But what! It may ſeem deducible from what we have ſaid, that both the eyes are equally under the direction and government of the two great Luminaries, whereas, in the mean time, *Metoposcopy* would have the Right eye to belong privatively to the *Sun*, and

and the Left to the *Moon*. It will be no hard matter to ſolve this difficulty, if it be remembred, what we have ſaid in the Diſcourſe of *Chiromancy*; to wit, That there are two kinds of Influences, which all the parts receive from the noble parts; the one common and general; the other, particular and ſpecifick According to the former, there is a correſpondence between the Eyes and the Heart, and Brain, by means of the vital heat, and the ſenſitive vertue, which they receive from them; and, in this reſpect, it may be truly affirm'd, that the *Sun* and *Moon*, who have the government of theſe two principal parts, have accordingly a general direction over both the eyes. But if we conſider the ſympathy and particular aſſociation, which is between the members among themſelves, a Truth we have demonſtrated both by experience, and the doctrine of *Hippocrates*, it will be found, that there is ſome reaſon to believe, that the Heart and Brain may have a ſtricter connexion with one Ey then with the other; and conſequently, that one of them may be under the particular direction of the *Sun*; and the other, under that of the *Moon*. Now, whereas the Right eye is in a nobler ſituation then the Left; in regard it is ſtronger, and more exact in its action, then the other, and that it onely cauſes the ſtedfaſtneſs and regularity of the ſight as we ſhall ſhew anone; there is no doubt to be made, but that it is accordingly governed by the nobleſt and moſt powerful Planet.

But that the Right eye it ſtronger then the Left, is a thing ſo certain, that it needs no proof. For, not to urge that all the parts on the right ſide are ſtronger than thoſe on the other, nor yet, that the Right eye is leſs ſubject to Diſeaſes then the other, and, when the

the fore-runners of Death diſſolve and deſtroy the vertue of the parts, this Eye conſerves its own, ſometime after the Left is quite extinguiſh'd; It muſt, upon this further account, be ſtronger then the other, that it is more exact in its action. And this is an evident ſign of its being more exact, that the regularity of the full and compleat ſight, which is made with both eyes, depends onely on the Right. Hence it comes, that when a man looks with both eyes on any Object whatſoever, and comes afterwards to ſhut the Left Eye, the Object will appear to him in the ſame ſituation, and upon the ſame Line, as he had obſerv'd it, with both eyes. But, if he ſhuts the Right Eye, the Object will appear no longer upon the ſame Line, and ſeems to have chang'd its ſituation: Which is a certain argument, that the regularity of the compleat ſight proceeds from the Right Eye, ſince the line upon which it ſees the Objects, is the ſame with that, whereby both eyes are directed.

Art. 5.

That Venus *hath the government of the Noſe.*

AS concerning the proof we have, that the Noſe is under the particular direction of *Venus*, it is ſo convincing, that the moſt obſtinate cannot doubt of it, it being ſtill preſuppos'd, that there is any part of Mans body under the government of ſome Planet or other. For, according to the concurrent teſtimonies of all Aſtrologers, which are alſo confirm'd by the common manner of ſpeaking in all the nobler Languages, *Venus* hath the overſight of Generation, and

and the parts neceſſary thereto. Now it is out of all controverſie, that there is a correſpondence and ſympathy, between them and the Noſe; and conſequently, 'tis requiſite, that it ſhould receive the ſame Influence, which that Planet communicates to them, and that it ſhould be under the ſame Empire as they are ſubject to. I conceive there is not any perſon ſo ignorant, as not to know ſomewhat of the correſpondence we ſpoke of, ſince it is come even into proverbs: but all haply are not acquainted with one thing which evidently demonſtrates it, and is this, That the natural marks or moles, which are upon the Noſe, inferr and denote others about thoſe parts, diſpos'd in the ſame ſituation, or at leaſt ſuch as is, in ſome meaſure, anſwerable to that they are in, upon the other.

Art. 6.

That there is a correſpondence between all the marks of the Face, and others in other parts of the Body.

AND certainly it is a thing worthy admiration, and ſuch as, in my judgment, is not ſufficiently taken into conſideration, That there is not any of thoſe natural marks upon the face, but there is another upon ſome certain and determinate part of the Body, particularly anſwerable thereto. For if there chance to be one upon the Forehead, there will be another upon the Breaſt; and accordingly as the former ſhall be in the midſt of the Forehead, or in the upper or lower part thereof, on the one ſide or the

other, that upon the Breaſt ſhall have the ſame differences of ſituation. If there be one upon the Eybrows, the correſpondent mark ſhall be upon the Shoulders; if upon the Noſe, the other ſhall be about the Parts we ſpoke of in the precedent Article; if on the Cheeks, the other ſhall be on the Thighs; if on the Ears, the other ſhall be on the Arms, and ſo of the reſt.

It is certainly impoſſible for a man to conſider the miraculous references of theſe correſpondent marks, and not take occaſion thence, to reflect on the infinite wiſdom of God, who reducing all things to unity, that they may be the more conformable to himſelf, after he had made an abridgment of all the World in man, thought fit to make an Epitome of man in his own Face. For it cannot be affirm'd, that this correſpondence, whereof we ſpeak, is ſimply in thoſe marks, ſince they are all fram'd of one and the ſame matter, and conſequently, they cannot have any more reference to one then to another: But it muſt of neceſſity be in the parts themſelves, and that the aſſociation there is between them ſhould be the cauſe, that one cannot have a mark imprinted on it, but the correſpondent member muſt at the ſame time undergo the ſame impreſſion. Accordingly we find, beſides the ſecret concurrence they may have together, a ſenſible aud manifeſt rapport and reſemblance in their ſituation and ſtructure. For the Breaſt, which is that part of the Body, below the Head, which is moſt bony and moſt flat before, is exactly anſwerable to the Forehead, which hath the ſame qualities. The parts neceſſary to Generation are in the midſt of the Body, with a certain prominency, as the Noſe is in the midſt of the Face. The Thighs, which are very fleſhy, and ſideling, have a

refe-

reference to the Cheeks, which have the ſame ſituation. The Ey-brow is anſwerable to the Shoulders by reaſon of the eminency remarkable in both; the Ear, to the Arm, as being both on the ſides, and as it were out of play; and ſo of the reſt. Yet is it not to be inferr'd hence, that this reſemblance is the true ſource of the ſaid ſympathy; no, it is not ſufficiently adjuſted, and exact enough, to produce effects ſo like; and it is neceſſary, that there ſhould be ſome more ſecret tye and connexion, whereby theſe parts might be ſo aſſociated among themſelves as they are, and which may be the principal cauſe of that miraculous Harmony which is found among them, whereof theſe natural Characters are the irreproachable witneſſes.

Art. 7.

Whence the Lines of the Forehead proceed.

THe Forehead is, no doubt, that part of the Face, wherein *Metopoſcopy* finds moſt work to buſie it ſelf about, and where it meets with the greateſt number of thoſe Signs, upon which it makes its judgments, which are therefore the more certain, in regard there is a greater diverſity of the ſaid marks, and that they are the more apparent in that part then in any other. And this is alſo the reaſon, why it hath taken the name it bears from that part, as ſuch as it looks upon as the moſt conſiderable and moſt neceſſary.

For certainly, he who ſhall make it his buſineſs to obſerve, that in ſo narrow a ſpace, which ſhould naturally be ſmooth and even, there is fram'd ſo great

a variety of lines, points, and irregular figures; That of theſe, ſome ſtart out, as it were, of a ſudden, and others vaniſh, and are blotted out; That ſome are more deep, others more ſuperficial; ſome ſhorter, ſome longer; ſome pale, and others in a manner betraying a certain colour; That there are not any two men in the world, in whom they are alike; And laſtly, that all this diverſity of lines may be obſerv'd in the ſame perſon; He, I ſay, who ſhall take a particular notice of all theſe things, will have juſt occaſion to believe, that there is in the Forehead ſome ſecret which is not known to men, and that the impreſſions made therein have nobler and higher cauſes then any that are in Animals.

And indeed, upon examination, it will be found, that all the reaſons which may be alleged for this diverſity of Lines, cannot be deduc'd, but either from Motion, which gives a certain fold or wrinkle to the skin where it hath been often accuſtomed to be made, as it happens in the joynts; or from Drought, which cauſes a contraction of the skin and wrinkles, as may be ſeen in fruits, that have been long kept, and in the furrows and wrinkles which old Age ſpreads into all the parts.

But there is no probability, that the Lines of the Forehead ſhould be the effects of the motion which it is wont to ſuffer, ſince they are different in all men, who nevertheleſs move that part after the ſame manner. For all perſons have the ſame manner of dilating and contracting the Forehead; every one hath the ſame muſcles purpoſely deſign'd for thoſe motions; And Nature inſpires into every one the ſame motives, upon which they ought to be made.

Some may haply affirm, that the Conſiſtency of

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the skin is the cauſe of that diverſity, and according to its being more thin or thick, the folds are more or leſs eaſily made in it. But are there not abundance of perſons, who have the ſame conſtitution of Skin, wherein yet there is not any line like one the others? Are there not ſome, whoſe skin is very delicate and thin, wherein there is not any to be ſeen? And are there not alſo thoſe, who have it thick, which yet is full of them?

Nor can it be maintain'd, on the other ſide, that Drought is the cauſe of theſe Lines, ſince it may be obſerv'd, that ſome children of a ſanguine Conſtitution, have more of them then ſome decrepid old men; And that it is found they are not alike in old people, though, 'tis poſſible, the Drought may have been equal. Beſides, I would fain know, it being ſuppos'd that this quality ſhould be the cauſe of theſe impreſſions, whence it comes, that young people, who have wrinkles in their Foreheads, have not any in the other parts? And why thoſe which old Age imprints on the other parts of the skin, are alike in all men, and are not ſo in the Forehead.

Yet it is not to be inferr'd, but that Motion and Drought contribute very much thereto, but with this caution, that they do not occaſion the firſt draughts of them, and only promote their ſooner, or more remarkable appearance. There is ſome other Cauſe, which draws the firſt deſign of them, and, as a Maſter-builder, takes the firſt meaſures thereof, and begins the ſtructure; which is afterwards compleated, by the contributory labours of other workmen. For, to be ſhort, all the Lines are deſign'd on the Forehead, even from the very birth, though they do not immediately appear there, but diſcover themſelves

ſelves after a certain time, ſometimes ſooner, ſometimes later; ſometimes they are deeper, ſometimes more ſhallow and ſuperficial, according to the efficacy of the Cauſe, whereby they are imprinted, and conſonantly to the nature of the Temperament of every particular perſon, and the motions of the Forehead whereto he is accuſtomed. Since it is not to be doubted, but that a man often tranſported with anger, or ſuch a one as is of a froward peeviſh diſpoſition, is wont to bend or knit his brows, that is, to frown, and by that means cauſes certain folds in the Forehead, which contraction makes the Lines drawn therein to appear ſooner, and more remarkably, then they would have done otherwiſe.

Since then it is to be inferr'd, from what hath been deliver'd, that the firſt impreſſion of theſe Lines is not to be attributed to any Cauſe aſſignable within the Body, we muſt endeavour to find one without it; And whereas there are undeniable proofs, that there are certain Planets, which have the government and direction of ſome particular members, wherein they produce ſuch effects, as cannot proceed from any thing elſe; It muſt be concluded thence, that the lines of the Forehead are of that rank, and that they cannot be imprinted there, but by ſome one of thoſe celeſtial Bodies, under whoſe government that part is.

There are therefore two things to be taken into our preſent examination, the one, What Planets they are, which have the government of the Forehead: the other, What Reaſons and Experiences there are, whereby the ſaid direction may be confirm'd.

Art.

Art. 8.

What particular Planet hath the government of the Forehead.

AS to the former Queſtion, there is ſome difficulty in it, by reaſon of the ſeveral opinions of thoſe, who have written of that Science. For ſome of them do make the Forehead ſubject to one particular Planet; others are perſuaded, that all of them have a certain government of it. But theſe latter are not agreed among themſelves, as to the ſituation of them in it, as we ſaid elſewhere. Had they brought any proofs to make good what they advance, 'twere rational we ſhould ſubmit to their deciſions: But having not produc'd any, we are left at liberty to make our own choice, and, after ſo many experiences, as we have ſeen confirm'd upon other principles, we may reject theſe, and ſtand to ſuch as are maintain'd upon better grounds.

We conceive it therefore more probable, that the Forehead ſhould be g vern'd by one particular Planet, rather then by all together, in as much as all the other parts of the Face, which are more noble, and of greater advantage then that, have each of them but one of thoſe Stars, whereto they are ſubject. For if there be a correſpondence and ſympathy between the parts of the Body, and that thoſe between which there is ſuch a correſpondence are govern'd by the ſame Planets, it being ſuppos'd that all the Planets have ſome government of the Forehead, it muſt follow, that every part of the Forehead, wherein any

Planet is placed, ſhould correſpond with the other Members, over wich the ſame Planet governs: And whereas the Moles, diſpers'd up and down ſeveral parts of the Body, are the certain marks of that ſympathy, it will be accordingly requiſite, that thoſe, which happen in the Forehead, ſhould denote others on all the Members govern'd by thoſe Stars. Now, it is clear, that they have not any correſpondence, but with thoſe on the Breaſt; And conſequently the Forehead muſt be ſubject only to that Planet, which commands the Breaſt. And whereas thoſe two, *viz.* the Forehead and Breaſt are the moſt bony parts of the whole Body, and that all the Bones are under the direction of *Saturn*, as we are taught by Aſtrology, it follows, that the ſaid Planet hath its particular ſeat in the Forehead.

But if that be not granted, this at leaſt will be very probable, that if there be any place more noble then another in the ſaid part, it muſt be that wherein the ſaid Star acts moſt powerfully, and in which it imprints the Lines, which are the effects and marks of its power. And in that caſe, the Line which is directly in the midſt of the Forehead belongs to *Saturn*, ſince the middle is as it were the centre and principle of the extremities.

From this Ratiocination, it may be deduc'd, that the Syſteme of the Phyſiognomiſt I ſpoke of before, is better grounded, then that of the ordinary *Metopoſcopy*, and that beſides the Line of *Saturn*, which is in the midſt of the Forehead, and that which ſeems to be moſt proper and natural thereto, all the others ſerve only to denote the rapports and aſpects, which there might be, between *Saturn*, and the other Planets.

But

But how ever the caſe ſtands, he attributed, to the ſaid Planet, thoſe lines, after a manner different from that which is commonly us'd. For he aſſign'd to *Mercury* that which is immediately under that of *Saturn*, and that above it, to *Mars*; the next to *Venus*, and the uppermoſt to *Jupiter*; and, on the loweſt, which are juſt over the Eye-brows, he placed the *Sun* and *Moon*. And according to the conſtitution which each of them had, he judg'd of the Aſpects, between *Saturn* and thoſe Planets, in the Horoſcope, which proceeding prov'd conſonant to the calculation of Judiciary Aſtrologie. So that, according to his judgment, all thoſe lines belong'd as much, or more, to *Saturn*, then to thoſe other Planets, and depriv'd him not of the abſolute government he ought to have of the Forehead.

Upon which account I cannot forbear affirming, that the ſaid perſon had ſo exact a knowledge of this Art, that he found in it certain Rules, whereby to diſcover the day and hour of the Nativity; And that I my ſelf, having made uſe thereof, fail'd not above ten times at the moſt, in an hundred judgments, that I made of it. Now, if the Science may arrive to that pitch, there is hardly any one but will conclude, that it will be able to make good its promiſes, in the diſcovery of things leſs obſcure and abſtruſe, ſuch as are the diſpoſitions of the noble parts, the Inclinations and manners of Men.

But to produce any other reaſons of all theſe particulars, then the experiences which the Art it ſelf hath thereof, is a thing not in the power of Philoſophy, which, it ſeems, hath been negligent in making ſuch Philoſophical obſervations as might have rendred the truth thereof more manifeſt. Let it not however be

account-

accounted an inconſiderable aſſiſtance, that ſhe hath given us ſome light, to diſcover, that ſome parts of the Face are under the direction of certain Planets. Let us now ſee, whether ſhe will help us, to ſhew, that *Jupiter* hath the government of the Cheeks.

Art. 9

That Jupiter *hath the government of the Cheeks.*

NOr will it be any hard matter for our ſaid Diſtreſs, Philoſophy, to ſatisfy us, that *Jupiter* hath the goverment of the Cheeks, if it be true, that the Liver is under his juriſdiction. For, as thoſe parts are the moſt fleſhie, and moſt ſanguine of any about the Face, and ſuch, as wherein the alterations of the Liver and Bloud are ſooneſt and moſt evidently apparent; ſo is there not any doubt to be made of it, but that they are under the ſame direction, as the other. Beſides that, the Moles, which are ſeen on the Cheeks, denote others on the Thighs, which have a correſpondency to the Cheeks, and are govern'd by the Sign *Sagittary*, wherein is the Houſe of *Jupiter*. For we have ſhewn in the precedent Diſcourſe of *Chiromancy*, that the Aſtrologers have learn'd of *Hippocrates*, to diſtribute the Veins to all the exteriour parts of man's body, according to the correſpondence, and ſympathy, there is between the ſaid parts.

Art.

Art. 10.

That Mercury *hath the like government over the Ears.*

THere is ſome difficulty to know, whether *Mercury* hath the government of the lips, as ſome affirm, or whether *Mars* hath the conduct thereof. But there is a greater probability, that the Ears are the parts govern'd by *Mercury*, in regard the Moles, to be ſeen on them, have others, correſpondent to them, on the Arms, between which and them there is a ſympathy. Now, it is a thing generally acknowledg'd in Aſtrology, that *Mercury* hath the government of the Arms, and that the Sign *Gemini*, wherein he hath eſtabliſh'd his principal Houſe and his exaltation, does alſo govern thoſe parts.

Art. 11.

That Mars *hath the government of the Lips.*

MOreover, there is correſpondence between the Lips and the Belly, and the Moles to be ſeen on the former denote others on the Latter, which is under the direction of *Mars*. Add to this, that the Lips are ulcerated in Tertian Fevers, which no doubt proceed from Choler, which is under the government of that Planet. And this is an obſervation, which deſerves to be exactly conſider'd in this place. For this ulceration being critical, and in a manner proper to

thoſe

those kinds of Fevers, it must needs be inferr'd, that there is a particular sympathy between the Lips, and the humour, which is the source of the disease, and that thence proceeds its fastning on that part, rather then any other whatsoever. I am,

SIR,

Your most humble, and

most affectionate Servant,

LA. CHAMBRE.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

What Judgment is to be made of Chiromancy and Metoposcopy.

WHat we have deliver'd in the two precedent Diſcourſes is all we can ſay upon a Subject which hath not yet come under the examination of Philoſophy. For though there have been ſome great Wits, who have addicted themſelves very much to the ſtudy of *Chiromancy* and *Metoposcopy*, yet is there not any one of them, that hath taken the pains to produce the leaſt reaſon, to maintain the principles thereof.

Not that I am abſolutely of opinion, that thoſe, which I have made uſe of, are ſuch as may ſatisfie either the expectation which ſome may have conceiv'd thereof, or yet the ſeverity which Philoſophy obſerves in theſe matters. To give them their juſt deſert, they are only conjectures and light preſumptions, but with this encouragement, that we muſt expect to run ſome hazard in the diſquiſition of natural things, ſince there are ſo few of them, wherein Demonſtrations and convincing proofs can find any place.

For, what advantages ſoever we may have in order to

to the diſcovery of man, we ſhall find it ſtill a work of ſo much delicacy, aud wherein there are ſo many ſeveral pieces to be conſider'd, that the number of thoſe we are ignorant of, very much exceeds that of thoſe which we know. And whereas he is in effect a little World, it may accordingly be affirm'd, that we are as little acquainted with the things which are abbreviated in him, as thoſe whereof the great World conſiſts, which are wholy conceal'd from our knowledge.

The Head is, no doubt, the Epitome of the whole Heaven; it hath its Conſtellations and Intelligences as well as the other. But if we obſerve the Stars, their ſituation and their motion, and yet not know what their Nature is, nor why they are ſo diſpos'd; the ſame thing may be ſaid of all the parts of the Face. For, not to ſpeak any thing of the figure of thoſe, which are the moſt conſiderable, the Lines that are in the Forehead, and about the Eyes; the ſtrokes and features which are of each ſide of the Noſe, and thoſe that compaſs the mouth, and a hundred other Lineaments, which diverſifie that Part, and make it unlike in all men; All this, I ſay, is eaſily diſcover'd, and as eaſily imagin'd, that Nature hath not done it without ſome deſign. But the manner, after which ſhe does it, and the end, whereto ſhe deſigns it, are not yet fully known: For the Obſervations which have been made upon that account, have made but a weak diſcovery thereof, the number of them being not conſiderable enough, nor they made with that ſtrictneſs and exactneſs they ought to have been. Nay, moſt of thoſe that are found in books are temerarious, and force the Science beyond its juſt limits. For it muſt be granted, that the greateſt ju-

riſdiction

riſdicton, that Metopoſcopy and Chiromancy can have, reaches no further, then to judge of the Diſpoſitions of the Body, and the natural Inclinations of the Soul, and that, if they pretend to the Confidence of Judicial Aſtrology, which would fain bring free and contingent actions under its Juriſdiction, they deſerve the ſame contempt, and are lyable to thoſe puniſhments, which Religion hath alwaies condemn'd the other to.

But if they keep within the limits we have aſſign'd them, it muſt be acknowledg'd, that there are ſome general reaſons very favourable to them, and ſuch as evidently ſhew, that there may be ſome truth in them. For it cannot be doubted, in the firſt place, but that the Stars act by vertues, which are differeht from Light, in as much as all the effects which they produce cannot be attributed only to that quality, and that there is a neceſſity of having a recourſe to to the Influences, to give a reaſon of the flowing of the Sea, and ſome diſeaſes, which, without all diſpute, follow the motion of the Moon. Secondly, it is as certain, that there are ſome parts of mans body, over which thoſe Stars have a particular government, and that ſince the Heart and Brain are of that order, in reſpect of the Sun and Moon, it is an invincible preſumption, that the other noble Parts are govern'd by the other Planets. And laſtly, that there is a connexion and correſpondence between thoſe parts, and ſome of the exteriour, whereto they ought to communicate the vertues and qualities, which they have received from the Stars.

Now, from theſe general Maxims, it follows, that there is a correſpondence and ſympathy between all the Parts of the Face and Hand, and the Interiour

Parts

parts of the Body, and the Planets, whereby they are governed; And consequently, that there is a possibility of discovering the Dispositions by those latter, and, consequently to that, the Inclinations, which accompany them, by the experience which hath been made of the nature and power which those Starrs have.

I know well enough, that the Enemies of Astrologie laugh at the particular vertues commonly attributed to them: But there is a certain mediocrity to be observ'd, between those, who deprive them of all, and those, who allow them too much. For no man should be so farr self-will'd, as quite to destroy their Influences, for the reason alleged by us; nor, on the other side, so credulous, as to grant them all those vertues, which the vanity of the Judicial part of the Science is so liberal as to give them. Though there be in it a thousand frivolous and ridiculous suppositions; yet may there be also derived from it some rational observations, which require a sincere acknowledgment. When it is taken into consideration, what Agriculture, the Art of Navigation, and Medicine affirm, of the Rising and Setting of the Starrs; When it is seen, that the Horoscope gives so exact a description of the Stature, the Temperament, and the humour of those whose Nativities are examin'd; would it not be an insupportable obstinacy, or rather a blindness of mind, out of pure willfulness, to contest against the vertue of the Starrs, upon which those judgments are made, and, without any reason, to oppose such experiences as have been observ'd an infinite number of times.

For my part, I am so distrustfull of the strength of Humane Understanding, and I find there are so few things in Nature, into which 'tis able to penetrate, that,

if

if Religion had not declar'd free actions to be exempted from all ſubjection to the power of the Starrs, I durſt not, upon the pure Ratiocination of Philoſophy, affirm the contrary. What! We are ignorant of that which we ought to know beſt? Nay, we are yet to learn what it is to *Think*, and know not *how* we think, and yet we ſhall have the temerity to regulate the power and influences of the greateſt, and moſt admirable Bodies that are in the World, and to preſume that thoſe are deceiv'd, who allow them more then we imagine they have?

It ſpeaks therefore greater prudence and moderation, to comply with the common opinion, which attributes, to thoſe Bodies, the direction and government of the principal parts of Man's body, as being ſuch as is confirm'd, by the many obſervations and experiences, which have been made thereof. But it muſt be done with this precaution however, that we ſuffer not our ſelves to be abus'd, by the conſequences which may be deduc'd from this Truth. For we muſt ſo look on it, as not to extend much beyond the principles and grounds of Chiromancy and Metopoſcopy; in as much as particular Rules, which have been built thereon, are either falſe, or uncertain. And indeed, it may confidently be affirm'd, that thoſe Rules which pretend to judge of free and contingent actions, are abſurd and criminal; And that thoſe others, which are limited, and levell'd onely to the diſcovery of corporeal diſpoſitions, are doubtful, as being not ſufficiently confirm'd, by juſt and exact obſervations.

It were therefore to be wiſh'd that ſome perſons had apply'd themſelves more ſeriouſly, then hath yet been done by any, to this curious diſquiſition, in as much as

it would possibly have furnished us with a fuller knowledge of that miraculous harmony which is observable among the parts of man's body, and gave the occasion of its being sometime call'd the *Miracle of Miracles*. Nay, it may be further presum'd, that the Science of Medicine, might have deriv'd some light, and assistance from it, in order to a more exact discovery of the dispositions of the interiour parts, and the making of more certain judgments of the success of Diseases. And lastly, *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* would also have made considerable advantages of such a disquisition, and would have inserted among its own Rules, such as those kinds of Sciences should have supply'd it withall: but with this caution on the other side, as not to permit those other things, which are not onely uncertain, and, upon their ill-groundedness, unmaintainable, but also cry'd down as vain and superstitious, to creep into a design so serious, and so solidly grounded, as that it pretends to. So that, instead of going so farr to find out the Signs, which may discover the Inclinations, the Motions of the Soul, Vertues and Vices, This contents it self with those, which are nearer hand, and more manifest, and such as may be deducible from sublunary Causes.

SECT. I.

Of the several parts which compleat THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

THe said Art then makes account to comprehend all the knowledge it may give, and the several dis-

diſcoveries it is to make, in Nine general Treatiſes; whereof,

The Firſt ſhall contain the Characters of the Paſſions, in two and twenty Chapters.

The Second, the Character of Vertues and Vices, in an hundred Chapters.

The Third, the Temperaments, in two and fifty Chapters.

The Fourth, the nature of thoſe living Creatures, which contribute any way to the Phyſiognomy, in twenty nine Chapters.

The Fifth ſhall treat of the Beauty of Man and Woman, in fifty Chapters.

The Sixth, of the Morality of ſeveral Nations, according to the Climates, in ſixty Chapters.

The Seventh, Of the Inclinations, proceeding from Age, Fortune, Courſe of Life, &c. *in twenty Chapters.*

The Eighth, Of Diſſimulation, and the ways how it may be diſcovered.

The Ninth, and laſt, ſhall ſet in order all the Signs which ſhall be deduc'd from theſe great ſources; ſhall ſhew, as it were, at the firſt ſight, thoſe, which ought to diſcover every Inclination in particular, every Motion of the Soul, every Vertue, and every Vice, and ſo compleat and give its utmoſt perfection to THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

CHAP. X.

What qualities are requiſite in that perſon, who would apply himſelf to THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

IF Antiquity had reaſon to ſay, That the caſe is the ſame with Sciences, as with Seeds, and Plants, which never bring forth any thing, if they meet not with a ſoil fit for them; it is certain, that there is not any, wherein that Truth may be more evident, then in thoſe Sciences, which pretend to Divination, as being ſuch as will become barren and of no advantage, if they meet not, in their minds who are deſirous to make uſe of them, with the diſpoſitions which are neceſſary thereto. Thence it is, that *Ptolemy* tells us, that it is not ſufficient to know the Rules and Maxims of them, and that if the Student have not the particular *Genius*, which thoſe Sciences require, he will never be able to make a rational judgment. So that before he exerciſe himſelf in THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, he ought to know, what that particular *Genius* is, whereof he ſtands in need, as alſo the Qualities he ſhould

ſhould be Maſter of, to make his advantage of that familiarity.

I ſhall not make the buſineſs more difficult then it is, nor bring in hither all the other Sciences, to keep this Art of ours company. I might ſay, that Medicine and Moral Philoſophy are particularly requiſite thereto; That treating of Climats, and the natures of ſeveral Animals, it cannot well be without Geography, and Natural Philoſophy; That treating further of the Proportions and Figure of parts, it it might ſeem not well able to do it, without Arithmetick and Geometry; And, in fine, that its judgments being grounded on a continual ratiocination, and one of its Rules deriving its name from *Syllogiſm*, it were requiſite, that he, who would apply himſelf thereto, ſhould be an excellent Logician. And no doubt, to proceed further in this conſideration, we may affirm, that there is not any Science, but may be made ſerviceable to this. But there is no neceſſity, that a Man ſhould go and conſult *Hippocrates*, *Ariſtotle*, *Euclid*, and *Ptolemy* to become a Proficient therein, and balking all thoſe ſtudies, that of the preſent work will, in my judgment, be ſufficient to learn It, and to make an advantageous uſe thereof.

But for this latter, I require in him, who would exerciſe himſelf therein, two things, which I cannot abſolutely teach him. One ſhall promote the good uſe he may make of this Science; and the other ſhall prevent his abuſing of it; as ſhall be deduc'd in the two next enſuing Articles.

Art.

Art. 1.

Of the Genius *requiſite, or in order to the exerciſe of this Art.*

OF thoſe two things, the former is the particular *Genius* we ſpoke of, under which denomination, I comprehend all the endowments and qualities, requiſite to this Art: For I diſſent from thoſe who derive it from the Starrs. It is a fantaſtick imagination of the Aſtrologers, to aſſign to every man two *Genius*'s ; one to have the preſidence of Life, and is ſuch as proceeds from the diſpoſition of the Heavens, at the time of the Nativity; the other, to preſide over the profeſſion, which the party is afterwards to follow, and that does not proceed from the general conſtitution of the Heavens, as the former, but from the particular diſpoſition of ſome certain Starrs, to which they aſſign the direction of the Art, and Profeſſion, which a man is to exerciſe, ; and theſe they affirm to be *Mars*, *Venus*, and *Mercury*, in the firſt, ſeventh, or tenth Houſe. And this is that they call the *Aſcendent*, of whoſe influence this *Genius* is the effect; This is that which the *Platoniſts* keep ſo much ſtirr about, and whoſe acquaintance and familiarity they ſo earneſtly endeavour to acquire. But theſe are no better then ridiculous and dangerous Viſions, which inſinuate a certain falſe repreſentation of thoſe Truths taught us by Theology, and ſuch as Faith and Philoſophy do juſtly condemn.

For my part, I am of Opinion, that we may ſay, of this *Genius*, what *Hippocrates* ſays of the good fortune

fortune of the Phyſician, that this latter proceeds not from any occult cauſe, which produces its effects without him, and contrary to his expectation, but is abſolutely the effect of his Abilities, and Conduct; And, in a word, that his Prudence makes his own good fortune, and his Patient's. For, without queſtion, the caſe is the ſame with the *Genius*, which is neceſſary for the Art we treat of. It is not ſome inviſible Dæmon, that illuminates the mind, by ſecret lights and guides, and directs it, in particular diſcoveries of this Science: But it is a juſt and exact application of its Rules, or rather that Prudence, which, putting the general Maximes in uſe, fitly applies them to particular Subjects.

Now, this Prudence proceeds partly from the Nativity, and party from Study and Exerciſe. From the Nativity do proceed the natural Qualities and Endowments of the Mind, requiſite for the exerciſe of a Habit. This is properly the Εὐφυΐα of the *Greeks*, whichich we may call *good* or *fortunate Diſcent*, whereof, as *Plato* affirms, there are three kinds; one, proper to Sciences; another, to Manners; and the laſt, to Arts, ſuch as is that, which *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* does require.

Art. 2.

Of the natural Qualities which are requiſite for the exerciſe of this Art.

THE natural Qualities of the Mind, neceſſary in order to the exerciſe of this Art, are ſtrength of Imagination, and ſoundneſs of Judgment. For, though Memory be alſo requiſite therein, in regard

there is a neceſſity of remembring many Precepts, a great number of Signs, and the connexion and correſpondence of many things, whereof this Art is full; yet is it certain, that the greateſt burthen lies upon the Imagination and the Judgment. For a man muſt, of a ſudden, frame to himſelf ſeveral Images; he muſt obſerve divers conformable and diſconformable Signs, and afterwards make a compariſon between the one and the other, to diſtinguiſh the ſtronger from the weaker; in which operation, it is out of all doubt, that the Underſtanding and the Judgment are more put to it, than the memory, which hath made its proviſion long before, whereas the others are haſtily ſet on work, and not allow'd the leiſure to prepare themſelves for it.

But to theſe natural Qualities there are yet two other things to be added, Method, and Exerciſe: For the latter brings a man to a certain facility of judging well, which cannot be acquir'd by any other means, and creates a kind of confidence, which may be interpreted an Enthuſiaſm and Divine Diſtraction or Fury in theſe Sciences.

Art. 3.

Of the Method, neceſſary in order to the Exerciſe of this Art.

THe Method we ſpoke of, conſiſts in certain general Rules, which are to be obſerv'd in order to the making of a more infallible judgment. We ſhall here ſet down thoſe we conceive the moſt conſiderable.

The

The First is, That our Artiſt ought very carefully to examine the Signs, which proceed from the external cauſes, which of them are tranſient, and which are common, and not to make any judgment by them.

The Second, One ſingle Sign is not to be thought ſufficient to make a judgment of the Inclinations and Habits; but it is requiſite there ſhould be more. For it is imprudence, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, to give credit to one ſingle mark: Ἑνὶ σημείῳ μὴ δεῖν τῶν σημείων δύνασις.

The Third. When there happen to be contrary Signs, it is requiſite a particular Obſervation be made of the ſtronger, and the judgment is to proceed according to them. Now, we have given an account of the ſtrength and weakneſs of Signs, in the Second Chapter of this Second Book.

The Fourth. Our Artiſt is, above all things, to conſider the Temperament of the perſon, whoſe humour he would diſcover, and uſe it as a Rule whereby he is to meaſure all the other Signs. For, being the preſent and inſeparable inſtrument of the Soul, it fortifies, or weakens, the other Signs, proportionably to its conformity or oppoſition thereto.

The Fifth. It is further requiſite, that he ſtrictly examine the ſtrength or weakneſs of the party's mind; for both theſe have a great influence over the paſſions and habits, in as much as moſt of the paſſions are rais'd in the Soul, for want of knowing the cauſes thereof. It is poſſible one may conceive himſelf injur'd, when there is not any injury done him; and ſome other may be ſeiz'd by an apprehenſion, who hath no cauſe to fear. So that upon ſuch occaſions, weakneſs of mind is the cauſe of thoſe emotions, as, on the other ſide, ſoundneſs of judgment ſmother them.

The

The Sixth. Whereas it is poſsible, that vicious Inclinations may be reform'd by ſtudy, and bad education may alter & corrupt the good, it concerns the Artiſt to add, as much as may be, the Moral marks, to the Natural, and endeavour to diſcover by the Words and Actions of the perſon, whoſe humour he would be acquainted with, whether he follows his Inclinations, or hath reform'd them.

Art. 4.

Of the Moderation of Spirit, indiſpenſibly requiſite in the Study of this Art.

NOw, whereas all theſe Rules, and all theſe Obſervations, are very hard to be reduc'd to practice, it muſt be laid down as a thing certain, that it is very eaſie to make many temerarious judgments thereby, and to abuſe this art, if great care be not taken. Therefore among all the Qualities, requiſite in the perſon, who is deſirous to ſtudy it, I wiſh him particularly *Moderation of Spirit*, that he may not be partial or præcipitate in his judgments, and, above all things, not to make any to the diſadvantage of others, but in the ſecret cloſet of his own Heart, ſo as that neither his Tongue, nor their Ears may be witneſſes thereof. Otherwiſe Religion and Prudence would not permit the exerciſe of this noble Science, and, in ſtead of being neceſſary and ſerviceable to Society, it would become its greateſt Enemy.

FINIS.

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